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AN

ESSAY

ON

IMMORTALITY.

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ON
IMMORTALITY.

"Now my co-mates, and brothers in exile,
Hath not old custom made this life more sweet
Than that of painted pomp?—Are not these woods
More free from peril than the envious court?

* * * * *

Sweet are the uses of adversity;
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head:
And this our life, exempt from public haunt,
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in every thing."

John Pearn

BY THE AUTHOR OF A REVIEW OF FIRST PRINCIPLES OF BISHOP
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PREFACE.

THE subject of the following speculation, is the MORAL ARGUMENT for the immortality of man.

The popular moral argument in favor of a future state, is grounded on the *unequal distribution of HUMAN happiness*; and, with regard to it, the following remarks appear to be warranted.

FIRST,—That it is *not progressive*; or, does not encrease in strength, with the general encrease of knowledge.

SECONDLY,—That, though it is encouraging to a considerable degree, it is yet, however, open to sceptical objections of some weight; to overcome which must be highly desirable.

THIRDLY,—That ANY moral argument in favor of a future state, can be good ONLY upon the supposition of A GOOD GOVERNOR of the World: but the one in question (be-

sides the last mentioned defect) grounds its hope upon HUMAN MISERY; which fact, of human misery, serves the SCEPTIC, and the ATHEIST, with their strongest objection against the supposition of any good Governor.

Thus, the existing moral argument, drawn from the *Human Species*, is not only defective in the eyes of some of those who profess to believe in a Deity; but, what is worse, the stronger it pleads its own cause, the stronger it urges the objection of the ATHEIST, and so defeats its own purpose whenever it attempts to eradicate infidelity.

Over and above these specified defects in the existing argument, I suppose, on general ground, that it must be in the highest degree estimable, had we any well founded advance made in the subject.

What circumstances have led me to presume in the matter; and whether any advance has been made; will appear in the Sequel.

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SECTION FIRST.

THE PRELIMINARY GENERAL ARGUMENT.

THE speculation now offered to the reader, is entertained owing to an apprehension that *the ordinary moral argument* in favor of a future state is not near so general or philosophical as *the Nature of things* seems capable to admit.

If this conception be well founded, it becomes the more important, considering that the *usual field* of speculation on this subject, does not appear to promise any stronger indication than what has been long and popularly recognised; and considering also,

that while the growth of moral evidence seems thus UNPROGRESSIVE, it certainly has not hitherto produced either a general unanimity of opinion among men, or even a sufficiently *confident reliance* in all those who incline to rest upon it.

"MAN IS BORN UNTO TROUBLE AS THE FLAME FLIES UPWARD."—This much worn truth has been registered in the bosoms of a long succession of human millions, and has been often and pathetically the theme of the best and wisest men in every age. But though the fact is so generally acknowledged, as to be equally beyond contest and above illustration, it is not to be asserted without a grateful acknowledgment, that there is also much good in human life.—There is indeed so much good already diffused among mankind, and so much more appears possibly attainable, that, upon a view of the whole *species*, (which we are to remark, is *the most extensive view usually*

taken) perhaps we cannot form any reasonable expectation of a future state, but are left in all the darkness of ignorance.

The prospect being thus obscure upon the last mentioned general ground, men have naturally been determined to what appears the next prominent consideration ; and this is found to be the INEQUALITY with which the whole sum of existing human good is divided among the individuals of our species.—This last indeed is a very striking truth, which comes home to every bosom ; and perhaps no persuasion arises more naturally, than that an intelligent and good GOVERNOR of the world, would not permit the injustice, or the hardships, which fall upon the innocent and the virtuous, without making some provision for the sufferers.

But reasonable as this opinion may seem, there arises, from THE NATURE OF THINGS, a consideration which may somewhat discountenance it. The evil in question, though

very hard, and indeed very extensive, is however but *a partial consideration*: and such is the utility of GENERAL LAWS in Nature, that it may be supposed fit, that individuals should be liable to suffer *accidental ills* involved by *these causes of general good*, even though no after provision were made for the sufferers.——It is obvious, that to make good and evil fall *presently* upon desert, there would need be a continual succession of violations of general laws, or a confusion, the consequences of which are incalculable; and from this consideration, many persons may incline to fear, that we have no very strong ground of hope from the INEQUALITY of *human happiness*, any more than from the state of *the SPECIES upon the whole*.

ONE thing, at any rate, is here very manifest, which is, that whatever strength the last mentioned argument really possesses, (and though I consider it very encouraging even by itself) we must confess it rests wholly

upon *particulars* and *accidentals*, not upon *ESSENTIALS*. Therefore, though it should be considered good, so far as it goes, *it does not extend to such a base as lies beyond the objection drawn from THE UTILITY OF GENERAL LAWS.*—Now it is in consequence of marking this *NARROWNESS* of the ordinary foundation, that I am led to propose here a very different field, which, in the course of some experience, has appeared to me as affording a comparison of much more general extent.

In entering upon the preparatory discussion, it may not be amiss to state, that the subject before us is intended to come home to every class of readers, and will contain nothing but what I trust may be both understood and appreciated by all; unless indeed it may be a very little of what is now immediately to follow in this preliminary part. The ordinary reader, or thinker, therefore may consider himself qualified as

a juror, in regard of the *general fact* that is herein to be illustrated by a variety of particulars, which he may compare with his own experience: and we will respectfully look to the learned to sanction the principle upon which its *application* is grounded.— This notice, I confess, is entered here, to prevent some readers from being alarmed at the very little there is which wears the uninviting aspect of metaphysical speculation. But, to resume.

The general laws of Nature just now mentioned, are not all of ONE SYSTEM, but of several, which differ vastly in their *nature*: therefore, without speculating upon the continual interruption, or confusion, of any of these, we may compare them, that is to say, one system with another, and draw reasonable inferences, or opinions, therefrom.

For this last mentioned purpose, the first or greatest distinction to be made, seems to be, that of TWO SYSTEMS OF LAWS *in Nature*,

which are, the laws of BODY, and the laws of MIND.—These two we know, differ most essentially; and it is to the MENTAL CODE that we owe all those moral evils, whose amount makes such a vast sum, in addition to the sum of *natural evils*. Besides this, a great part of *natural evil* itself is MENTAL, being comprised in the provinces of *foresight* and *retrospect*.—And farther, of that part of natural evil which originates with *body*, (inanimate and animate) *a part* may perhaps be likewise referred to *mental laws*.—*Thus we see how very great is the TOTAL AMOUNT of human miseries arising, one way or another, from THE LAWS OF MIND.*

But if now we turn, and contemplate MENTAL LAWS, we shall be presented with the view of a very grand provision in them, to which there is no arrangement in *the laws of body* that bear any parallel, or analogy. ——The laws of BODY are *the same to all known bodies*.—But the laws of MIND are *not*

the same to all known minds.—The number of minds which sensibly occupy this Earth are of TWO KINDS, or, are governed by TWO VERY DIFFERENT CODES OF LAWS, which may, upon inquiry, be found productive of *as different degrees of HAPPINESS* to their respective subjects.

Now, upon the first blush, this difference must be confessed highly remarkable.—The very existence of TWO ORDERS OF MINDS, indicates two final causes as widely different as the codes which govern them: and, besides this first conjecture arising from such *difference in STRUCTURE*, we seem to be strongly invited to compare the present *earthly HAPPINESS* arising from each, and draw farther conjectures from the result.— But we seem to be still more strongly solicited to this by observing, that there is NO SUCH DIVERSITY of systems in the vast fabrick of INANIMATE CREATION.

MAN forms only ONE ORDER, in a count-

less variety of *sensitive beings* which enliven this Earth : and, while he stands thus peculiar in the endowment of **MORAL REASON**, it is grandly significant, that all the innumerable other sorts of animal life form together but **ONE ORDER** : they are all very closely associated links of **ONE CHAIN** ; nor is there any intermediate link, betwixt them and us, to confound our distinct reasonings upon each.

Animal man, indeed, is usually treated in the relation which his organic structure bears to those of other animals, and he is therein considered as a proper *link* in one continued chain of animate beings.—Upon this classification I think Lord *Bolingbroke* coolly remarks to the following effect ; that it would not obtain, were it not that men differ from brutes more in the structure of their bodies, than their minds. But, though indeed there is a similarity in *some features* of mental structure, (which obviously is re-

quisite for the common property of *animal existence*,) we may very safely assert that the above mentioned classification is preposterous, or absurd in regard of the subject now in hand.

The structure of the human mind, (as known by its various operations) *differs immensely* from that of the highest brute: and this not in degree only, but in KIND. And besides this, the TWO ORDERS of *minds* differ no less remarkably in another grand point, which is, that INSTINCTIVE BEINGS are infinitely various, and *are formed upon A GRADUATED SCALE*, while, on the contrary, *all human minds are of one equal structure*.

With regard to the *essential difference* between the TWO ORDERS of minds, it may be sufficient here to notice two or three provinces of human mental operation.—Let us take but MORAL COGITATION, and the RELATIONS OF SENSIBLE THINGS. There are no offices in any *instinctive mind*, which corre-

spond to these.—But if we farther take, the conception, and contemplation, of *an invisible order* of things, *a CREATOR*, and an **HERE-AFTER**, we must be satisfied that no instinctive mind is formed for any such operations.

—Will any man, then, attempt to hook the **RATIONAL code** upon the **INSTINCTIVE one**, and pronounce them *two links of one chain*, that is, in effect, **ONE CODE** of mental laws?

From even so instantaneous a glance at the two **STRUCTURES**, it must appear highly evident, that when **GOD** made **MAN**, he did not intend him for a *head link of mere ANIMAL LIFE*; for, in that case, we might have been *included in the INSTINCTIVE CODE*, and thus *divested* of very important *mental offices which affect the HAPPINESS of mere animal existence*.—Contrary to this, man was made not merely a different *animal*; but *a different ORDER of MINDS*; insomuch, that the grand *instinctive code*, though it embraces *innumerable different gradations of minds*, could not

serve for him, and a far more noble and extensive SYSTEM of laws exists for his peculiar government.—Of this system it may be enough to say, here, that embracing man's possible attainments, it comprehends his KNOWLEDGE, his ELECTIONS,—and his ACTS; and, *that it appears to be an institution made in direct correspondence with THE GENERAL NATURE OF THINGS*, a correspondence which is certainly very different from that which brutes can have with the external world, and therefore, even of itself considered apart from our present subject, highly flattering to our hope of permanent existence.

Here then is a most extensive, and I suppose a truly philosophical field of comparison; and instead of being limited to compare the *accidental miseries* of one man, with the *accidental happiness* of another, (both individuals of one order, and liable to the accidents involved by the general laws which regulate this order,) the inquirer is now called

to attend to what is more GENERAL, or ESSENTIAL.—He will therefore turn from comparing *human nature with itself*, and proceed to contrast ONE KIND of *minds* with another KIND, in regard of the HAPPINESS resulting in *this life* from the constitution of each. And if upon so doing it be found, that the advantage lies with INSTINCTIVE LIFE, then every one who believes in the existence of a good GOVERNOR of the world, must take HIS GOODNESS as their *sure pledge* that he would not have laid the greater load of miseries upon the far nobler ORDER of beings, had these beings been intended for no other than a mere earthly existence.

Perhaps no man could reasonably desire a stronger indication than such. But, we are never to overlook that highly encouraging collateral fact which wants no proof, that the human mind is formed to take continued delight in contemplating the endless works of its great CREATOR;—that, if it were

united to a vehicle whose demands were less mean, it might be continually blest by such employments as we must suppose befitting angels ;—and, in short, that REASON, if less fit for this life, is far more fit for a higher sphere of action than that we now occupy.

From what has now been advanced, it will appear to be my opinion, that we really possess such very reasonable ground of expectation, as this extended field of comparison can contain. To show that we do so, is indeed the object of the present undertaking ; and the subsequent sections of the Essay are intended to illustrate or prove the *general fact*, by a variety of particulars.—If this view of the subject is an unusual one, it will however be naturally accounted for, by stating the circumstances which gave rise to my taking it up, these being perhaps equally unusual.—Accident, which brings us upon so many new truths and opinions, has subjected to my actual observation in various parts of

the world, a pretty extensive view of *free animal life*, under circumstances certainly very favourable to such a comparison as we are now considering.—Had this experience been limited to any one district or country, I think it probable, it might not have led me to a serious comparison, any more than such an extent of observation seems to do with people in general : but the local diversity of situations in which the facts have come under my view, has awakened the consideration of GENERALITY in this matter ; and the extent of the whole has impressed my imagination much more deeply, than I think is likely to follow upon a man's *observing* only a small part of animal nature, and *reading accounts of all the other parts*.—If this be not admitted to give any pretension to the subject, I freely confess I have none that is higher: and, as it has been openly avowed that accident, (or at least other pursuits than the one in question) led me into

the situations which afforded this solitary advantage, it obviously lays claim to no merit, therefore the mention of it must be considered no boast.—The only merit claimed, is in the endeavour to make what I consider to be; a very important and beneficial APPLICATION of the facts which accident has thrown in my way.——To this it may be proper to add, that I have not made the application, or embraced the conclusions which will appear in the sequel, without seriously weighing the evidence, and considering its principal bearings, to the best of my judgment: neither should I have rested satisfied in this, so long as I investigated the subject by my own sole reflection; but, trust I may be so, since it will appear, that my view, however unusual, is far from being singular, or unsupported.

As the simplest outline of the principle upon which the general argument is grounded, |

I begin by siding with those writers who, in treating the subject by the separate light of Nature, consider man to be in *a state of probation*:—To which we must, of course, add that he is also in a condition of *frail, organic, animal existence*.—In this case, therefore, a portion of *natural evil* must be thought fit and unavoidable, and *moral evil* is unavoidably permitted as being *involved* by the *accountable agency of man*. But, I have already remarked, that a great proportion of **HUMAN natural evil** is **MENTAL**, especially as arising in *foresight* and *retrospect*; and therefore *it* (as well as moral evil,) is *chargeable to the endowment called REASON*.

—Now *when to the whole of MORAL evil* (corporeal and mental) is added that *moiety* of **NATURAL evil** which flows from **REASON** excited by natural agents, it makes the *sum total of RATIONAL ills*, beyond all proportion, *greater than our mere ANIMAL ills*.—So great indeed seems the excess here, that if

we strike off all the various evils arising from reason ; and thus reduce man's mind to an equality of thinking with that of AN INSTINCTIVE ANIMAL *of the middling degree* ; we shall find by very far the greater part of the whole burden of HUMAN miseries thrown away.

—If this were done, the question that would then remain would be, as to the catalogue of HUMAN PLEASURES *thereby lost*, and those *retained*. And herein, I imagine, and shall endeavour to show, we should *retain* those which the mass of mankind, *by the undeniable test of their constant practice*, prove to be the most *solid, sweet, or desireable*.

But the gift of rationality is not therefore the less noble, or desirable, though its earthly effects appear thus unhappy ; it could be so considered *only*, if supposed the endowment of *a mere earthly being*.—If man's estate is that of probation, then, *moral elections*—and *a knowledge or contemplation of past and future*,—seem absolutely necessary

to his trial.—But *these two* last are the grand sources of *almost the whole* mass of human miseries: and, since without them we could not so much as argue our *eligibility* for a future state, the evils that flow from them appear *desirable*, even upon the very lowest estimate.—The highest estimate, on the other hand, affords far more than a bare *eligibility in the structure of our minds*; for, beyond this, it would appear that the grand aggregate of actual human sufferings (natural and moral, corporeal and intellectual) is vastly greater than is good, or than *need have been*, for *a mere earthly existence*:—But the grand consideration of all, in the present argument is, that we are not here left to doubtful conjecture, or to an unphilosophical speculation upon an unexampled state of existence; for, if the following induction be established, *we have actual evidence in proof*, by the very different state of *a different ORDER of beings, existing in*

Nature before our eyes, as examples of animal happiness which GOD might have bestowed upon man, in an equal, or a somewhat greater degree, had HE not, for some high purpose, judged fit to bestow upon us the GIFT OF REASON.—This gift has been bestowed, and has produced correspondent effects on our *present happiness*: therefore this last evidence leaves us no room to doubt of the DESIGN of creating rational beings here; —and HUMAN SUFFERINGS, COMPARED WITH INSTINCTIVE LIFE, thus become to us the SIGN.—The MORAL PLEDGE *in the goodness of GOD*, that our earthly state is burdened with great evil, only *as preparatory for a far GREATER GOOD.*

Thus we find, the same GIFT OF REASON, which brings to us, by *two grand sources*, a vast tide of various evils, contains *also the source of HOPE*,—that is, of a rational expectation which much more than counterpoises all the miseries we suffer, and leaves the pre-

ponderance on the side of happiness, even here; — a satisfactory reliance, which we gain, by a due exercise of this same reason, upon the phenomena of sensitive Nature; *not confined to views of our own species*, (which at the greatest can be *but particular*) but more philosophically extended to *the full scale* of known animal existences.

As I am not aware that any one has preceded me in the same extent of view; and certainly it is a field which has not yet been cultivated, so as to produce a beneficial or *popular argument* in favor of a future state; I might justly fear the magnitude of the attempt, especially since the subject has in all ages occupied the attention of mankind, and is one in what the *means of a moral argument* may have been considered as almost equally efficient at all times. But, fortunately, while there appear various and powerful reasons why *the great comparative fact*, here-

in, has been *overlooked*, *in ordinary*;—and still stronger reasons why it has *not been applied* by the *philosophic few* who have noticed it; (two important considerations which I shall have occasion to treat) it will at least be manifested that I do not stand alone as to *the fact*.

Complaints against the *actual evils of rationality* are almost innumerable: but these can only make up *a side* of the question. They can lead to no conclusion.—It is the *comparative fact* alone that must determine us. But now, in regard of this last, a concurrence, or rather an anticipation of my opinion, is to be found in authors of the highest rank of moral, intellectual, and literary reputation; an agreement which doubtless will place my ground above many trifling cavils which otherwise possibly might be started by persons of limited views; and which, therefore, I shall place in front of my position.—The extracts from these, which

will be placed before the reader, will, I trust, be fully sufficient to satisfy him (if he be unwilling to judge for himself) that my views are not singular, nor taken upon slight ground.—At the same time it may be farther satisfactory to him, as it is to me, to know that I could not have been *biassed* by these authorities, because I was unacquainted with them when my own opinion was originally formed.—In stating this, however, I would not omit to confess, with due respect to those great names, that such an agreement affords me a confidence, which no man ought to have in his own single judgment, especially on a point of such deep and general interest to his species.

In referring to authority, perhaps, I could not begin more unexceptionably, than with the sentiments of *Archbishop King*, in concurrence with those of his illustrious commentator, *Mr. Law*, afterwards *Bishop of Carlisle*.—The main object of the “*Essay*

on the Origin of Evil,” is to account for Evil, consistently with the wisdom and goodness of GOD: Therefore, the greater the proportion of human misery, the more difficult must have been the author’s undertaking.—In the progress of the work, we accordingly find, it was a great object to argue *the good of reason*, and even *a good above reason*. And, upon the whole, we can have no doubt, that every thing therein either expressed, or implied, to the disadvantage of *human life*, was yielded with caution, and with real reluctance, as was equally requisite for the success, and becoming the high office, of the writer.—We are at the same time to remember, that the general concurrence of his commentator renders this a two-fold authority of the most desirable kind.

Now Archbishop King had so little to say, positively, in favor of the *gift of reason*, that he assumed and laboured at large to prove, that man has *a power* which would seem to

me as if *independent on REASON*; that is, a power of "*being pleased with objects only because he chooses them.*"—Among the various illustrations of the nature of this wonderful gift, he says, (Oct. Edit. 3 : Page 338) "Since this power is supposed of such a nature as can please itself, in its act, wherever it can exert that act it can also please itself even in opposition to the natural appetites, the senses and reason."—Again, in Page 346 he goes on thus, "I think it is evident that God has given us a principle of this kind, and that our Will is only determined by itself. They are mistaken therefore who affirm that either the appetites, passions, or understanding, determine elections."

Farther on, Page 388, the author sums up thus, "For in the sixth place, it is most manifest that *the greatest good, and that whereby man excels other animals,* is owing to liberty. By the assistance of this we rise above fate, and when attacked from with-

“out by adverse fortune, we find our happiness within ourselves. Other animals have nothing to oppose to a distemper, death, or pain; nothing to delight themselves in except sleep, food, and the appetite of propagating their species. But a free agent in the midst of pains and torments, of hunger and thirst, nay death itself, has where-withal to please itself, and to blunt the edge of all these evils.”

Now for my own part, I have deeply to lament that I possess no such power of making myself happy as that here described, except it be in the *hope of futurity*; which, be it observed, I did not *first elect* without reason, and *afterward cherish because I chose it*; but only hope it, *because my reason makes me expect it is some sweet or happy state*.—The object, however, of quoting this passage, is to make it highly evident to all those who, like me, *have not this power of making themselves happy in spite of “the senses and reason”*,

that the learned and dignified author would not have resorted to such an *extraordinary source* of human happiness, had it been within the powers of sense and reason, taken together, to render our state sufficiently overbalanced by good *in this life*.

Besides this unwilling virtual admission of our author, and the *general concurrence* of his translator, we find *the latter* express to the point in question. For in Page 210, where the author says, “God produced all things “out of nothing, and gave us being without “our advice; he seems therefore obliged in “justice not to suffer us to be reduced to a “state that is worse than nonentity,” the translator adds,

“It would be so indeed if this were our only state: but “as it is at present, I fear many have nothing but the hopes “and expectations of another to support them under almost “complete misery; to comfort and encourage them to un- “dergo evils infinitely greater than all the benefits of life: “Evils which make life itself an evil, and (as our author “says) put them into a state worse than nonentity.”

We have already seen that, in Page 388,

the good Archbishop draws a sort of brief comparison between the estates of man and beasts, wherein he limits the happiness of the latter to "*sleep, food,*" and such "*appetites,*"

— Now I apprehend it will abundantly appear, from men's practice, that the *great mass* of mankind do, and ever will, "*elect*" THESE gratifications among their most solid pleasures.—But farther, I must observe, the comparison was in this instance sorely strained, to help mankind to a vantage ground.—The fact really is, that though brutes enjoy the *sensual pleasures* in an extent vastly beyond us, these are *not their only*, nor perhaps their greatest pleasures. Besides the very remarkable contrast which may be noticed, that most of the innumerable tribes of *brutes* have a particular kind of food *choicely suited to their taste*, while the mass of men, in most countries, fare upon things which *they find coarse, and often disgusting*; Besides this, I say, we find a great

proportion of brutes continually wantoning on earth, in air, and in water, in various delightful ways which man would fain imitate, but never can accomplish.—The pleasures which brutes thus take, are partly sensual, and *partly mental*; for there is no doubt they enjoy the *society and converse* of their own kind: But far beyond this, *their courtships, their sympathies, their fidelities*, often through *a long course of years*, and *their exemplary discharge of domestic duties*, evince *their high gratification* in those acts.—To whatever structure of mind we choose to refer these observances, we must confess they display examples of happiness therein, which the greater number of human beings cannot reach.—This, however, is not the place for me to enumerate, or describe, the round of instinctive pleasures.

The gentle charge of partiality which I have here made against my author is, in effect, confessed by himself in Page 184, where,

not having the cause of *reason* then immediately in his eye; and being to consider only the good of creating *brute animals*; he says, “The common objection then is of no force, “viz. that inanimate matter might have been “prepared for this use (*food*); for ‘tis better “that it should be animated; especially as “such animals are ignorant of futurity, and “are neither conscious nor solicitous about “their being made for this purpose. So that “so long as they live, they enjoy themselves “without anxiety; at least they rejoice in the “present good, and are neither tormented with “the remembrance of what is past, nor the fear “of what is to come; and lastly, are killed “with less pain than they would be by dis-“temper, or old age.”

In this passage we have a compensation for what he says in page 388, by a few leading features of instinctive happiness sketched to the truth of life, though indeed but a few, compared with the whole. Yet how much

it says in few words — “*so long as they live “they enjoy themselves without anxiety.”*”— Why, if this be the case, it cannot matter whether the *number* of their pleasures be great or small; though I shall have to show they are far more *numerous*, or various, than the author has here supposed them to be.

Enough, I trust, has appeared, since *Archbishop King* has so deplorably found, that human sense and reason, taken together, *do not afford us “that greatest good whereby man excels other animals;*” but, that we must search for it in his “*power of elections:*”— and since the *Bishop of Carlisle* freely confesses, our state would be, to many, *worse than nonentity, “were it our only estate.”*

But to conclude, of these high authorities, I shall here quote one other remark.—In page 199 it is said, “*Hence Childhood, blessed “with the simple enjoyment of good things and “void of care, becomes more pleasant to us than “any other age.*”—Now this express and de-

cisive acknowledgment amounts to the following ; that *man*, (if he be but fed and comforted,) is most happy during that stage of life when he has *least exercise of reason* ; which, in other words, is when *he most resembles an instinctive animal*. That this is the truth I agree ; and now let us see what this strictly amounts to according to Archbishop King himself, in general concurrence with the Bishop of Carlisle.—We know that the pleasures of a child are *fewer*, and far *more limited in extent*, than the pleasures of many tribes of brutes : therefore, according to our author, **MAN**, if provided and cherished, is most happy during that part of his life, *when he cannot possess so many, nor so extensive pleasures, as are enjoyed by several INSTINCTIVE TRIBES*.—That this last conclusion is by no means strained, I leave to the judgment of the impartial reader.

The next authority I think proper to appeal to, is that of *Dr. Tillotson*.—This

learned author in his discourse concerning the Immortality of the Soul, is very full upon the subject of human miseries, and of *the inequality of human happiness*. He considers this last as one of the strongest arguments we have for the soul's immortality; and expresses his reason thus. “The sum
“of this argument which I have thus largely
“dilated upon, because I look upon it as one
“of the most strong and convincing of the
“soul’s immortality, is this: that the justice
“of God’s providence cannot sufficiently be
“vindicated, but upon the supposal of this
“principle of the soul’s Immortality: where-
“as if this principle be admitted, that men
“pass out of this life into an eternal state of
“Happiness or Misery, according as they
“have behaved themselves in this world;
“then the account of the unequal providen-
“ces of God in this world is easy.”—That
the argument is the strongest we can derive
from any view of *our own species*, must be

very generally felt: But Dr. Tillotson goes farther, and agrees with me, to look a little beyond *our own species*.—In the following passage he draws a brief comparison between our earthly state and that of lower animals; and finds that *the advantage, in this life, lies with brutes*.—“The condition of “men in this present life, is attended with “so many frailties, liable to so many miseries “and sufferings, to so many pains and dis- “eases, to such various causes of sorrow and “trouble, of fear and vexation, by reason of “the many hazards and uncertainties which “not only the comforts and contentments of “our lives, but even life itself is liable to, “that the pleasure and happiness of it is by “these very much rebated; so that were not “men trained on with the hopes of some- “thing better hereafter, life itself would be “to many men an insupportable burden; if “men were not supported and born up un- “der the anxieties of this present life with

“the hopes and expectations of a happier
“state in another world, mankind would be
“the most imperfect and unhappy part of
“God’s creation. For although other crea-
“tures be subjected to a great deal of vanity
“and misery, yet they have this happiness,
“that as they are made for a short duration
“and continuance, so they are only affected
“with the present, they do not fret and dis-
“content themselves about the future, they
“are not liable to be cheated with hopes,
“nor tormented with fears, nor vexed at dis-
“appointments, as the sons of men are.”

This expresses enough: and the reasons why such comparisons and conclusions as the above mentioned, (being once made,) have not led to a more extensive investigation and proportionate inference in result, will be matter for our consideration farther on.

We will next take the sentiments of *Arch-deacon Paley*.—He glances but slightly at

the *comparative fact*; but what he does say, is no less than this, that though “the average “of sensations, the plurality, and the pre-“ponderancy, is in favor of happiness by a “vast excess,” —— “in our own species, “perhaps the assertion may be more ques-“tionable than in any other.” —— Now this last remark, by an admired moral philosopher, in the happiest nation and happiest age that have been produced by all the growth and powers of civilization, may well awaken the attention of men, to *that hope* which is indicated by the *comparison* I am now making; a comparison which we here see, has, in other hands, proved so mortifying to *the earthly pride of man*.

But the writer who perhaps goes most pointedly into the comparative fact, is *Mr. Wollaston*. —— In his *Religion of Nature* delineated, at the latter part, (Sect. 9. Page 210, 211,) he says, “There are other argu-“ments for the immortality of the soul, *two*

“of which I shall leave with you, to be at
“your leisure pondered well. The *one* is
“that if the souls of men are mortal (extin-
“guished at death) the pleasures of brutes,
“though but sensual, are more sincere, being
“pall’d or diminished by no diverting consi-
“deration; they go *wholly* into them, and
“when they have them not they seem less to
“want them, not thinking of them. Their
“*sufferings* are attended with no reflection.
“They are void of cares, and are under no
“apprehensions for families and posterity,
“&c. &c.”——This passage goes on some-
way farther in the same strain, and, consider-
ing I had never seen the author’s book
when my own views were formed, our sen-
timents are remarkably similar, as will far-
ther appear in the illustrative Sections of this
Essay.

The difference between *Mr. Wollaston’s*
view of the subject, and that I am now tak-
ing, lies in its *extent* and *estimation*.——He

does not advance his argument from brutes, as a leading feature, or even as a prominent one, at all; but, brings it in at the close of his book, as a make-weight or auxiliary consideration, and, consequently, *as of inferior importance, in its nature*, to the argument drawn from the *human species alone*.—

The same remark may be applied to the other authorities herein mentioned, and to all, so far as I know, who have cast this way. Though they have been struck by the *fact itself*, and have mentioned it, *off hand*, they do not appear to have noticed its greater philosophical value, that is to say, *its superior nature*, as being an argument from *ESSENTIALS*; while the miseries of human individuals afford only an argument from mere *involved particulars*.—But, as has already been hinted, I apprehend there may be found sufficient reasons why men have not gone farther into this field; and these will be submitted to the reader in their proper place.

The authorities which have already been quoted, will, I trust, be considered fully satisfactory, without swelling the number.—They are not the sentiments of *atheists, sceptics, or malcontents*; but of persons of exalted rank and character, in every point of view which affects our subject.—These persons must be admitted to have considered the matter profoundly, and with every disposition to think the work of Creation good upon the whole, and every part of it ordered for the best, by an ALL-WISE, ALL-MERCIFUL OMNIPOTENT. Were it, however, requisite, I believe that, besides other such sources, considerable support might be drawn from even *higher authority*, at least higher in the opinion of all who confide in the truth of revelation; and though *this research* cannot claim the aid of any such, as *inspired*, it might certainly with propriety quote inspired writers, when they speak as *mere observers of Nature.*—

But upon this head I shall only observe, that the care of Providence for instinctive Creatures, is remarked in different parts of the old and new testaments ;—that the Mosaic law considers it good that brute animals be comforted, and provides for it ; and, that it seems to have been the opinion of some of the highest characters in Scripture, that the pleasures and comforts of brutes are of the most solid kind for mere earthly beings.—

As an instance of this last, take the saying of St. Paul. “ If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me if the dead rise not. LET US EAT and DRINK, for to-morrow we die.”

But a saying of the same tendency occurs, as proceeding from one who, even if considered as only a mere observer of life, stands as high as any man ever did. It is the remarkable reply of CHRIST, to one who would have followed him to his dwell-

ing.—“*The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head.*”

What picture must have been in the thought of the SAVIOUR of man, when he breathed this reflection, I leave to the reader without presuming any comment, since it seems to explain itself; and shall merely remark, by the way, that the *mission of CHRIST* seems scarcely compatible with the supposition that man can, as an earthly being, be *happy*.

Here, if any one imagine, that the general assumption in the present moral argument, asserts more than the true sum of *actual* human misery, he will widely mistake the design.—To suppose instinctive tribes happier than they are generally thought to be, is no assumption that the *actual state of man* is more miserable than it is generally thought.—I do not believe the actual state of the species so bad, as Revelation seems to

threaten, in consequence of man's transgression ; or worse than it is generally considered to be, by the high authorities already quoted, and by the sacred writings of the old and new testaments. The mention of this, as well as the quotations from scripture, may be proper, to save the advocates of Revelation, whom, I trust, form a great majority, from going into the evidence of *fact* with a prejudice founded on error. Be it therefore observed, that the argument drawn from *a comparison of the two different ORDERS of minds*, which occupy our Earth, justifies *no complaints* of our *actual state*: but, on the contrary, urges us to *gratitude*, to *virtue*, and to thoughts of *happiness*, by illustrating the happiness of a much *lower ORDER of beings*, which GOD has placed here, *in our sight*, a grand exemplar of a happiness, he could easily, *without any breach of general laws*, have bestowed upon man, by making him an additional *LINK* to the *earth-*

ly, or instinctive chain had he not designed, and therefore formed, him for a double purpose; that is, for both an earthly life,—and a higher one.

In human affairs, if any thing be formed to answer *two purposes*, experience leads us to expect it should not answer equally well for both; and, if wisely planned, it ought to be found *most fit for its most important design.*

SECTION SECOND.

OF CONSIDERATIONS WHICH TEND TO PREVENT A GENERAL COMPARISON OF HUMAN LIFE WITH INSTINCTIVE LIFE.

IT has been hinted in the last Section, that there exist powerful reasons why the comparison of rational life with that of instinctive beings, is generally *overlooked by ordinary observers*: and, at the same time, equally strong ones, why the *philosophic few* who have noticed the comparative *fact*, have not, however, made any general *application* of it.

— These two considerations are so im-

portant to our subject, that it becomes necessary to devote a Section to each of them : and the first named of the two is for present discussion.

The reasons, then, which I suppose to have operated upon ordinary observers, so as to prevent their making such comparisons, are chiefly as follow ; — *Self-love*, — *Pride*, — *Imagination*, — *False associations*, — and, the being confined to *narrow views of animal life*.

In treating these, a considerable mass of *illustrative evidence* will appear, in support of my general assumption, and will be drawn from a source which I apprehend is deserving the highest credit in this inquiry. It consists in the reflections of plain impartial men, made on the most extended field of human nature, at the moment of observation ; reflections of men whose statements of fact have justly gained the confidence of the world, and who took down their impressions

warm from the scene.—It is true, I am to follow these with a detail of particulars, drawn from my own actual observation: but this is not upon a supposition that such evidence will be more satisfactory to the reader; but, because it is a primary object to *endeavour* to bring the general fact home to every breast, by embodying its truth in lively colours, so as to spread its application, and influence, among all ranks of society. At the same time it is also no less the design, *to obviate the objections of the profound Sceptic*, and win him upon his own ground.—These two are, indeed, widely different objects, and require very different powers, the want of which must here be deeply felt: but the difficulty of the task will doubtless excite the candour of the judge.

The first named of the five considerations, *Self-love*, is always drawing comparisons, between our own situation and that of other men; for, comparison generally flows from

some sort of competition, and competition arises only from a supposed approach to equality.—Now in this employment we often warp our judgment so far, as to suppose such men happier than ourselves; though, it may be, we afterward find they were, at the time, really much more miserable.— We carry our own miseries always about with us; they are never hid from ourselves, and are usually much over-rated in our own estimation: Yet do we nevertheless studiously conceal them from the million. But, the like conduct is observed by all prudent persons in society; and thus, to the unreflecting, mankind usually appear in masquerade; so that, though each thinks his own situation unsatisfactory, he imagines the world in general has no reason to complain.—Such is the common error when men compare themselves with *their own kind*.

On the contrary, when any circumstance calls up a glance of the situation of man in

comparison with brutes, a very different passion instantly takes possession of the mind, and usurps the seat of judgment. Self-love sleeps ; and pride starts up in its stead, back'd by another most erring judge, which also steps in, unasked, and utters its decision :—This meddling intruder is the IMAGINATION ; and it will always be found very hard to repress its powerful influence. At the bare thought of *brutes*, in any relation to ourselves, human nature is immediately coiled up in its vanity ; and we usually feel *an unqualified, uninvestigated contempt* for *their pleasures,—their thoughts,—and their general state*.—Nay, to such a pitch is this pride carried, that it may be said to have turned the head of mankind, or, to have left us no alternative but to confess gross absurdity, or an equally gross dishonesty, in our discourse concerning *instinctive kinds*. Thus, when we see a *man* covering himself with the disgrace of ineptitude, we with a marvellous

coolness of untruth say, he is as drunk as *a beast*; and, as he flounders in the mire, the tongue almost itches to call him beast; though no beast ever did the like, *unless man improved its taste*.—Now, when we view brutes, in regard of their *happiness*, our conclusion is as unjust as when we charge them with our own exclusive vices: Our *pride* generally prevents any disposition toward a fair comparison; and our *imagination* renders such comparison extremely difficult, even if we were so disposed: while *false associations* also arise, and contribute to deceive us.

Since man generally contrives to command all other animals, he imperiously deems *all made for him*, and associates the ideas of *meanness* and *slavery* with these creatures, at any moment when he thinks of them at all. Now, there is *a close association* in the mind, between these two last named ideas and that of *misery*; and thus,

the first complex conception entertained by an ordinary person as to the state of a brute, is unfavorable in the abstract.

But this is little compared with the egregious error into which we are herein betrayed by the influence of *imagination*.—A hog feasting in the mire, excites great disgust by its very appearance; and the least thought of being *ourselves* placed in a similar situation, would cause loathing and misery. This idea of the imagination therefore, when it happens to arise, we hastily *associate with the state of the hog*, and quite overlook that he is, at this very moment, as happy as one of our ordinary good eaters at a feast; nay perhaps much more so, for *he is happy without alloy*, which our human feasters very often are not.

Here we must not be told of the *nobleness* of human pleasures, and the vileness of those of brutes.—Were it even supposed that the *mass of mankind* usually cherish nobler plea-

sures (which I fear would be found to be shooting above our mark) we are to recollect, that it is not the KIND, but the QUANTITY, the mere MASS or AMOUNT of *happiness*, that is to decide this important question.

— If the *baseness* of brute's happiness could operate any way at all in the matter, the more vile or worthless it is supposed, the more reasonable is our hope that our meritorious pleasures, if any such there be, will be extended in some *future state*, to form an equivalent to the substantial goods which brutes appear to enjoy in a greater degree here: But, to deny that *happiness is happiness*, upon a plea that it is *ignoble or gross*, would be an absurdity which I do not apprehend any one will offer by way of objection.

To illustrate the influence of imagination in rendering a false estimate of the happiness of brutes, almost innumerable instances might be offered.—In order to effect this

as briefly as may be, I remark, that FOOD, CLOTHING, and LODGING, seem to be the three principal points for consideration, since the imagination is most, *or first*, apt to dwell upon these.—What epicure, sitting down warm, and elegantly appointed, to a sumptuous feast, can easily bring his imagination to figure a brute equally happy out in a bleak field, eating insipid grass; or drinking water equally insipid, with its limbs immersed in the cold stream? If however he be told that the creature is thus content, he will *pity the imperfection of taste* in this *brute*, and conclude that its pleasure of the palate is scarcely better than *indifference*; nor will he once imagine that the direct *contrary* is the fact;—that the taste of the brute *is exquisite*, so as to receive delight from a very delicate gustatory stimulus, just as children do from milk; while it is his own palate only, of the two, that is imperfect, being dulled by the use of high stimulants,

and without which it can no longer be excited.

The like reasoning will hold in regard to the *clothing* of brutes which, we must observe, also includes, in great part, THEIR LODGING, since the *natural coverings* of brutes generally answer for *both*, and are *admirably adapted* to their situations.—The wild boar, nestled in his thicket; the tiger, bedded in long grass; or, the monkey, roosted on a tree, does not appear, *to us*, to be very enviably lodged, compared with even the poorer class of men in such a country as England. But, in the first place, this is not a fair comparison; because many tribes of brutes, such as Birds, Bees, Beavers, and Ants, are far better lodged, even according to *our idea of comfort*, than the *average of mankind*.—In the next place, of such animals as are most exposed to wet and cold, it is not true that *they feel* that want of comfort which we imagine.—Their natural coverings, their

constitutions, and, above all, the effect of *habit*, amply make up for all seeming deficiencies.—The following remarks from Lord Bacon's 'Prognostics of weather from 'animals' shows that this reasoning holds even in the climate of England, which is cold and severe compared with the greater part of the habitable earth. After enumerating a variety of *water* and *land birds* that take pleasure in, and "seem to call upon, " rain," he goes on to state that, "*Beasts* "generally delight in a moist air, which "makes them feast the better: whence "sheep will go early in the morning to feed "against rain. Cattle, deer, and rabbits, also "feed hard before rain: and a heifer will toss "up her nose, and snuff up the air against "rain."

Not only does it hold true of *brutes*, particularly those in a state of *Nature*, that they feel very little misery from the two great considerations of *clothing* and *lodging*; for

the same holds very extensively of *mankind in a state of Nature*. In proof of this we may remark the very little clothing worn by savages, *on the score of comfort*, in any temperate region; and the great wretchedness, or imperfection of their habitations, in many countries where their fishing apparatus, their implements of war, their navies, and *ornamental dress*, evince a very considerable and even admirable advance in arts. Of this fact I have myself had sufficient ocular proof; but refer the reader, for his greater satisfaction, to the instructive voyages of our illustrious circumnavigator, CAPTAIN COOK. And here, in naming this great man, I have to add, that *he* and his associates form the authority I lately alluded to. I would therefore suggest, that a perusal of his voyages, in those parts which describe both human life, and that of animals, will perhaps be found very conducive to the readers forming a just estimate of the undertaking now

before him.—He will therein find, the opinion of a most sagacious observer, (and I suppose we may include the majority of his associate voyagers) is on the same side with mine, especially where he estimates *the happiness of savage life.* ——————

But beyond this, from the picture he draws of BRUTE *happiness*, even in some of the most dismal regions of the globe, I shall quote him as a very high authority, *in coincidence* with that of speculative men in the closet.

In severe climates, one would readily imagine the considerations of clothing and lodging must be very serious for any animal. But they probably are less so to brutes than to man.—Birds, bears, and foxes, and other such arctic animals, seem to be at least as well off as the *Esquimaux*, or the *Kamtschadale*: And I should suppose the amphibious tribes must be better off.—Now I don't know that the Kamtschadale is so badly situated, in these particulars, as the men of

many more advanced countries : and this at least I can say, that in several barbarous and savage nations, situated in temperate climates, I have not observed any men, the New-Hollanders excepted, to be more miserably housed, than some human beings are in the bleak northern extremity of *Britain itself*.—But in this last situation, if the native be furnished with *food*, I believe he will not think his poor lodging so great an evil : and, as to the *Kamtschadale*, we are told he thinks himself the happiest nation upon Earth.

From these facts we learn, spite of prejudice or imagination, that *civilised man has raised up to himself a world of factitious comforts*, which have *not raised* his happiness ; (at least not without raising his frail needs in an equal degree) but the *want* of which, after they become habitual, renders him *truly miserable*.

Here also we are led to see, that the great

cause of deception in judging of the question in hand, is, that *civilised man* never in *imagination* divests himself of *his factitious wants*. — He would certainly feel miserable in being sent from his delicacies and his drawing-room, to coarse fare and a hovel ; and therefore he cannot imagine a savage happy under such circumstances, though he have *food, health, family, pastime, good humour, and freedom*, to bless him. But not only is the *savage* happy thus ; for many an individual who has both tasted, and been fully sensible of, the comforts of civilised life, has subsequently passed some of his happiest hours in a hut.

This brings me to glance at a consideration which deeply interests society, in another point of view. These errors of the imagination are not confined to the present subject ; they, in a very strong degree, influence the tastes and morals of civilised society.— As one instance let us observe, that the *na-*

tural relishes of children are for *fruits, cakes,* and other sweet meats ; But their kind parents, acting merely from *their own acquired tastes,* cannot *imagine* the little things happy without the addition of *Wine*, or any other such trash which happens to be on table. Now few children have any relish for wine at first, that is, if observed at *the very first trial* : but, the taste is found passable, the colour is tempting, and the example of elders is still more so ; and by the third or fourth trial, *the foundation of THIS HAPPINESS* is laudably laid, for the infant's future exultation as a member of *civilised society.*

No one will deny that the pleasure of the bottle (*for its own sake*) is one of the grand pleasures of civilised life. Yet I apprehend a man's happiness is augmented by being *taught this pleasure*, in some such way as if he were taught to walk with a crutch, until he became unable to go *at all* without it ; while *with it* he cannot go so well, as *he*

would have done had he never known its use.

If this reasoning were applied to the whole catalogue of our pleasures, one by one, we probably should find; how many of them *do actually* tend to make our condition better than *it would have been* without them.

It is very remarkable, and important here, that in the two opposite, and dreadful extreme countries of the habitable Earth ; where climate and want of intercourse have rendered *man's reason*, and his *means*, the poorest possible ; *men are found to be among the happiest in the world.*

First, of the *Northern extreme*.—*Captain King*, in his continuation of Cook's third voyage, communicates an account of the people from Mr. *Steller*, who resided some time in Kamtschatka, and who, among other matter, says of the Kamtschadales, “ they believe themselves to have been created and placed in this very spot by their

“god, Koutckou ; that they are the most
“favoured of his creatures ; the most fortu-
“nate and happy of beings ; and that their
“country is superior to all others, affording
“means of gratification far beyond what are
“any where else to be met with.”

Next, of the *Southern Hemisphere*.—In the account of Captain Cook’s first voyage, the following reflection occurs upon the people of that miserable region, *Terra del Fuego*.—
“Upon the whole, these people appeared to
“be the most destitute and forlorn, as well
“as the most stupid of all human beings ;
“the outcasts of nature, who spent their
“lives in wandering about the dreary wastes,
“where two of our people perished with cold
“in the midst of summer ; with no dwelling
“but a wretched hovel of sticks and grass,
“which would not only admit the wind, but
“the snow and the rain ; almost naked ; and
“destitute of every convenience that is fur-
“nished by the rudest art, having no imple-

“ment even to dress their food: yet they
“were content. They seemed to have no
“wish for any thing more than they possess-
“ed, nor did any thing that we offered them
“appear acceptable, but beads as an orna-
“mental superfluity of life. What bodily
“pains they might suffer from the severities
“of the winter we could not know; but it is
“certain, that they suffered nothing from the
“want of the innumerable articles which we
“consider, not as the luxuries and conveni-
“ences only, but the necessaries of life: as
“their desires are few, they probably enjoy
“them all; and how much they may be
“gainers by an exemption from the care, la-
“bour, and solicitude, which arise from a
“perpetual and unsuccessful effort to gratify
“that infinite variety of desires which the
“refinements of artificial life have produced
“among us, is not very easy to determine:
“possibly this may counterbalance all the
“real disadvantages of their situation in

“ comparison with ours, and make the scales
“ by which good and evil are distributed to
“ man, hang even between us.”

These reflections upon the state of two Nations who, living at opposite extremes of man's terrestrial range, have scarce any thing but *animal health* and *ignorance* to make them happy, exhibit to our conviction *stubborn facts*, WHICH IT WERE VAIN for us to ATTEMPT to deny. Whatever *figures* of happiness, or misery, our *imagination* would conjure up, we must from such facts be assured, that *they apply to us only*,—and may not even as such, raise our *actual* happiness above that of the most remote savages.

Having put this matter in so clear a light in regard of the *two extremes*, let us complete the view with the picture afforded us, by the same shrewd authority, of *Savage Nations* inhabiting the *middle region* of the Earth, namely, the Society Isles, in the great

Pacific Ocean.—Upon these people the following reflection occurs.—

“ It is not indeed strange that the sorrows
“ of these artless people should be transient,
“ any more than that their passions should
“ be suddenly and strongly expressed : what
“ they feel they have never been taught either
“ to disguise or suppress, and having no ha-
“ bits of thinking which perpetually recall the
“ past, and anticipate the future, they are af-
“ fected by all the changes of the passing
“ hour, and reflect the colour of the time,
“ however frequently it may vary : they have
“ no project which is to be pursued from
“ day to day, the subject of unremitting anx-
“ iety and solicitude, that first rushes into
“ the mind when they awake in the morn-
“ ing, and is last dismissed when they sleep
“ at night. Yet if we admit that they are
“ upon the whole happier than we, we must
“ admit that the child is happier than the

" man, and that we are losers by the perfection of our nature, the increase of our knowledge and the enlargement of our views."

By this, upon the whole, we observe, that in proportion as *reflection is narrowed*, that is as reason approaches instinct, the MAN IS FOUND HAPPIER.

Perhaps the reader will not fail to observe the striking agreement between the sentiments of this unbiassed Navigator, and those of *Mr. Wollaston* which I have already quoted in concurrence with my own: but I am wronging the subject, for *unbiassed he was not*, as appears from his *reluctance* to allow that those savages were happier than civilised man.—He says; “*yet if we admit, &c. &c.*”——Now he was not called upon to admit it, if the truth did not force itself upon his ingenuous mind, even in evident violation of his vanity as a member of civilised society.—What is farther remarkable

is, that he finds consolation in the very sentiment of *Archbishop King*,—that if the savage really is happier, “*the child is happier than the man.*”—The truth, thus wrung from unwilling authorities so widely different; the dignified Churchman in his closet, and the Voyager in his course; must be superior to all the tortuous insinuations of our prejudice, and, even, to the strongest convulsions of our pride.

But, let us return to the *Kamtschadales*. —We do not trust even to the best *observer* for the truth of their happiness, for it appears *they think themselves HAPPIEST*. —It would therefore be *worse than impertinence to say they are not happy*. —Their confession also strengthens the credit of Captain Cook’s opinion as to the happiness of the men of *Terra del Fuego*; and thus we see how far *ignorance and a sound animal constitution can make even human beings happy in a most miserable Country*, though these beings

must still have *some of the anxieties of fore-thought*, besides wars and other evils, which brutes have not.

Let us but consider, for a moment, what are the gifts these men possess to make them so happy. They are soon enumerated.—A sound animal constitution including cheerfulness;—An instinctive pleasure in their young, or family;—A pleasure in the enterprises of hunting and fishing;—Eating;—Sleeping, &c.;—and lastly, A HAPPY IGNORANCE of greater enjoyments; with a *foresight as circumscribed* (by want of thinking,) as it can well be in human creatures.—Such are the endowments of those who *think themselves*, in the worst of countries, the happiest men in the world.

Here now I will turn to another ORDER OF BEINGS, and fairly ask which of the above endowments is not found, as well, with *Seahorses* on their beds of ice, as with these happy *Kamtschadales*.—Those sea animals

appear to lead an easy happy life.—Ice cannot be *cold* to them, since they delight to rest and sleep upon it, in preference to the water : and, from their appearance and habits, it does not seem that they want *food*—Neither are they a torpid race, so as to be insensible to pleasure and pain. The *affectionate* conduct of the old to the young ; and of the young back to the old ; show that they both *feel*, and *enjoy their feelings* ; which also are seldom disturbed by cruel intruders who outrage them.

But it is not only one species of *brutes* that in such severe climates appears to live *at least as happily* as the happy Kamtschadales. The following account, given in Captain Cook's voyages, of an assemblage of animals upon a small Island in the horrid region of *Cape Horn*, exhibits a picture of *brute happiness* which seems to reflect no small degree of mortification, if not of odium, upon CIVILISED MAN.—“ It is amazing

" to see how the different animals which in-
" habit this little spot are mutually recon-
" ciled. They seem to have entered into a
" league not to disturb each other's tranquil-
" lity. The sea-lions occupy most of the
" sea-coast; the sea-bears take up their
" abode in the isle; the shags have post in
" the highest cliffs; the penguins fix their
" quarters where there is the most easy com-
" munication to and from the sea; and the
" other birds choose more retired places.
" We have seen all these animals mix toge-
" ther, like domestic cattle and poultry in a
" farm-yard, without one attempting to mo-
" lest the other. Nay, I have often observed
" the eagles and vultures sitting on the hil-
" locks among the shags, without the latter,
" either young or old, being disturbed at
" their presence. It may be asked how
" these birds of prey live? I suppose on the
" carcases of seals and birds which die by

"various causes; and probably not a few,
"as they are so numerous."

Upon reading this, let any one tell me the name of that *civilised Nation of men*, where our *Human "Eagles and Vultures mix, like domestic cattle and poultry in a farm yard, without one attempting to molest the other;"* —and where "*the old and the young are safe and undisturbed,*" by these rapacious inmates?——Had a man, by chance, *found the narrative, without the names of the several species,* would he not believe that it is a description of *some new Sect of CHRISTIANS,* who, resolving to live up to the *spirit of their LORD's precepts,* were thus displaying to the World a proof that *a whole people may be truly christian?*——Were any man, in the most virtuous country, to expect to bring society to such a pitch of mutual and total forbearance, as was witnessed among *the most discordant species of brutes,* in the

worst of regions, would not every one smile at his knight-errantry?—The best Nations *may improve*, and that incalculably; but for once I may assume the gift of prophecy, and predict, *they never will reach the observances* of Captain Cook's “*cattle and poultry.*”

Here, in illustrating the **DECEITS OF THE IMAGINATION**, in our regard of the happiness of *brutes*, I have naturally fallen to touch upon its influence in regard of our estimate of *Savage life*, which in fact amounts, so far, to a comparison of the happiness of savage man with civilised man.—I do not however intend this to be taken for a **GENERAL or full comparison**. My *main argument* is not the greater happiness of savage life, but, *the earthly advantages of INSTINCT over REASON, both in civilised and savage life.*—I not only admit, but argue, that reason produces dreadful mischiefs in savage life, as well as in civilised societies; and if it produce greater evils in the latter, I as rea-

dily allow, it also produces greater goods.—It would be a tedious task, and perhaps a very difficult one, to come to a balance upon this comparison; but my object does not entangle me in any such difficulty; and therefore, when I touch upon *particular points*, to illustrate my own views, it will only show what sort of weapons a man *might* wield in favour of savage happiness, were this the main question to be settled.—In any such question as this however, it must never be forgot, that whatever could be urged against civilised life, its balance of *good* becomes manifest, and vast, whenever we take in (as we must do) *the knowledge of A CREATOR, and the HOPE of hereafter.*

In concluding this argument drawn from Captain Cook's observations on human nature, there is one broad fact of savage life, necessary to be stated; because, thereupon I have directly founded a most important conclusion. It is this,—There are many Sa-

vage Nations on Earth, which *we* would say are miserably clothed and lodged, who *not only think themselves happy*, but were judged, by our people who had seen *all the rest of the world*, to have *good REASON for being happy*.—This I state because some may think it a better criterion of happiness than the poor ignorant Kamtschadales' opinion of themselves.—Now upon this fact I extend the following judgment, that, if these fortunate Savages *had not WARS, — nor HUMAN SACRIFICES, nor SUPERSTITIOUS and OTHER FEARS,* — all of which are of REASON'S GROWTH; but, in place of this mischievous REASON, if they were endowed with a NOBLE INSTINCT, like that of the *Elephant*; they must be *happier* than they now *ARE*, in their continual bloody feuds and fears.—AND, since they are actually found to be (even as it is) among the happiest nations in the world, it thus becomes manifest, that the happiest nation of

men, (but I will say only the AVERAGE of men) are not so happy, as a nation of *Elephants* well supplied with food.

I request here, that the *philosophic and sceptical* reader will mark the reserve with which I have taken this position.—I have not, like so many high authorities, advanced the assertion in the *most general terms*, that **BRUTES are happier than MEN.**—The INSTINCTIVE scale is made up of innumerable gradations in which *happiness* (as well as faculties,) may be graduated; and there may be wise reasons why some species of brutes should be made less happy than man, though other species may be more happy.——All that I advance, as matter of fact, is, that the HAPPIER SPECIES of brutes have more earthly happiness than the AVERAGE of men, if the HOPE OF HEREAFTER be totally excluded.

If, therefore, there be any who would controvert my assumption herein, they must, before they can approach it, totally demolish

the assertions of such men as *Mr. Wollaston*, —*Dr. Tillotson*, —*Archbishop King*, —*Archdeacon Paley*, and others of that class, who have asserted the fact in unlimited terms, and far beyond what I do; though I have laboured to show that the CONSEQUENCES of it go far beyond what they thought, that is, that the fact being admitted, the MORAL ARGUMENT arising out of it, is of vastly greater philosophic value, than any argument drawn from the *human species alone*. —— My position of fact, indeed, stands so intrenched and retired, compared with theirs, that it might stand impregnable, even were their ground demolished: But the admissions appear on so many sides that I do not suppose it needs defence.

Should it be observed, that in the quotations given from *Archbishop King*, he has not asserted the fact, like the rest. I answer, true; not in his “*Essay*;” but, he has done it in the very outset of his “*Sermon on*

*“the fall of man.”—“The Beasts are sick,
“and want, and die as well as men ; but
“yet are not so miserable, because they see
“no farther than the present, and therefore
“are not tormented with the remembrance
“of what is past, or the fear of what is to
“come. Whereas men are apprised that
“pain and diseases, disappointments and
“death are before them, and have not the
“like certainty of one single act of pleasure
“to balance the dismal consideration.”*

Who, indeed, can help being struck at this language ;—from the pulpit,—from a high dignity, and one who also was bent, to his utmost, to assign the advantage to MAN ; as his great work clearly shows. But, since the truth thus forces its way through the interstices of the intention, who can deny it ? —Those who would, will perceive how far they have to go, and what forces to encounter, before it can be any concern of mine to look to my own ground.

Besides *the reserve*, be it also remembered, mine is not a mere *closet view*. I draw it directly from *actual observation of both the savage and the elephant*; and supported by the better observation of men to whom the world owes much credit and respect.

It has now I trust appeared how liable we are to mistake, in estimating the *grosser pleasures and comforts of brutes*. But there is another error of great magnitude, which is usually added to this last; for we generally imagine the *grosser pleasures* to be the **ONLY ONES** which brutes are formed to enjoy.—How false an estimate this is of instinctive life, cannot be unknown to those who have considered it with any attention.—I have no doubt that the pleasure which brutes take in associating with their own kind, and the pain they feel in total solitude, is as great, as is usually felt by man in like situations.—So strong indeed is the call in brutes for soci-

ety of *some kind or other*, that animals of the most *opposite natures* will form friendships, and afterward pine when they are forcibly separated ; a fact, I believe, too well known to need being illustrated by particular instances.

As to the enjoyment of brutes in the society of their own kind, the following remark from Bishop Cumberland may suffice.—

“ It is two well *known* to need proof, that
“ *Animals*, if by any accident they have been
“ sometimes separated from others of the
“ *same kind*, as soon as they have come within
“ sight of one another, even at a distance, im-
“ mediately *rejoice*, shew their joy by gestures,
“ run to one another, and with pleasure eat,
“ drink, and play together, but very seldom
“ fight with one another, and that if at any
“ time they happen to fight, immediately
“ after a victory, for the most part obtained
“ without any damage, the same animals
“ herd again very lovingly and peaceably
“ together.”

But there are other relations, in which the pleasures of society appear to be far higher with brutes, than in such cases as are here just alluded to.—If we remark the uniform spirit with which they follow up all the different duties of domestic life; (at which I have already glanced in the last Section) we must confess, that what may be called their *refined enjoyments*, bear a very considerable proportion to those that are merely sensual.

Would we strain this consideration to a comparison with *human life*, it would only the more confirm what has been advanced. There is scarce any passion under which human nature appears more amiable than in *social affection*.—Yet, the truth is, that in receding from civilised man, to brutes, this passion seems rather to gather strength, than to grow weaker. The *tremendous New-Zelanders*, have been observed to be agitated even to tears with joy, upon meeting after

a very short separation ; and I can myself assert the kindness of their nature, *in ordinary*, to be equal to that of any nation I have seen.—But, I would ask any man, if there be found instances of savage affection (or, if he please, *of civilised affection*) which cut deeper into the feeling soul, than the *sorrows* of a *bear*, or *sea-horse*, robbed of her cub :*— or, on the other hand, if there is any picture of *extacy* that surpasses the meeting (as it is described) of two friendly *elephants* that had been a little time kept asunder.

* “The gentlemen who went on this party were witnesses
“of several remarkable instances of parental affection in
“those animals (*Sea-horses*). On the approach of our
“boats toward them, they all took their cubs under their
“fins, and endeavoured to escape with them into the sea.
“Several whose young were killed or wounded and left
“floating on the surface, rose again, and carried them down,
“sometimes just as our people were going to take them
“into the boat; and might be traced bearing them to a
“great distance through the water, which was covered with
“their blood: we afterwards observed them bring them,
“at times, above the surface, as if for air, and again diving
“under it with a dreadful bellowing.”——Cook’s Third
Voyage.

“ Separated from each other during a
“ long and tedious journey, the moment they
“ met again was to them a moment of great
“ joy, and to the observer of nature, a curious
“ event. When the female entered the stable
“ which was prepared for her, and which
“ was divided into two compartments, com-
“ municating with each other by a door, she
“ uttered first of all a cry expressive of her
“ joy at being at liberty: she did not per-
“ ceive the male who was already in the
“ compartment, occupied in eating. Neither
“ did he think that his companion was so
“ near him; but the cornak having called
“ him, he turned round, and immediately
“ these two animals ran toward each other,
“ and began to utter cries of joy so lively
“ and so loud, that the whole place shook:
“ at the same time they made a sort of noise
“ with their trunks, which resembled a strong
“ wind. The joy of the female was the
“ most impetuous, and she expressed it par-

"ticularly by a quick flapping of her ears,
"which she moved like the wings of a bird,
"and with an extreme celerity. She moved
"her trunk over the body of the male with
"tenderness and delight: she directed it
"particularly towards his ear, where she
"held it some time; often, too, after having
"passed it over the whole body of the male,
"she brought it towards her own mouth.
"The male also passed his trunk over her
"body: but his joy was more concentrated,
"and he seemed to express it by tears,
"which flowed in abundance from his eyes."

Surely no man who has witnessed such scenes as this last described, or who believes them, can doubt the high pleasure which brutes have in associating with their kind: And if in the case of the bear, or the sea-horse, any one should object, that the instinct of the *dam*, for her young, is of a peculiar kind, we see by the conduct of the *elephants*, that the evidence is not limited to

any such cases.—Besides this, I have had occasion to observe, of certain wild birds, which go in pairs, that when one of them was shot, the forlorn survivor continued to hover round the dead, trying to rouse it by piteous and heart-rending lamentations, regardless of danger, or, as it were, seeking a common fate.—And, for more ordinary cases, who is there that has not noticed how *dogs*, and *other brutes*, pine for the loss of human beings with whom they have associated?

Perhaps it is *a law of all finite minds*, that none can be happy in *total solitude*. And, I have no hesitation to believe, that society is as great a happiness to *brutes in general*, as to *man in general*.

It would be taking up time unnecessarily to enlarge, since, I trust from what has been advanced, we must perceive a necessity to be continually on our guard, against the powerful influence of the **IMAGINATION**, through-

out the whole of a comparison of instinctive life with human life.

We come now to the last of the five enumerated considerations of this Section, namely—"the being confined to narrow "views of animal life." This is a circumstance which usually arises from a *confined situation*.—Some countries, that are very fortunately situated for the well being and increase of mankind, prove much less so for instinctive creatures than many other regions, especially those lying in milder climates.—Great Britain is of the former description.—It indeed abounds with *reclaimed animals*, and I think their state, in general, quite happy enough to establish our moral argument: yet *there appears to the imagination such a dullness and cold comfort in their tranquil content, that, in ordinary, people are not apt to estimate their happiness at any thing near the truth.* But

in those countries, on the other hand, where *wild animal life* abounds, in all its undescribable luxuriancy of *numbers* and *variety*, the *general scene* makes a vastly different impression upon the observer.—We there see instinctive tribes enjoying such an extent and liveliness of pleasure, as the most ordinary observer cannot overlook;—though, indeed, it generally happens that those who are accidentally thrown into such situations, have other objects in mind, than that of *generalising*, or of *applying* the fact.

With regard to Britain, it may be said we find our poets enlivening their lays with descriptions of animal happiness, especially of *feathered life*. But the *comparative* truth really is, that if a man travel over this Island after having traversed certain other regions of the Earth, one of the most striking impressions he will receive from the general face of the country, is, a seeming *almost total want of free animal life*, and more espe-

cially of *feathered life* ;—*a melancholy blank* ;—*a want* certainly beneficial and therefore desireable, but, at the same time, *in regard of our present subject*, **A DREARY VOID AND SILENCE**, instead of a continually moving picture, and a varied happy noise, *of countless millions and varieties*, of *animals* which occupy **EARTH, AIR, and WATER**, and whose sensations make up *a sum of happiness inconceivably vast*.

I believe it may be safely asserted, that a person may traverse far the greater part of the British empire, without the most distant conception of the *numbers*, or *sum total* of greater animal life on this Earth, or being once awakened to the consideration *how small (comparatively)* is the *number* of **HUMAN LIVES**. But some notion of this, however inadequate, may be gathered from the vast assemblages of animals occasionally mentioned in **Natural Histories and Voyages**, among which last, such congregations are

repeatedly noticed by Captain Cook, as amounting to an "*incredible number.*"

It is natural to think that those who have been thrown into situations to contemplate such scenes as these, are most likely to be drawn into an extensive and general comparison, such as that I have undertaken ; and *they* may therefore be expected to be earliest in it : though, when attention is once called to the subject, the *fact* may be rendered sufficiently evident, even in those countries where animal existence is *far less* varied, extensive, and luxuriant.——But indeed we find the *general fact* is too striking even in our own country, to have escaped the philosophic eye, although it has usually eluded that of the ordinary observer. For it appears from the authorities already quoted, that the same general fact was observed by them ; probably without any better means of judging than are afforded by *our own climate.*

It would, however, be doing great injustice to the subject, to omit calling the reader's attention strongly to the circumstance, that in many situations, especially in great towns, the true picture and dimensions of animal happiness cannot be seen: and, even, were it formed else-where, it must, in the bosom of a great city, soon *fade in our imagination.*

—Letting alone the prejudice we draw from observing *the treatment of hack horses,* and some other animals, (which evil, we forget, *is ACCIDENTAL* to the individual sufferers, and *not essential to their species*) it may be observed, that in a walk, in the fields near LONDON, if a man happen to encounter two or three *forlorn crows,* and a *single hawk,* or any bird other than a *sparrow,* he may go home and relate his surprising adventures. And, as to meeting with an unreclaimed animal of any other kind, I apprehend such a prodigy would be chronicled in the registers of the day.—How, then, would

the inhabitant of this great city be astonished were he, at once, transported to a region, where the *variety* of animals under his eye must be great and the *number* beyond all description;—where the phenomena of their *sizes*, *figures*, *colours*, *cries*, and *motions*, are *endlessly diversified*, and yet, *the feelings of ALL these beings are specifically identified* under the word HAP-PINESS.

“ Yea the Stork in the heaven knoweth
“ her appointed times, and the Turtle, and
“ the Crane, and the Swallow observe the
“ times of their coming; but my people
“ know not the judgments of their God.”

SECTION THIRD.

OF CONSIDERATIONS WHICH HAVE OPERATED
UPON THOSE WHO HAVE NOTICED THE COM-
PARATIVE FACT, AND PREVENTED THEM
FROM APPLYING IT.

IF the views in this Section prove well founded, they may explain why we have not earlier found a more perfect *moral argument* for a future state. The reasons which I suppose to have operated against it, are chiefly these:

FIRST.—The *Hypothesis of “A SCALE OF BEINGS, filling all the room in Creation;”*—and, consequently, the NOT DISCRIMINATING

that the laws of *mind*, on this Earth, are not all of one System, like the laws of body; *but consist of two very different SYSTEMS*, insomuch that the happiness of any *species of beings* may be made great, or little, according as this species has been placed in one, or other, of these TWO SYSTEMS.

SECONDLY.—The supposition that *every species* in the scale of beings *must exist*; each species being *necessary for the good of the whole*.

These two considerations seem to be of the first moment; but there are two others which it may be also proper to notice. These are,

THIRDLY.—The notion that the *dignity of reason* is degraded by supposing it less fit, than instinct, to make us happy on earth.

FOURTHLY.—A speculative question, how far it appears probable, from the acknowledged attributes of GOD, that he

would here confer upon instinctive Creatures greater happiness, than upon man.

THE FIRST.—With regard to the first of these four considerations, it is, in the outset, necessary to observe, that the acknowledged *utility of GENERAL LAWS in Nature* seems to present rather a check to our hopes of a future state, *as these Laws have hitherto been viewed*, that is to say, *together with* a supposition that all the minds on Earth are involved in ONE SYSTEM.—For, confessedly, such is the grand benefit of general laws to *the whole series of species in ALL CREATED WORLDS*, that we could not expect they should be unhinged to save *some individuals, of one species*, from *a liability to accidents* involved by those general causes of good; and therefore one may think it fit, that these should take their chance, *even though there were no after provision made for such accidental sufferers.*

In this supposition, which Sceptics might

stick upon *as the case has been viewed*, I do but agree with those who have treated the Laws of Nature, as the reader may observe by the following concise statement of *Bishop Cumberland*, in his Chap. I. Sect. 19,—

“When we treat of good or evil, with relation to the laws of Nature, we regard not “the body, or mind, of any *particular* man, “or of a few, because the suffering or punishment of these may sometimes contribute to “public good.”—Now the public good here meant, is that of the *human species only*; and, if the public good of *one species* can justify the sufferings of *a few men*, how vastly must the sufferings of these few men be justified *if there be only one system of general laws*, which could not be deranged to save them, without incurring evil to all the species of minds in Creation.

Upon this aspect of the case, we perceive how highly important it must be to establish,

that there are actually two systems, in either of which man might have been placed, *without detriment to the whole of Creation*; and therefore, that there is no necessity, either from *general laws*, or from *the good of the whole*, that man should suffer as he does.

Without diverging so far as to the opinions of *Atheists*, the supposition among *Theists* of there being but one system of minds, on Earth, is AS BROAD as from **Dr. Priestley**, who laboured to prove that we have no hope but through christianity, to **Lord Bolingbroke**, who wrote to deny both soul and christianity; and AS HIGH as the highest assertors of the dignity and hopes of man.—Both the above named champions of their respective schemes held, virtually, the same doctrine of *man's mind*. The former supposed us to differ from brutes, more in our *bodies* than our minds: the latter asserted that the faculties of a man's mind differ from those of a brute,

not in kind, but in degree ; and, that “*brutes* “*must necessarily have*, in kind, every faculty “*that we are possessed of.*”—Now here, by the way, I should like to know if these brutes have, *in kind*, the faculty of conceiving that they have *a vital principle which shall live in another state*; if they conceive *another state*,—a *Creator*,—an invisible judge, —a responsibility,—or any of a great variety of such considerations.—Yet, letting this alone, if such doctrine be true, it is certain there is but *one system* of mental laws,—or *one order of minds* upon this Earth. But, besides what I merely hinted *metaphysically* to the contrary (Sect. I. Page 10, and 11,) this doctrine is so far from being true in *moral consequence*, that the instant it is noticed that *man*, by being *changed* to *an instinctive animal*, would *throw off* his load of *foresights* and *retrospects*,—his *moral elections* and all their multifarious miseries,—his busy faculty of creating *factitious want and evils*,

—and his great load of *bodily evils of luxury and vanity*, ALL ARISING IN *reason*;—the moment, I say, that this is noticed, and that, instead of all this, the man would move content in his *narrow sphere of instinct*, clear of all baneful attractions of reason, we see that **THERE ARE ACTUALLY TWO SYSTEMS** of minds, containing vastly different portions of *earthly happiness*; and therefore, that *there is no necessity from the operation of GENERAL LAWS*, that mankind should have been made so miserable.

Upon this (*grant but a good GOVERNOR of the world*) we confidently discern, that man was placed in the higher class as a necessary *preparation* for a higher state.

But, the confounding of the two Systems is not the doctrine of those *only* who deny our *natural capacity* for a future state. For the desired distinction has not been *systematically described, nor consistently claimed*, (far less has it been used to furnish a more

philosophical *moral argument*) by those, even, who have been highest in favor of our hopes.

— It is true, the assertors of the natural dignity of the human mind, distinguish at all times between *rational beings* and *instinctive beings*. It is also manifest that, from many high hands we have, of each, some one *insular confession* that *brutes are happier than men*, and that they are so from wanting moral elections, foresight, &c. Nay more, the same authorities actually make the fact an *auxiliary or secondary argument* for our hopes.— This is, *in point of fact, the very basis upon which I also stand*; and therefore I assume no novelty, nor differ from those as to *foundation*.— But what I object here is, that notwithstanding these *detached particular confessions*, those very parties *virtually contradict all this*, by maintaining the great hypothesis of “*a scale of beings* ;” an hypothesis which from its magnitude swallows up all their particular con-

cessions, and implies *only ONE SYSTEM of minds.*

The very language of the hypothesis,—“A SCALE OF BEINGS,”—implies but *one system*. And who, from this *denomination*, would imagine what is the fact,—that *rational man*, and *instinctive brutes*, actually move in systems as distinct from each other, *in regard of happiness*, as do the planets of our Solar System from those of any other visible fixed star.——But the confounding of the two systems, into one, is made circumstantially complete, as we may observe by the following passage from *Mr. Addison*, who is quoted with approbation for having illustrated the order of the *supposed scale*.—This writer, in the course of a long and beautiful description of the ascent of the scale, has the following remark—“The “whole chasm in Nature, *from A PLANT to a “MAN*, is filled up with diverse kinds of creatures, rising one above another by such a

“gentle and easy ascent, that the little transitions and deviations, from one species to another, are almost insensible.”

Now, IF WE EXCEPT MAN, this description is just, or even *less* than just; because, in every other species the gradation is not only “almost,” but *quite* insensible. But when this fine writer includes MAN in the *insensible ascent*, I have no hesitation to declare it a monstrous violation of the truth of Nature.—The single glance I have just taken at the several great departments of misery, which man would escape by being made an *instinctive animal*, proves the breach of the chain, a thousand fold; and shows that “*the chasm in Nature*” is *not filled up*; no, not *by an immeasureable distance*.—It was therefore a great oversight in Addison to assert it; and whoever admits his illustration, as philosophically just, must in so doing deny that reason, and instinct, are the names of two different systems:—But, it is

the object of my present speculation to prove that *they are two*;—that the distinction is *real*, and *great*, and *vitally important to our hopes*.

After advert ing to the above passage of *Mr. Addison*, (which I have copied from its place in the notes to the “*Essay on the origin of Evil*,”) the reader can have no doubt that the hypothesis of *a scale of beings* is inconsistent, with the confessions of fact made by its advocates that sensitive beings possess very different conditions of existence, according as they are placed under the government and operation of reason, or of *instinct*: I say *inconsistent*; because it must be absurd to talk of the evils of *reason*, and good of *instinct*, as TWO CONTRASTED NATURES, if the change from an *instinctive* being, to a *rational* one, is *but AN INSENSIBLE STEP*; or, if there be no more distance between a *monkey* and a *man*, than from an *ox* to a *horse*.—Such a “*filling of the chasm*,” leaves no

room to CHANGE man, to happier than he is *here*:— and, as to any hope of *hereafter*, what can he expect if every species exists *of necessity, for the good of the whole*, which is a good *so vast*, as *may* fully justify his *accidental* sufferings?

If it be requisite to place this matter in a stronger light, let us observe what is the *doctrinal result* of the hypothesis in question. First.—It is true, it has not prevented its advocates from fairly admitting the earthly advantage of brutes over men; from which, I have already said, they have indeed drawn *some degree* of hope. But, *it has prevented them from making any better* of this fact, than *a mere make-weight*, which they throw into the scale *after* they have exhausted all their reasons from the *human species alone*.

—Now, truly the *human species* is nearest the eye of every man; and every *ordinary man* observes the inequality of happiness in this species, and readily inclines to think it

good ground of hope. But the opinion of the world is, and ever will be governed, directly or indirectly, by the *philosophic class*; and what is more, *the morals of mankind will ever be deeply affected by the SCEPTIC BAND in this class*; and it is this band we must discomfit, else we do nothing.—Here, then, if we present the Sceptic with the argument drawn from the *human species alone*, he will say, Gentlemen, your own hypothesis of a *Scale of beings, every species of which must exist for the good of the whole*, is a complete bar to your hopes; because you thereby make the existence of man NECESSARY, while the fact of *one man suffering more than another* is, confessedly, but ACCIDENTAL.—If now, upon this, you add,—O, but we do not argue from the *human species alone*, for behold the *brute species* are happier than the *species man*. The Sceptic will reply,—If the brutes are happier, *you do not show me how it could possibly have been otherwise*: You

make but *one scale* of beings, each species of which *must exist* for the good of the whole; therefore, the greater suffering of any *one species* (*suppose it man*) becomes only A PARTICULAR EVIL, and is no more to be considered when your argument is the *whole of Creation*, than the sufferings of *a few men* when the argument is the *human species alone*.

Thus, whether the argument be contracted to our own species, or enlarged to the whole Creation, the Sceptic has a fair plea against our hope, if there be but one system, necessarily existing.—But if, instead of this, we show him (*as I hope to do*) that the existence of man is NOT NECESSARY;—and, that his sufferings as a species, more than brutes, are NOT ACCIDENTAL, but are the consequence of being, for some wise end, placed under ANOTHER SYSTEM OF GENERAL LAWS, he then will have nothing left to object, and cannot deny that a *moral* hope arises from it, unless he be a downright atheist, and deny

that the world is the work of a good Being, at all.

The following matter is connected with, and will farther illustrate the importance of the present subject.

THE SECOND REASON. — The *supposition* of every species of beings existing *necessarily, or unalterably, for the good of the whole Creation*, is one which seems to have operated far, and wide; and it must be exploded here, as being highly prejudicial, while fortunately it seems now to be totally disproved by facts.

Archbishop King has maintained this doctrine at large; and it has been asserted by various popular writers, among whom, besides Mr. Addison as already mentioned, we find the admired poet, *Thomson*, whose creed herein I shall quote, because it minutely shows *how rigid is the demand of the hypothesis*, for the existence of *every species*, small, as well as great.

“ with all
“ Those rolling spheres that from on high shed down
“ Their kindly influence: not these alone
“ Which strike ev'n eyes incurious; but each moss,
“ Each shell, each crawling insect holds a rank
“ Important in the plan of Him who fram'd
“ This scale of beings,: holds a rank, which lost
“ Would break the chain, and leave behind a gap
“ Which nature's self would rue.”

Mr. Pope, too, seems to hold the same philosophy; and, by the well merited popularity of all these writers, this belief of *an UNALTERABLE fulness of minds in Creation*; has perhaps become the creed of all reading classes.

Now FIRST.—I object, that the hypothesis in question (though not so intended) questions the Power of GOD, by supposing that he could not make all this vast Creation, without making the good of the whole depend on the unalterable stability of all its minute parts.

SECONDLY.—It degrades the human mind most unjustifiably, by treating it as

but *a link* of one unbroken chain of animal beings ; though we know that the *break sudden*, and the *distance* between the part is *immense*, decidedly proving that no such chain was designed, or is requisite.—By the way, while the *figure of a chain or scale*, is before us, I cannot avoid observing again, what a preposterous appearance it gives to Nature's work. *Monkies* hanging next links to *men*, though at an immense distance from them ; while from monkies downward, we observe *a close consecution* and *gradual reduction of minds*, each following link being so near in *size*, and *shape* to that next above, that it is only by stepping over *several at once*, that we can discern any difference of *intellect* ;—a chain whose growing diminution is *so beautifully regular*, and *exquisitely minute*, that we are lost in admiration in *reflecting* upon it, for *behold it* we cannot.— Surely those who consider this chain must believe, that Nature works very strangely,

when she could not continue her plan, or find any *intermediate stuff* to fill up that immense CHASM from *monkies*, or *elephants*, to *man*, so as to make her CHAIN *all of a piece*. —Had she indeed meant MAN for this chain, we may be assured, the work would have been *gradual*, or *uniformly proportioned*.

Let it not here be thought that I undervalue the sagacity of instinctive tribes.—Setting aside those lesser animals which possess a *heavenly-high instinct*, I have often observed, and admired, those who act by a *lower reason*, especially our *next brother link*, the *monkey*: And, after giving each its due, I assert, there is a *greater chasm* between monkies and men, than between mice, and monkies.

THIRDLY.—But, to decide the question as to the *necessity of existence*, we now learn from the reports of Naturalists, and from our better knowledge of the interior parts of the several continents, that *animals have, at*

some time, existed on this Earth, whose species exist no longer.—This discovery, unless it can be disputed, (of which there appears not the least probability) must set the question at rest, by proving the *hypothesis* of a *necessary chain of animal beings* to be wholly void of foundation in fact; and I apprehend it is a discovery which may be hailed, as of the most welcome importance to us, in regard to *a moral argument for a future state*.

Let it be observed with due respect, that the *hypothesis* against which I bring this decisive evidence, was made up to *the state of natural knowledge at the time*.—It accords with very wide conceptions of GOD's goodness; and is certainly at least *countenanced by an appearance of fullness* in the Creation, insomuch that, *in a loose sense*, we may always talk of a chain of beings, or of a plenitude of minds: Yet it must be owned, there never were means of investigating the question, *on that side*, so as to furnish its ad-

vocates more than a mere conjecture ; which might at any time have been questioned, even were there no evidence against it. And, as I have already noticed, the advances which have been made in natural knowledge *since those days when the notion of a chain or fullness of minds was adopted*, presents a totally new prospect of the designs, or economy of CREATION, vastly different from what could have been entertained by those earlier inquirers.

Upon this change of prospect, it behoves us henceforward in our moral inquiry, to remember, that instead of saying with Mr. Pope,—“*beast was made for man, and man for beast;*”—we have to say, **MAN was made for HIMSELF, and beasts for themselves**; and that either one, or both, may be, *or not be*, at GOD’s pleasure, without the least inconvenience to *the whole of Creation.**

* For a satisfactory report of the state of this inquiry, the reader may consult **M. Cuvier’s “ESSAY ON THE**

In the present view of things, therefore, unless evidence arise to contradict the decisions of naturalists, we must necessarily admit that *any species of animal might as well have been omitted in Creation, or be now done away*, as those which are *actually found to be missing*: and in this case there can be no shadow of pretence, *with philosophers*, to deny that **MAN** *might be of this number*.— It is equally obvious, that since the existence of no particular animal is requisite for the *good of the whole*, therefore **MAN** might as well have been made (had **GOD** so pleased)

“THEORY OF THE EARTH,” recently given to the English reader, and from which the following opinion is transcribed.—“From all these considerations it may be concluded, as shall be more minutely explained in the sequel, “that none of the large species of quadrupeds, whose remains are now found imbedded in regular rockey strata, “are at all similar to any of the known living species;— “That this circumstance is by no means the mere effect of “chance, or because the species to which these fossil bones “have belonged, are still concealed in the desert and uninhabited parts of the world, and have hitherto escaped “the observation of travellers; but, that this astonishing “phenomenon has proceeded from general causes.”

with his present organic BODY, and *a MIND equal to, or a little above, that of AN ELEPHANT*; with which I argue, and so many high authorities admit, he would have been *happier*, as an earthly being, *than he now is*.

The explosion of the hypothesis of *an UNALTERABLE scale of minds existing for the good of the whole*, is of the utmost importance here.—The conclusions to which it led are these, That it is better that any species of beings should be less happy *than it might be*, than that such “*species of beings should be wanting to THE WORLD*:”—And—“that there could have been no *partial alteration of this system, but for the worse as far as we know; at least not for the better*.”—Here now let us observe, that the main reason why it was supposed there could be no alteration but for the worse, is the good of “THE WORLD.”—Therefore the *hypothesis* seems not merely to say, that when any spe-

cies was created, it was fitly to make a small sacrifice, or suffer *a little evil*, for the good of the whole, *in order to the enjoyment of great good ITSELF*; in some such way, as a man in civilised society gives up a part of his *natural liberty*, for the sake of *great benefit to HIMSELF*; but if he chose to withdraw, *society could do as well without him*.—The case here supposed is quite different; for it seems, by the hypothesis, that *every species* that has been created, *must exist at all events*, rather than that any one species should be “*wanting to the WORLD*;”—which want we also see, *Thomson says*, “*Nature's self would rue*.”

Now, were there indeed any such necessity for the unalterable existence of every created species, I think *Human Nature* might *rue*: For it would seem to threaten our moral hopes, seeing that our lot as a species, whether happy or unhappy, might well

be supposed to be made subservient to *so vast* a consideration, as the *good of ALL CREATED WORLDS.*

I suppose every thing that exists is adapted to the other parts of Creation; but I must certainly conclude that the **WHOLE** is infinitely too grand a contrivance, to have its good dependent upon the **UNALTERABLENESS** of *all its minute parts.*

It is here to be stated, that as *a compensation for the supposed necessity of existence*, the scheme thus opposed makes an equitable supposition, that no species has been created so imperfect, but that the *good* of its earthly state at least *out-balances* the evil, in some degree.—Now I will not here rigidly inquire whether the advocates of that scheme have not, in *some of their detached admissions*, questioned the fact of this *good balance*: but I will observe, that supposing the *balance to be good*, **ESPECIALLY IN REGARD of the HUMAN species**, the Sceptic is thereby furnished with

a DOUBLE plea. For if *man* exists, *first*, for so good a purpose as the good of the whole; —and if, *besides this*, his happiness more than equals his misery; what right has he to expect a future state of reward on the ground of GOD's justice, since he is *already a debtor for a balance of good?*

I so far agree with the scheme in question as to suppose, That no change would be for the better *but such changes as actually do take place*;—That “*whatever is, is right*,” in the grandest or *ultimate view*;—and, That one instance of this is displayed in the *better adaptation* of the *human mind* for another state, than for this one.—But, as it seems now reduced to *a fact of experience* that **ALTERATIONS do take place, without injury to the whole**, we perceive that the *noblest of earthly beings* might have been left out without any evil to **CREATION**: and therefore, no man but a downright atheist, none who believe in the existence of a **GOOD**

INTELLIGENCE RULING THIS WORLD, can possibly suppose HE would have created by far the *nobler beings*, to be more miserable than the *basest*, if this were the ultimate state.

The reason of man's suffering from his *high endowments* is plain : evils are their natural fruits here. But, *his receiving those endowments* is absolutely without any apparent reason, or need, to make an earthly being happy.—What more would any *Theist* desire, than to have this position made plain and undenialble, as I trust it must be, by all the evidence arising in our comparison of the **TWO ORDERS** of *earthly minds*?

The grand points for us to rest upon, are these,—

That MAN does not exist for the *whole Creation*; but for HIMSELF.

That he has a capacity for a *higher state* than he is now in.

That, *here*, he would have been HAPPIER

in a *lower order*; that is, with a NOBLE INSTINCT instead of REASON.

That *changes*, or *removals of species*, actually do take place on Earth.

And, That there is ROOM enough for him in the INSTINCTIVE ORDER.

If these positions prove sound, no Theist can doubt why man is placed in the *higher and more miserable order*, rather than in the *lower and happier*.

THE THIRD REASON to be considered in this Section, regards *the dignity of reason itself*.—Upon this I think little need be said. It can be no disparagement of reason to suppose it more fit for a *higher sphere of action*, than a lower one: The nobler thing, of every kind, is usually less fit for the more mean office, or situation.

So noble a thing is reason; and so much pride as well as various pleasure, does it afford us, together with its vast and innume-

rable evils, that it is *only in comparison with instinct* that we could possibly form a just estimate.—Had *no instinctive order* of beings existed to afford us this occasion, or, had the change been *gradual* from one ORDER to the other, we should have had *no land-mark* in this search,—no moral argument from *essentials*, which (be *thanks to GOD*) we now have in a very high and significant blazon of two different orders.—

When different objects are given to our view, comparisons of various kinds may arise.—The elephant is a tractable, a useful, and, above all, a *noble animal*; he bears his rider on high, towering over all other creatures; and affords him, as he goes, a view of the surrounding world, upon which he may look commanding down: But, for the general low drudgery of man's service, the *horse*, or even the humble *ass*, is much better adapted, or more fit.—Then why should not *reason* be found less fit than *in-*

stinct, for this earthly state, if it be the lowest, and most *unfit*, of two spheres in which man is to act.

The FOURTH REASON is, as to the probability from the acknowledged attributes GOD, that instinctive animals should be made happier than man, on Earth.—Now, we have seen that there are very obvious and unavoidable reasons for *the far greater part of HUMAN misery*, since most of it arises in the *moral liberty of man*, and *the involved evils of foresight and retrospect*.—We therefore must confess the fitness of it to at least a very considerable extent.—Let us then turn and ask, what reasons appear that *brutes* should be made miserable, who are void of both *liberty and forethought*; of *understanding*, and of *blame*.

There appear to me but four conceivable reasons for placing sensitive beings on this Earth.—It is either as a *gift of happiness*;

a state of *trial*;—of *reward*; or, of *punishment*: unless indeed we suppose it some compound of these.—Now the mere *Theist* must naturally suppose that man, being endowed with moral capacity, is placed here to suffer in some degree, if only in the way of probation: and the believer in *Revelation* is bound to consider his species as having transgressed, and justly sentenced to suffer, in this life at least.—But both these reasoners must equally admit, that *brutes*, (*having no moral capacity*) can neither be placed here for probation, nor have deserved punishment unless for some former life. Therefore, neither of them can think it right that instinctive creatures should suffer more of evil than is rendered unavoidable by their organic condition, if there be no better reason than to keep countenance with *human misery*.

Perhaps no man doubts the happiness of a *dog* caressed by every body,—proud and secure in the friendship of his master,—and

continually grateful and content.—This animal's life is one scene of good ; and yet no one ever thought of feeling discontent at observing his happiness.—No well disposed person ever feels chagrined at beholding the happiness of any harmless brute ; and, since we approve the thing *in every particular instance* that comes under our view, we can not philosophically object to it as a *general fact*.

The confessions of all ages are united as to the fact that good men are often subjected to great miseries, while the wicked live triumphant.—Now, if it were for us to judge, at all, of this, we must surely think it *more fit* that *innocent brutes* should be happy, than that *wicked men* should prosper in their wickedness.

The usual feeling that arises with us upon any view of animal life, is *to sympathise with it*. If we see a brute in distress, we are pained, and would kindly offer relief.—

Again, when the lamb, or the kid, skips on the green, or the birds revel in the trees, we are *made happier by beholding them happy*, even though we be distressed by our own state at the time.

We may observe, that wicked and most dissolute men, when taken together with innocent persons for the commission of a crime, have often so strong a sense of right, and a *desire* also, as to express anxiety that the innocent may not suffer with them. How much more, then, ought all good men to confess, that, so far as appears to us, instinctive animals *ought* to share all our sensual goods, for which their organs are obviously adapted; and at the same time be exempt from our *moral* and *intellectual ills*: which done, leaves them the advantage to a vast amount, so far as regards this life.

So directly, and strongly, must the natural justice of this come home to the bosom of every man, in every rank, that, besides be-

ing such a conclusive evidence for our HOPES, it affords even a strong additional evidence of the *existence of a GOOD GOVERNOR OF THE WORLD*, to find, that unoffending and *un-aspiring* creatures are made actually happier, than other creatures which are placed here under PROBATION *at least*.

I would not have it mistaken that I, for a moment, suppose the existence of GOD requires any additional evidence. But I deem it important in a general point of view, as well as to the subject of our hopes, to point out, that the greater earthly happiness of brutes HARMONIZES MOST BEAUTIFULLY with all the other instances we observe of GOD's GOOD GOVERNMENT. And it must not be forgot, that whatever I, or the generality of men, may believe, there have been, and now are, in the world, some men unhappy enough to require additional proof, that they were created and are supported by a wise and good Being.

SECTION FOURTH.

A TEST OF THE GROUND OF THE PRESENT
MORAL ARGUMENT,—AND A GENERAL REA-
SON FOR THE PROBATION OF MAN.

IN order to illustrate, beyond the chance of misconception, the nature of the ground upon which this moral argument is built, it may be necessary to contrast it, a little farther, with a scheme which, I willingly confess, appears good in its *first principle*; though I have been obliged to object to the superstructure reared thereon.

The doctrine of the EVIL OF DEFECT sup-

poses that IMPERFECTION is the origin of all the evil in the mundane System.— That doctrine assumes as a first principle, (*which may be granted*) that the CREATOR, though perfect himself, could not create any beings *absolutely perfect*, since this would be making the creature equal to its Creator.— It next supposes, that GOD saw it convenient, that created beings should exist in *a graduated series of imperfections*, in order to occupy all the room in creation, so as to produce the greatest sum of happiness; and that, to effect this, each species of beings was made necessary for the good of the *whole*.

The doctrine thereupon argues, that in proportion as *any species* is placed lower, or exists with a *greater degree of imperfection*, it must be subject to *greater evil*.—But, as an equitable provision, it supposes that no species is created so imperfect, but that the good it enjoys *out-balances* the evil, in *some*

degree; and thus it can be no loser by being made for the good of the whole.

This I think is all that is necessary for me to state here, concerning the above mentioned scheme, in order to justify my own views, by pointing out that the latter are built upon *induction*; the former upon *an hypothesis now opposed by facts*.

Now the advocates of this scheme of DEFECT, argue thus against the discontented. If men could imagine any other contrivance, or, form a system wherein their state might be expected to be bettered, "when they have "done all this, and completed their system, "they are at best only got to the absurdity of "putting this system into a higher class, where- "as all the different classes in every conceiv- "able degree of perfection were supposed to "be entirely filled at the first."—And here, I grant that, upon the supposition the doctrine of A SCALE OF BEINGS is true, this reasoning is conclusive; for it must be

absurd to murmur that we were not made *angels*, rather than men.—Ants and flies would have much more reason to complain, since they are placed so much lower than we are.—But let us mark, that both *this reasoning* and *the doctrine of imperfection itself*, are evidently identified with a supposition that HIGHER CLASS MAKES HIGHER HAPPINESS;—whereas, behold, *the very contrary is the main fact* so fully proved all along, and which is even virtually admitted by the maintainers of the doctrine of defect, themselves.

The moral *phenomena* of Nature, before our eyes, is a direct contradiction of the scheme in question, since the **BRUTE** is happier than the **MAN**. And let us observe, the only way that is adopted to salve this great sore, is to insist that man can make himself happier than brutes, by ELECTING some indifferent object in spite “of the *appetites*, “*senses*, and *reason*.”—Now I confess, I

never observe the mention of this power of election without astonishment ; but certain it is, that those who have not this power, must think with me, that the earthly miseries of men, more than of brutes, is a fact which proves, that higher classes *do not, as such, possess higher happiness.* Nay, this important fact is not confined to the *human species.* An *Elephant* is a vastly more perfect animal than a hog : yet I think the latter full as happy ; which he ought not to be according to the scheme of *Defect.* The Elephant has much mind, much sagacity, caution, and anxiety, more than the stupid and careless hog : he has finer feelings, although they *may* seldom be outraged. But the hog exists in *an armour of dullness,* and waking dreams of gluttony are probably his delight, when he thinks at all : He scarcely fears any animal, and *is a signal proof that IMPERFECTION IS NO CERTAIN source of misery.*— Many other brutes, (*and men equally*) prove,

that *defect of mind may rather give happiness, than misery.*—I may here fortify this fact with the words of the *preacher*,—“*for in much wisdom there is much grief; and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.*”—It is remarkable here, however, that this is language held by a wise man who appears to have had no view beyond *the goods of this life*, in which, doubtless, it stands *a conspicuous truth*; but it may now be most happily contrasted with the knowledge which indicates *a future state*.

It is plain, from what is stated, that any such absurdity as that of desiring to have mankind admitted in a higher class, *to attain higher happiness*, cannot be changed to my views.—My argument on the contrary is, the vast seeming impropriety, of **A LOWER ORDER possessing HIGHER HAPPINESS**; which is a state of things the very opposite to that which the doctrine of defect supposes;—a grand enigma of Nature, which, we see,

the doctrine of defect only attempts to solve *by a supposed power of election*; but which beautifully solves itself upon the supposition that we are the only beings, on Earth, in a state of probation for a future life.

Besides this, we see, the doctrine of defect supposes we could not have been made happy in the class of angels, (though we are actually fit for it,) *because there is no room in that class.*—*Good.*—But since the removal of some genera and species of brutes has actually made room *below*, we might certainly have been made happier in the lower class, had not a higher destiny forbade it.

I state these considerations in order that I may not be charged with a *visionary scheme*, of supposing that man might have been made happier on earth, by being made HIGHER in his Nature.—We see that the doctrine which forbids this absurdity is far more liable to be called *visionary*, because it rests its reason-

ing upon *a presumption*, here exploded, that higher beings are happier ; and because one half the classes in this scheme are but IMAGINARY *beings*, or, at the most, beings *whose nature* we do not certainly know, and therefore all speculation upon them must be merely conjectural : But, *we DO KNOW apes, and elephants, and various other happy INSTINCTIVE BEINGS, which furnish us A REAL COMPARISON* ; and *upon this REALITY is my argument founded.*

We come now to the SECOND SUBJECT of the present Section ; a subject hitherto vastly more important than profitable to the inquirer ; to account for the permission of *our most exceptionable evils* by an omnipotent good CREATOR.—The evils which fall under this description, are chiefly the INTELLECTUAL and MORAL.

The moral argument before the reader is

grounded, all along, upon the supposition that, at the very least, the existence of an INTELLIGENT and GOOD FIRST CAUSE is granted.—The desperate pitch of scepticism which doubts this assumption, is very far more rare, than that degree which is *satisfied as to a good CREATOR*, but nevertheless *doubts man's immortality* upon any ground, whether philosophical or religious. But unhappily there *does exist* such a desperate scepticism as the former; and it is chiefly built upon the excessive *evils of human life*. Now, although it is *the half believer*, the *wavering thinker*, and the *qualified sceptic* who doubts *only the immortality of man*, that I have nearest in view, in this moral argument; I do not think I can hurt a DESPERATE man by offering him a consideration which at least appears suited to his lamentable case. I will therefore suppose a Sceptic of this last description to express himself thus. ——— Your moral argu-

ment, drawn from a *comparison of the two ORDERS of minds*, and the greater earthly advantage of the *lower order*, would satisfy me *provided* it were also shown, *WHY a good CREATOR OUGHT to have subjected man to PROBATION*, instead of creating him *happy at once*; but, unless this be shewn, I may *doubt the GOODNESS of the DESIGNER*, and therefore doubt the reality of your supposed future recompense.—What I plainly see is, that life, *especially human life*, is full of misery: tell me, then, how I am to know from this that *the DESIGN is good?* Give me a reason *why man OUGHT to be placed here first*, to be thus *proved*; and I *may then trust* to your *hypothetical hereafter*.

To this severe question, the doctrine of Defect answers, First,*—“it manifestly appears to be better that we should contend with the present evils, than that the Earth

* *Essay on the Origin of Evil*, Chap. 5.

"should be void of all rational inhabitants."—Next, That human evils are better than "to take human nature entirely away."—Thirdly, That it is necessary we should be prepared here, "as plants in a nursery."—Besides all which, it is principally argued, *on the hypothesis of a scale*, That there was *no room in Heaven* when man was made; and though his mind is capable of the place of angels, it would have been unjust to displace them without fault.—Farther, if by the fall of angels, room is made for man; those *only* who have shewn merit, ought to be promoted.

But, says the Sceptic, Every one of these reasons is *but mere hypothesis*. — I see there is both *room* and *changes below*, without any hurt to the world; and therefore have a right to suppose *room above*. But what is more, in plain consideration of your scheme, I find that *happiness descends* as the *class ascends*. — To compensate for this, you indeed tell me that I have

a power to *elect* my own happiness,—a power which you call “*the greatest good, and that whereby man excel other animals,*”—“*the second property of which is, that it is able to oppose the natural appetites, senses, and reason, and can please itself in the opposition.*”—I answer, You may as well tell me I have a power to *elect myself six miles high.*—You admit that *bating this power* the brutes are better off, here, than man:—and upon this last, which *I inductively find to be the melancholy truth,* I must doubt the goodness of the whole design.—Even if your scheme were not contradicted by fact, I have liberty to doubt *any hypothetical proof* of GOD’s goodness, and I demand an *inductive proof:* I will not cavil, or insist on a justification of every particular objectionable point; but expect *some general argument* to show that the Creation is good according to our notions, which is the *only way we have of judging* GOD’s attributes.—In fine, I

make the evils of human life my grand objection : satisfy me **WHY THIS EVIL OUGHT to have been.**

Here, in order that it may not be thought I give my own precise sentiments in the name of a Sceptic, I avow that the immense ocean of instances of **POWER, WISDOM, and UNITY OF DESIGN**, in which the contemplative mind seems as it were to float ; and, the **GREAT PREPONDERANCE OF GOOD** in *the whole series of animal species*, would (if there were no other evidence,) fully satisfy me that the **GREAT AUTHOR** of all is good : But it is the inveterate Sceptic, whose opinions have in so many instances poisoned the hopes of other men, who is here to be satisfied, or silenced if possible.

First then, let us properly advert that *one of the foregoing reasons given for the probation of man, is, in fact, an inductive reason* ; meaning that **HABITS of virtue** are necessary even to the *enjoyment of the pleasures of*

Heaven, were we there : and this reason appears unanswerable when *applied to man's actual state, as we find him*; since a man of vicious habits, certainly, could no more feel happy in the virtuous manners of Heaven, than a blackguard in the society and manners of a gentleman. — It is but another way of expressing this reason, when 'tis said, we are placed on Earth like “*plants in a Nursery.*”

But here our Sceptic objects, saying, I demand to know **WHY** *were we* created so much as **LIABLE** to vicious habits.—Why not born good ; and then all this dreadful scene had been avoided ?—*Natural evils* might take their unavoidable course ; but, **WHY ADD INTELLECTUAL and MORAL miseries ?**

To this, it has indeed been answered, that *habits are formed by a succession of acts*, and therefore, *as acts, they cannot be INSPIRED.*— But here I must object, that I think this defence cannot silence a Sceptic of that depth

which I am now supposing to contend.—The word *inspired*, to serve its purpose, must here mean **GIFTED** *in any way*: and we find that many men *are actually* so happily *gifted by Nature*, as to suffer *scarce any anxieties*; and others, so as to commit *scarce any offences*. Farther, such gifts might, if God pleased, *encrease in degree*, and be *common to all the species*. This is a position *so undeni-able*, that it is vain to say we *could not* have been made with *good dispositions*.—Indeed it is evident, that the *necessity of gain-ing virtuous HABITS*, or the supposed *impos-sibility of men being born good*, has not been thought so strong as could be wished by its advocates, since it is only brought in as *an after or secondary consideration to the HYPO-THETICAL plea of “a necessary SCALE OF BE-“INGS,” and “no room in Heaven.”*

Since, therefore, the above defence, *so far as it is inductive*, does not amount to prove what is desired, namely that the evils in

question *could not have been avoided*, it still remains a vast desideratum to know *some good reason why they are permitted*.

Here now nothing appears left but to consult THE TWO ORDERS, to answer the Sceptic the best way I can.—And in the first place I would say to this man, that the whole *inductive* tenor of my present undertaking, furnishes a *general evidence of GOD's GOODNESS*; which is the only point he demands to have ascertained, *abstractly considered*. —— I have already argued, and shall do so more in detail, that *the innumerable tribes of brutes are far happier than they are usually thought to be*; and I desire the infidel's attention to the fact that brute life is *so inconceivably numerous upon earth*, that the *whole sum of happiness must be adorably vast*. —— Let him but observe, that the *whole number of the human race*, to that of all brutes, perhaps does not stand in the ratio of *one to millions*; and, as each happy

individual is *one in happiness*, whether it be large, or *small*, HUMAN *miserу* seems but a very *partial* evil.—Now, all those writers who have supposed man to be by any earthly means happier than brutes, have thereby thrown away this vast evidence of GOD's goodness upon the whole; but I offer it to the infidel, as an inductive and undeniable proof.

But, returns the Sceptic, I am not yet wholly satisfied.—If brutes are so infinitely numerous, and so much happier than I once thought them, I still see a very strange *enigma*,—a far nobler *order* of beings much less happy than brutes.——WHY IS THIS?

At this now I turn and say, suppose no reason can be assigned to solve *this enigma*, enough has been inductively proved, to make any man of a good disposition TRUST the rest.—But I do not leave the infidel thus.

To justify Providence in this case, not

hypothetically but inductively, is indeed a rare consideration ; but I think something would be effected if we could but only show, that *any* eligible reason exists which has not yet been estimated : for in this case we should at least prove, that the knowable reasons are not all exhausted, and we might well suppose that other and stronger ones may yet come to light.

With this view I shall presume to promise the Sceptic, in the way of justification of human trial, a *reason that ACTUALLY EXISTS as a fact* ; therefore, all that remains for him, or for the reader, will be to *judge for himself* whether it be *SUFFICIENT* to justify the probation of mankind. And though it becomes me to introduce the thing in the most humble way, it would be but a senseless treason to pretend that I do not think it a justification *fully sufficient*. At the same time I suppose GOD has *other* reasons for the probation of man, than will serve for *a mere justification*.

Strange as it may appear, if my Sceptic be a man of any the least *character*, I will draw the justification from the last place in the world where he would look for it ; namely, from **HIMSELF**.—To this, I know he will vouchsafe a smile of pity ; and say, I have CHOSEN *an adventurous DIFFICULTY*.—He is right, and a good omen it is, in being an anticipation of my very argument ; for I am just going to point out to him that **MEN CHOOSE DIFFICULTIES**, and that, *though STEEPT IN EASE, they cannot live content without them*.—In other words, I am going to appeal to a beautiful parallel, or agreement, which *actually runs* between GOD's design for man (*present and future supposed*), and that course which every proper man ELECTS FOR HIMSELF, *here on earth*.

The history of every age and nation, and our own experience, equally show us, that if any man (*the Sceptic included*) be born to

talent and virtue, and easy fortune to boot; whenever he begins to reflect on *his powers*, and upon *all external relations*, he scorns and forsakes an inglorious ease,—starts forth at the call of his country, or his species,—and either as a soldier, or in some other *public* course of utility, *wastes his life in a succession of hardships, toils, anxieties, vexations, disappointments and pains*: ALL WHICH HE CHOOSES, when he might have lolled on in soft luxury.—But, now the motive.—These evils are *chosen because* they form the road whereby a noble mind must get to its highest ambition, THE RESPECT AND HONOR OF OTHER INTELLIGENT BEINGS *around it*.

Let us mark the proof of this in the result of success.—Suppose a public assembly of men, of equal *titles* and *fortunes*; and suppose all of them equally noble minded, and basking in the sun of honor for a life of virtues *proved*, EXCEPT ONE who is obscured from public esteem, only because he has

had no opportunity to be proved.—All those who possess a noble mind, know how *humbled* and *miserable* this man must feel in the presence of the others; and how he would secretly deplore that his life had *not been a course of painful trials.*

Since, then, GOD has actually given to man that very course which we find *every proper man elects*, or sighs for if he cannot elect it; must we not adore the gift and the giver, and *deem it right*, by *our own rule.*

Now I suppose this undeniable *general fact* to be a truly philosophical criterion of the *fitness of man's probation*,—since it appears, that without having been proved *in the eyes of our compeers* we cannot be happy even here, on earth; and therefore, we could not be happy with all the other pleasures in Heaven, *without this BALM OF GOOD REPORT poured over them.*—What seems more characteristically to mark this criterion is, (as will be shewn,) that the *want*

of probation could not have been made up to us by any *other gifts*, or prevented by any *conceivable power*.

This general *desire of the human mind for trial*, is so important in the present case, that I will, so far as my present plan admits, endeavour to illustrate its extent and operation.

First then I assert, It is a **GENERAL LAW** of the *human mind* (and therefore perhaps of all rational finite minds) to desire *honor, respect esteem, or good report*; all which are degrees of the same thing.—All men of every rank, sect, and country, agree in this desire; and all are willing to sacrifice much ease or pleasure for it: though the **QUARTER** from which we wish it *may differ infinitely*, as well as the *mode* and *extent* of sacrifice we are willing to make in exchange.

The man who has not courage to shed his *blood* for honor or esteem, will shed his *gold* for it; and he that has not soul to do either,

will yield applause to him that has thus proved himself.—A bad man, *not countenanced by any other bad one*, will act well, merely for the esteem of his neighbours.

The american warrior, the asiatic enthusiast, and the european patriot, will for honor *choose* to encounter miseries that *twice surpass the average evils which God lays upon man*.—Nor is this limited to what are commonly called *heroic* minds. Men of every profession feel *an appropriate* pride in being esteemed, by those around them, for having *proved themselves* worthy in the trials incident to their station.

The very children of every country have an ardent desire to *show some point of worth*, to command the esteem either of superiors, or of equals ; and even the lowest dregs of human kind possess the very *same principle*, down to the wretch who will suffer *in any excess* to command the admiration of *equal wretches*.

So universal is this *law of the human mind*, that it is as rare to meet a case of a person who can bear the contempt of ALL, as to find any other instance of a *monster*. And what is more, there is no evil *so great* which even the lowest of mankind will not face rather than this.—A common soldier, as such, is an honorable character: but among common soldiers there is many a man who has scarcely one point of good in his soul, who will nevertheless *offer* to face death *where he need not*, merely to *prove himself* as stout a man as his comrades *Dick* and *Harry*, who are as worthless as he is, but whose disesteem he could not bear to suffer.—In a word, this balm of *merited esteem*, is to *man's happiness* what the air is to his animal life:—He often does not heed that he breathes it, but his *happiness would instantly die if it were TOTALLY withdrawn*.

Such is the *extent* and *force* of this law: and now to obviate objections.—It will be

said that thousands live without seeking this balm of honor.—Do we not see men who are born to fortune, and are heirs of honorable names, wallowing in luxury and careless of good fame: and thousands of others, who are content to live *at ease by any means*; some of them even execrated by all good men?—Yes, we do; but this is *no objection*.—Each of these men have, and *to be happy must have, some persons*, whether *good or bad, high or low*, in whose opinion *they think they have proved themselves well*. The man who aspires not to the applause of a senate, the voice of an army, or the acclamations of a people, looks for it from some inferior source: and if he can find it no where without doors, he turns to his own home, or to whoever are his *most intimate associates*.—All that the *law demands* is, that he must have esteem from those *whom he has himself elected* for his judges; or, in the worst case, must have the *hope*

that he *shall receive it* when his *proved* conduct is known: But, be it observed, that the law of his mind *obliges him* to elect those whom *he esteems*.

Now here a grand consideration occurs to give *infallible effect* to the law in question.—The Sceptic must admit, that upon the very supposition of an HEREAFTER, there will be **NO PRIVATE society**;—no *particular views*, or *habits*;—no *solace obscure from the public eye, there*. Every thing that has been done, must be *unerringly known*; and each man will have his just gradation of merit assigned in the eyes of all. If the public eye approve him not, he has *no one* to turn to who can console him. Farther, Every man on earth chooses *his own* standard of merit; some in *good*, and some in *evil*: But, by the supposition, there are none above but the virtuous; and *he must seek their applause*.

Now suppose any man admitted into such a society by *interest* instead of *tried merit*;

How could his spirit bear to be addressed thus,—“ You partake all our pleasures, and “ mix with us ; but we cannot yield you our “ esteem ; for though you have lived a harm- “ less life on earth, you never performed *any* “ *act of merit*: You have, in fact, no character “ that *merits respect*.”—How would any man bear to be told this in a company, here on earth, among persons many of whom he does not esteem, and all of whom he must soon leave ?—Then how much more intolerable must it be in a society which he cannot help honoring, and with which he is to spend *an eternity*?——We know that even the lowest mechanic, or labourer, would not suffer such a charge among his fellow labourers ; but would fight till his bones were broken, rather than not repel it.

It therefore here flashes upon us, as clearly as the sun’s light, that if pleasure only *without trial* had been granted, we could not *hereafter* be content : and, that the course of

trial we *voluntarily* encounter, in the case of a noble mind, is often FAR BEYOND the AVERAGE evils laid by GOD upon man.—

We are now to observe, that the *gratification* of having been proved, cannot be either *inherited*, or in *any way received*. It must be EARNED by the individual HIMSELF.—The Son of a line of fifty heroes, is never the more a hero until he has been *actually* under the trial.—He may be SELF-SATISFIED of his own heroism ; but history fully shows that princes of any spirit are never satisfied with this. In vain may pomp, pleasure, and even *assigned heroism* flowing from the mouth of flattery, all endeavour to stay his desire, or pour the balm of satisfaction into his soul : HE WILL be tried, in the face of all.

The law holds in every gradation, from “*Macedonia's madman, or the Swede,*” down to the child with the garden rake.—It germinates with human life itself. *Not Papa,* but *Tommy* must do it ; and when *Tommy*

becomes *Tom*, the adventure to be achieved must be attended with some difficulty, privation, danger, or pain. He that dare not aspire to wield the sword, will at least prove his ambition with the whip, or attempt some other scheme to catch applause, down to a good *song*, a *pun*, or *feats in the culinary art itself*.

In all cases of noble minds, whatever be the pursuit they engage in, it is remarkable how much they will sacrifice to excel, or at least to equal others, in the same race.— Pleasure, ease, fortune, health, nay life itself, are often successively given up to this pride. Without turning to far famed instances wherein *pride of emulation* is nearer than *gross self love*, a fine one is furnished us in the death and character of *Captain Clerke*, as related by Captain King in his account of Cook's Third Voyage.— This account first states *Captain Clerke's*

death, worn out by a lingering decline; and gives a short sketch of his services. It then concludes thus.—“It would be doing his “memory extreme injustice not to say, that “during the short time the expedition was “under his direction, he was most zealous “and anxious for its success. His health, “about the time the principal command de-“volved upon him, began to decline very “rapidly, and was every way unequal to en-“counter the rigours of a severe northern “climate. But the vigour and activity of “his mind had in no shape suffered by the “decay of his body; and though he knew, “that by delaying his return to a warmer “climate, he was giving up the only chance “that remained for his recovery; yet, care-“ful and jealous, to the last degree, that a “regard to his own situation should never “bias his judgment to the prejudice of the “service, he persevered in the search of a

" passage, till it was the opinion of every
" officer in both ships, that it was impracti-
" cable."

Now I have had opportunity to observe that Captain Clerke's noble disposition is by no means rare. I have the fullest persuasion that he persevered *longer* than he would have judged requisite for any other man to do, had his opinion been asked *as an inferior officer*; and that he did so *only* because it was *his trial* in the sight of his companions and the world.

It is indeed to be fairly admitted on the other side of the question, that many thousands are tried against their will; and that thousands of those who suffer well would eagerly avoid it *at the time*. But we *inductively know*, that our just *after pride* is always *in proportion* to the degree, or extent, of our trial: therefore every one will, **HEREAFTER**, have *a proportionate cause* to rejoice at having been tried.—Suppose, on the

contrary, that men were not furnished with this satisfaction when the time came? Would they not repine, and say; Our MAKER knew, though we knew not, what we should want to feel happy *with the rest*.—Why did he not give it to us?——On Earth, how many mixed minds, which have reached a contemptible old age, have blamed their parents for not subjecting them to a proper *course of proof*, by which they might have deserved respect?

Those who shrink from trials are but *the weak*; and, also indeed, the *deeply unfortunate*, as some lamentably are.—As for the rest, I will show the *general bent* by a picture of life which is very analogous to our case considered in relation to our Maker.

Suppose an over-fond Father to be the General of an army; and that while every one burns to distinguish himself, this Father always orders his Son into the rear.—How

would not the young man repine?— But now, as the service goes on, the Father calls his Son from time to time, and *promotes him* along with his brother officers who had *exposed themselves*. — How would his mind brook the eyes of his tried companions? If he have any soul at all, he would suffer a load of shame, and almost hate society.

— Many a stripling is a pest to society,— fires at a feather,— puts his own life in wanton jeopardy,— shoots his bosom friend, who has seen twice his age and ten times his service:— all for what?— not because he hates him, or is any way injured;— but only because *he had not been proved*, and could not bear even so much as the *suspence* of public opinion until the course of service content him, in having *proved himself*.

This being undeniably the general bent of man, should we not *hereafter murmur* had our MAKER denied us that happiness, which every wise father on earth would

grant, and without which, *it is proved, ANY STATE OF SOCIETY MUST BE THAT OF PAINFUL DESIRE UNSATISFIED.*

Upon this general principle, I say, *every proper man, if he had an ELECTION, would CHOOSE to be a suffering man; rather than be basely content as a brute, or even to being ingloriously happy as an unproved man admitted into approved society.*

Having, I trust, rendered it highly evident that PROBATION—*deep and systematic probation—is ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY to the happiness of man* in the presence of other intelligent beings, it must appear not only justifiable, but merciful or considerate in GOD to grant it to all, if all are to exist hereafter in each others view and society.—Now the Sceptic cannot help allowing that if a law be *good in GENERAL*, it does not argue against the goodness of its MAKER though some unavoidable *accidental evils* arise from its operation.—We observe, that the chief

means which GOD has taken to prove man, are the gifts and operations of INTELLECT and MORAL ELECTIONS.—Those, we see, in their cross operations produce, to *some individuals*, dreadful evils and far *beyond the AVERAGE* of human misery: But, while it has appeared that *the HAPPINESS of the whole species demanded the GENERAL PROBATION*, the *particular accidental excesses* can never be objected to, by the Sceptic, as arraigning the goodness of GOD.

The infidel must now either show us, that the Senator can be happy in the Senate,—the soldier in the camp,—the mother surrounded by mothers,—and the mechanic or labourer in the ale house,—*each of them UNPROVED in the eyes of their peers*; *else he must admit that the DESIRE OF PROBATION IS A GRAND LAW OF RATIONAL MINDS*; which desire, it does not appear that *any gift, or any power, could prevent*.

Another real and great consideration is always to be added to this last; which is, *the comparative short duration* of our trial.—The ATHEIST is not here set against the supposition of an hereafter: but only, *upon the supposition of an hereafter* he demands WHY WAS MAN PLACED, OR PROVED, FIRST ON EARTH?—Upon the supposition, then, of an hereafter, the Atheist *must allow its vast duration*: And what man would think much of *one night's dismal dreams* for a long life of happiness; especially when it is proved that such dreams are necessary to make him relish the sweets that are to follow?—Seventy years of misery, nay a woe of seventy hours, is truly a dreadful *absolute evil*; and it is no wonder that our present pains fill the imagination, and usually prevent all thought of their disproportion to the future: But, if the ATHEIST would reduce it to proportion, it is matter of the simplest process to perceive, that the miseries of a whole human life are

to eternity not in the proportion of one minute's pain to the life of man.—Futurity absorbs all such proportions.

If men could be made to *keep in view* that our earthly miseries are to hereafter, but as one twitch of pain to a long and happy life, they would doubtless treat it as a trial which they shall hereafter consider as *small*, as *any thing deserving the name of probation* could have been.—This is a position which begs nothing; for we *inductively know* that we do come to view many of our past earthly trials in a similar light.

Here I would entreat the reader's attention to the circumstance, that the LAW OF DESIRE FOR PROBATION operates both *heeded*, and *to a great extent unheeded*. I have already compared it to *the air we breathe*; and now I would have it observed that in the *natural world* it frequently happens that men are deprived of air and they

thereupon *die*, which makes the value of respiration *continually evident*; besides which we may be every hour put in mind of this effect: but *there is hardly such an instance to be found IN THE MORAL SYSTEM* as a wretch so low, as *has not one person* in the world whom *he thinks* has some opinion of his DESERTS. The man of *intellect*, or of *honor*, thinks he has it from *his like*;—the man of *taste, of business, or of play*, from those of *similar habits*; and so on with all.

So like is this balm of MERITED esteem to the vital air, that it is *not in the use*, but in the *total privation*, that we are called to notice its true value; and there are *few men alive so unfortunate* as ever to have *actually measured* this.—In general, therefore, we can only *imagine* it.

Observe that battered and mutilated military veteran, stumping into a circle of his own profession. He is gloomy and sad from hard service, a broken constitution,

and disappointment, and his whole exterior bears the marks of a life both *severe* and *neglected*. —— He is *not presently* alive to any pleasure; but is at this moment the prey of many stings and wants: Yet, I say, all this while he hugs an inestimable jewel under his belt, which gem he would not exchange to be the most favoured minion of fortune, without merit.—This jewel is the REFLECTION that the *whole army has seen his exemplary conduct* and rate him at no mean standard.—He may not catch himself thinking of the value of this treasure three times in three years; and in a fretful moment might possibly curse it if he did; but if it were possible for any one to attempt *to rob him of it*, we should then see how much he rates it at.

On the other hand, see that exemplary mother surrounded by her children and by other women.—Her cast in life is not obtrusive, and one might think it but little glori-

ous. She has had affliction enough to bear and rear her family ; and has perhaps often murmured at the hard trials of domestic life : But now, *setting affection totally out of the question*, I would be glad to know for what she would resign *the pride* of having suffered so much and reared such an offspring. And here I do not mean that SELF-SATISFACTION which follows any good conduct : for though this is *a real* and *an important* satisfaction, it is quite *a different feeling* from the CONTENT OF PROBATION.

—The good mother, or any other good person, is *self-satisfied when alone*, or before GOD : but the mother's great pride of probation is when *other women*, or all the world, are looking on.

The same principle operates upon every man, woman, and child, in one way or another ; usually upon each in *their vocation*, or approved society of whatever kind.—Weak or silly minds only are excepted by this

law.—It is no breach of the law that either *a worthless wretch*, or *the most noble of minds*, *may* be reduced to an almost *total privation* of esteem from others, and yet seem to bear it.—In the case of the former *there may indeed be* such a **MONSTROUS depravity of soul**, as to care little for any such thing:—but in the other, or when a mind that is good and strong in any degrees is *totally obscured*, or *totally wronged of its due*, I confidently assert that either this mind must be *bouyed up by a HOPE* of being justified *here, or HERE-AFTER*; *OR else, it must be truly MISERABLE.*

If this is so, as seems in the highest degree evident, it comes completely home to the severe demand of the Sceptic, to know why man was not placed *at first* in Heaven: and, (as I promised) the justification will come from the Sceptic himself *if he be a man of any dignity of mind.*—It matters not how unpleasant men may find the trial as

they go along, (like short-sighted children under education, or medicine,) since it is inductively and universally shewn that men must be both proud and happy at it *when they come to the EVENING of their destiny.*

Here some ungracious malcontent may perversely ask, Is it any thing new that men have emulation and love to show themselves?—I answer *no, certainly.*—Have I not already said it operates *heeded?* which all the world knows: and indeed perhaps there is no moral general fact that is not known. But it may be, and I believe is new to sound the *depth* and *extent* to which this law operates *unheeded;* and *to apply it as a justification of Providence.* And if this has been done before, by any one, I shall be at least happy in strengthening his views by an unbiassed suffrage.—Whatever the Sceptic *who complains of evil* may say, I think he would have started, at first, to have

heard in any company the following proposition—*Men could not be happy without the evils of life.*—And yet I think this paradox is proved beyond the objection of any man who is *in earnest*; and if my Sceptic is not so, that is *his affair*.

Here it yet remains to advert to some other reasons (subordinate ones I suppose) which have been assigned for man's probation: such as, that he could not have properly appreciated good without having tasted evil: and, that his trial yields him a comfortable **SELF-SATISFACTION**.—Both these reasons have *a real existence, as facts*; and I by no means wish to lessen their weight; but still I must think them minor considerations, and very inadequate of themselves.

And here, to set this in a clear point of view, it is highly necessary to distinguish between **SELF-SATISFACTION** and *our sense of the approbation of OTHERS*. This more

particularly because I suspect, that our very general exertion to obtain the esteem of OTHERS has been, by the writers in question, often erroneously *referred* to a desire of SELF-SATISFACTION.—I shall view this matter as I have done all the former, *inductively*; and refer every man to his own feelings, to judge of it.

SELF-SATISFACTION is a *solitary feeling*: but the sense of the APPROBATION OF OTHERS is only *social*.—No man has any desire to show himself a hero, an orator, or an artist, in the midst of sheep, or among herds of cattle: But he might be *self-satisfied* that he is either of those, even among sheep or kine.—Nay, he might feel so though he had never been *actually proved*; and it is undeniable that though men *require proof* of their fellows, they are *very apt* to take THEMSELVES upon trust.——As an instance of this, I myself am as fully *self-satisfied* how I would act in many cases in which I have

never been proved, as I ever could be by *actual* proof: and I always think that GOD knows, and will judge me as much upon these principles, as upon any performed act; with consideration for *intensity*, *deliberation*, and *continuance*, of *unperformed* conduct.— Thus I think the SCEPTIC may object, that such mighty evils as those of *probation*, are *not necessary* to our *self-satisfaction*.

But what is more than all this, if we analyse these feelings, we shall find that the *desire of probation before others*, *actually presupposes self-satisfaction*; because no man, but a fool, ever offers himself for the combat unless he is *beforehand self-satisfied* that he can fight.

Here now we clearly distinguish that it is not for self-satisfaction, but for the satisfaction of *others* among whom we must live and whose esteem we must gain, that emulation and virtue are so constantly exerted.

Truly it is deeply irksome to a noble

mind to receive direct and obtrusive praise in the sight of *equals*; but does any one suppose from this, that the *modest man* is any the less sensible of *having proved himself to others*?—Does the rich man value his gold the less because he does not taunt his neighbour with the want of it; or, even, though he may really dislike to have it the subject of present remark?

I may repeat, that if the approbation of others is so strong and general a desire here, in the sight of those whom, as earthly beings, we must soon leave; and the greater part of whom we have but little respect for; how strong must be this feeling in a society all of whom we must esteem, and remain in their sight to all eternity?

Next, with regard to that other reason, that we could not appreciate good without having tasted evil.—This seems to apply to two very different objects;—To our adoration of GOD; and our own relish of enjoy-

ments.—Now it may be, that trial is useful for the *former* of these purposes; and it is certain that it gives a relish to the *latter*. But it does not appear, *inductively*, that men in general would volunteer a fit of the gout, for the sake of afterward contrasting it with sound health; though the average of men will hug any opportunity to risk even *limb*, or *life itself*, for *general applause*.

In fine, Probation is at once the opprobrium and the talisman, the sorrow and delight, of human life. It is the morning joy, the noon-day pride, and the evening solace of man's earthly race: it gladdens the eye of the child; raises the sparkling crest of the mature man; and gilds all the recollections of the declining veteran with a serene lustre, to have *proved himself in the EYES OF HIS SPECIES*.—When the trial draws to a close,—when the MIXT of human feelings and actions has stood the fire; the war of heated elements,—the crackling and ebullition, have

ceased;—and the remainder is to be examined; PROBATION is *the pure gold* at the bottom of the crucible, and all else of the heterogeneous mass has clearly manifested itself to be froth, fume, and vapour;—*vanity, and vexation of spirit.*

I therefore find no *inductive* justification of Providence *so general, so strong, and so indispensably NECESSARY to our content*, as *the gratification* of our desire to prove ourselves in the sight of OTHER INTELLIGENT BEINGS around us;—nothing which shows THE DISPENSATIONS OF GOD so AGREEABLE TO THE ELECTIONS OF MEN.

My plan does not admit of enlarging to consider all the various relations of the general fact which has been offered here, as *MORAL ground of hope*. I shall therefore only subjoin a few general remarks or conclusions.

First.—The *only* point required to render the argument from brutes a *complete moral indication* of a future life, is, that *we believe the existence of A MORAL GOVERNOR*.

Secondly.—If it was a vast absurdity in the *Ancient Greek Atheists*, to suppose this great Universe the work of any cause *less than intelligence*; that absurdity has become *ten fold vast* from the subsequent augmentation of *Natural Light*. And therefore, an atheist must on this ground be *a growing wonder*; even if we chose to suppose *Matter* made to his hand, and let him get over the absurdity of thinking that *motion began without an intelligent cause*.

Thirdly.—The ineffable *Wisdom* displayed,

even within our limited view, is of such a *nature* and *extent* as cannot possibly be supposed combined with *wickedness* in the designer; *because* wickedness, so far as we know it, is ever the result of *wants*, of *short sighted views*, and *an intention* of the designer *to better himself within those views*: neither of which can be supposed of any Being powerful and wise enough to form this Universe.

Fourthly.—The two last considerations are amply sufficient to claim the reliance of all but depraved minds, and to assure us, that the evils of human life are permitted for some great and good end; even though we could not have assigned any reason for it which might appear sufficient.

Fifthly.—Besides the foregoing indication of **GOODNESS** in the **GOVERNOR**, the whole of my present general view of Animated Nature is a faint glance at *a measureless amount of HAPPINESS* which **GOD** has bestowed

upon *innumerable series of sensitive beings on this Earth*: In other words it is, so far as it goes, though that is deplorably short of the *real magnitude of the object*, *an inductive evidence of the GENERAL GOODNESS of Creation, above the EVIL*.—Attention to the phenomena of Nature, (*which is the Sceptic's own rule,*) cannot fail to convince him that *brutes have vastly more happiness than misery*. But when he has ascertained this fact, he must, in order to deal *in the least fairly* with PROVIDENCE, stretch his conception to the *utmost*, and then *he will fall far short*, to estimate *the INNUMERABLE MIRIADS of animal beings which daily awake to joy*.—If, however, he do this *to his utmost*, he will be forced to confess that the number of *human beings* is so *comparatively small*, that though their miseries were even *altogether unaccountable* it never could *discountenance the general goodness of OUR MAKER*.

The happiness of brutes seems indeed to

be graduated, though by what rule we know not: and there may be wise reasons for this, as referring to their *past*, and perhaps to their *future lives*: But supposing brutes made for this life only, there is one thing which an *enlightened Sceptic* who has any sense of equity must admit, namely, that *infinite GOODNESS* would not make *rationality* the *exclusive object* of its mercy; but that wherever it creates the **CAPABILITY OF FEELING**, it is universally the plea for **HAPPINESS**: or, in other words, **GOD** surely made happiness the end of creating *all those beings* whom he has made *capable of FEELING THE WANT OF IT*.—It therefore follows that the happiness of *brutes* is **AS HIGH AN EVIDENCE** of **GOD's GOODNESS**, as is the happiness of men.

In concluding this remark I must repeat, on account of the inestimable value of the evidence from brute happiness, that this mighty Engine has been quite lost by those

writers who have treated *man as the happier being* of the two. And since the miseries of *human life* form the great ground of ATHEISM ; (while, *as a fact, it is not denied by any party,*) it is the more deplorable omission not to have brought forth the prodigious amount of brute happiness, to overwhelm this atheistical objection.

Sixthly.—Besides all these evidences, I have advanced an INDUCTIVE REASON for the probation of man ; which, though I by no means suppose it the only end of *Human Evils*, is A FACT so *strong, so broad and universal*, as to render any ATHEISTICAL cavil at evil at least puny and contemptible, if indeed it does not forbid such attempts.

Finally.—Though I would hold it contemptible on our side, to combat Scepticism with declamation instead of argument, I think (from this summary, without enlargement,) it becomes but a tame figure to say, that ATHEISM *lies fettered in TRIPLE BONDS*

OF ABSURDITY: and if so, and the fact of brute happiness be any thing like as I have viewed it, our MORAL HOPE *seems unassailable.*



END OF THE FIRST PART.

AN
ESSAY
ON
IMMORTALITY.

PART SECOND.

INTRODUCTION.

THE FIRST PART of this Essay has been chiefly devoted to the evidence of *others* as to the comparative fact of human and of brute happiness, and in following the consequences which seem indicated.—The PART which is now to follow, is but a detailed view of the same as it has appeared in my own experience; from which source it chiefly is, that I draw my conclusions.

A A

With regard to this amplification, one great object is to unveil the vast mass of brute happiness which actually exists on this Earth, or, to awaken attention to its **REAL magnitude**, which I take to be vastly beyond what I may denominate its **VISIBLE magnitude** in the eyes of all those writers who have considered *man* as the happier of the two **ORDERS**.—Against the views of those writers I am obliged to object, not only their denying the *variety* and *extent* of *individual* brute happiness, and their shortly slurring over such advantages of brutes as they have been obliged to confess; but also, their consequent omission, or rather *inability*, to make *a grand appeal* to the **INFINITY OF NUMBERS** in the brute order, which makes the **WHOLE SUM OF GOOD** so high a general evidence of goodness in the **CREATOR**.

What I wish to show in regard of this is, that men in general, in their views of brute

happiness, form a telescope of their imagination ; while human vanity always inverts it when directed to that object.—Nothing is easier than to err ; and it is for others to decide whether my views have avoided the opposite tendency. This is the very matter I would have *properly investigated by more competent judges*: and all that I conclude with confidence is, that if the whole sum of animal good in the LOWER ORDER be estimated at only *one half* what I conceive it to be ; it, of itself alone, presents annihilation to *atheistical objection*: besides the grand object of its furnishing us a more broad and philosophical moral argument for our own future existence.

So long as the defenders of Providence limit their views to the *Human Species*, they must stand the loud complaints of the *Atheist* against the prevalency of evil in this species ; *which they cannot deny as a fact*, nor have they ever been able to find any *unanswerable*

justification of it. But if the INFINITE NUMBERS of other animals be taken into the account, and they be proved generally happy, the miseries of the human species become but *an enigmatical EXCEPTION* to a general rule of animal happiness ; and the coldest calculator may well trust to its happy *solution*.

To render this undeniable by the ATHEIST, we have only to agree upon what must be the mark of perfect goodness in a creation of animal beings.—And here I think the thought that must start into every mature and reflecting mind as the main rule of granting happiness is, to bestow it upon every being (transgressors excepted) who is created subject to *feel miserable in the want of it*.—This indeed seems the broadest moral rule : but it also seems to be the narrowest that strict justice can sanction.—An Atheist who cries out at the evils of *human life*, or who would be satisfied were but *man*

made happy, and is totally dead to the good, or evil, that befalls *innumerable millions of feeling beings of other shape than human*; such an Atheist has, in my opinion, no conception of divine goodness, nor any right to ask questions. And here, that I may keep at due distance the meanness of cloaking foul practice under a fair theory, be it confessed, that few men have transgressed deeper in scattering annoyance among unoffending brutes than I have: And, what is more, I do not “take to my soul *the healing unction*” of a belief, (which I suppose is entertained by many *conscientious* sportsmen) that it was fit, to restrain the destructive increase of animals; nor even had I, in general, the excuse of a desire to partake of what was killed.—Those happy and unoffending animals presented a temptation to sport, which, in the situation I was then placed, appeared scarce less than noble. At least it was enterprising, invigorating, and, in truth, at that

unreflecting age, delightful.—I have indeed since reflected with deep regret, that one of the greatest pleasures of my happiest years was in a habit, which I am now sensible put me upon a level with the most destructive animal of prey: But self-love has not blinded me to the conviction that it is unjustifiable.—It is to discharge a feeling of my own that I make the Sceptic a present of this fact, and I am not anxious to offer to him any matter of excuse: But he will discern that the confession is by no means impertinent to the *main subject of our inquiry*, since it shows I am in possession of the EXPERIMENT (which is the best single evidence any man can have) of the great pleasure of a life which approached, as far as might be, to an instinctive one.—He who thinks it is impossible to enjoy such a life, and yet cherish nobler feelings; must have reflected very little on the INCONSISTENCY OF MAN, and perhaps scarce attended much to his history.

The fact itself does but prove, what is too well proved in innumerable other ways, that an individual's happiness often wars with true moral rectitude. But it cannot prevent our discerning, that it is a certain mark of divine goodness, to bestow good (except in cases of offence) upon every thing which is made *capable of feeling the want of it*; which principle being acknowledged, renders the whole sum of brute happiness a mighty manifestation of GOD's moral attribute.

I have now to apologise to the reader, for what he might otherwise consider but a silly impertinence; *a change of style*, which will be found throughout this SECOND PART.— The plain truth is, it rarely happens that those who are properly trained for such spe-

culations as the present, have gone about the world *and gathered their own materials*; while, those who have been thrown upon such experience, very seldom have any after bent for using it in this way.—What is yet more unlucky, if in the latter case a man happen to have such a bent, any advantages he may have gained of *facts*, he probably loses in the want of cultivated talents, to apply them to philosophy, or to fit them for the public eye in an age grown fastidious in literary taste.—Though labouring under such causes, I have nevertheless found, that when **HAPPINESS** and **MISERY** were the subjects to be depicted, a cold narrative style could by no means do them justice; and nothing appeared left, but to let Nature tell her story, in her own wild irregular way.

The statement of facts, the reasonings, and conclusions, are here the only fair objects of criticism; and I cannot suppose that any one who is interested in the *main subject*, will

descend to waste attention upon transgressions of any other kind, in a case where no pretension is set up.

It is a fortunate compensation of Nature that we often prefer our own deformities to the beauties of other persons. The reader is welcome to suppose this one reason why I have not called in the aid of cultivated talent to dress my facts and sentiments in some better mode: But my amusement is the searching of plain matters of fact, and I cannot stoop to appear in borrowed plumage.

—The SECOND PART was written before the FIRST. It claims all the liberty of Nature; and I have not ambition enough of this sort, to attempt to *civilise or reclaim* it.

PART SECOND.

SECTION FIRST.

THE ILLUSTRATIVE MORAL ARGUMENT; CONTAINING A COMPARISON OF THE TWO ORDERS OF MINDS.

PRAISE to Almighty God, by whose good providence all things exist, we HUMAN THINGS, by HIM endow'd with intellect to read his great design, may surely trust.— Else why would GOD inform the son of man, above the beast which *neither hopes, nor fears, nor knows of any thing beyond its feed?*

In all creation's range, no character seems

larger writ than this, that Providence hath nothing made without an end in due proportion fit.—The *bodies* of men and beasts are brothers by one common law; but vastly different are their *minds*. The brute lacks UNDERSTANDING,—useless gift for beings not destin'd to future praise, or blame: But man hath INTELLECT and WILL to choose 'twixt right and wrong,—*and CHOOSE HE MUST*;—then, *being forc'd to sow* with good, or evil deeds, shall he not fitly live to reap the field?

Utility admir'd appears in the least seeming of great Nature's works: and shall the mind of man—the wonderful prolific womb of human thoughts, impress'd with hopes and fears—the thing which thirsts for, and revives on knowledge—rare contrivance far above the rest,—shall *this* be thought the sole opprobrium of the great design—a *thing without fit use*? O wit of fools, and thought which ne'er can live till reason die. Sure

none can doubt that UNDERSTANDING bears the tacit promise of a future life.—In all the Universe, great means announce great end ; and by this law the mind of man is made to live.

Though he is gross in part—to sensual passions for a season fetter'd—man bears deepest stamp of future destiny : The present sordid working of his soul is, sure, its lesser occupation.—Forethought wings his prescient view through a long train of sublunary consequences, reaching far ;—employment high, which claims affinity with higher minds :—But, in advance of these immeasurably far, (unless he's sorely mock'd,) he hears at every turn the heavenly distant voice of IMMORTALITY? —it sounds unbidden in his ear ; its bode sublime *he cannot WILL, nor STOP.*—Who gives this voice a tongue, but GOD : —and *why* would PERFECT GOODNESS thus torment with alternating agony of hopes

and fears, like ague heat and cold, the short liv'd insect of an hour, who presently must rest in death, with all his useless suffer'd mockery of things to come?—Were this our utmost limit, would Almighty GOD, so manifest in merciful decrees, have grievously entwin'd the very texture of man's soul, with a vast world of various self-made miseries; and guil'd him, ever, with the figuring phantoms of sublime and heavenly thoughts, and exquisite perceptions;—*ALL, from first to last, made absolutely useless by a present death?*

This reasonable question rises, here, from a mere *general* view of good in GOD's DESIGN, without COMPARISON of things: and from this *actual fashion* of our minds, we chance might hope of future life, were there indeed no other sign vouchsaf'd. But when we turn to contemplate *each individual human creature's lot*, wise men collect a farther, and a stronger hope from the *unequal hap-*

piness of MAN to MAN :—the good one suffering for his good ; the bad, for bad made happy.—Doubtless this seems wrong for perfect work, in case there be no retribution-day ; since **JUST OMNIPOTENCE** could, surely, make the lot of all men equal as their worth.

Yet here the melancholy Sceptic, loath to trust, will say, that Nature rules by *general laws* ; and to maintain the justice here desir'd, would need continually break through her rules by miracles for every separate man.—Such prodigies, if not beyond **ALMIGHTY POWER**, at least exceed *the general scheme* ; and, since man shares the common gift of life below, 'tis vain to hope he shall outlive the brutes, his earth-made peers.

This deep despondency seems morbid Sceptic fear, improbably arraigning the vast mercy of **CREATION'S LORD**. But, happily we have a stronger anchor, far, to

hold our hope, than lives in the comparison of MAN with MAN : *For certain doth appear a deeper strange enigma still, in INEQUALITY of HAPPINESS of MAN to BEASTS, and this of REASON'S GROWTH.*

THREE GROUNDS OF TRUST now here are manifest, *from view of GOD'S BE-NEVOLENCE*; apart from evidence of PROMISE HIGH REVEAL'D and all the growing lights of PHYSICAL RESEARCH.—TWO, *of the three*, are obvious to all : The THIRD BE HERE OUR THEME. *We take it for our STRONGEST MORAL GROUND: 'tis living truth, and speaks to man a promise worth his care.*

Look round the many peopl'd Earth, full teaming as it does with countless tribes of animated things ; and ALL, *save REASONING MAN*, serenely void of FORECAST CARES and HEARTSICK THOUGHTS OF RETROSPECT. Yet what lack these of senses to enjoy the vari-

ous goods of Nature in a sublunary state.—Colours, and sounds, and tastes of various sense, glad them as sweetly piquant as they do the most luxurious man.—They sport, they love, they build, they hunt; 'tis seldom that they war in their own tribe, but live content, in calm retreat, or social intercourse: not tantaliz'd by cares for worldly weal, nor steep'd in worldly woes, nor deep tormented by forebode of what may be, or not be, felt hereafter.—Surely such a state well suits the tenants of *an earthly life*.

Of all the brutish tribes, observe how they are fitly cloth'd and fed by Heaven's sustaining hand; and such as fancy curious lodgment, richly gifted with rare craft of wondrous architect. Nor are they left to seek purveying arts, or policy of provident arrangement for the season's want.—How many a science deep directs their work; no jot their own design, but all the *partial gift* of bounteous Heaven?

Some enviable kinds make up the round of life in tranquil browsing on luxuriant fare: restrain'd from feasting never but by soft attacks, and welcome arms, of fascinating sleep.—Fearless they feed, and roam, and rest; *and have no thought they could be happier made.* Witness the elephant serene;—the towering elk;—the arm'd rhinoceros, who not an equal knows;—the placid fearless buffalo;—the gross luxurious glutton wild swine; and an endless train of equal happy tribes.

Other kinds, which ape the desultory life of man, live by their favorite sport, in all the wild irregular delights so highly priz'd by hunters in a human shape.—Health, pastime, enterprise, and appetite, by ultimate possession crown'd, make up the pleasures of a hunter's life;—as well the *leopard's*, as the *Persian lord's*.—And here the best that we can say, is mere equality of happiness between the highest sensual man and vilest

beast, each in his favorite hour: but this crude judgment may not stand the sanction of a full comparison. The beast enjoys his day *quite unalloy'd*. The chieftain's mind, much *reason-sick*, in vain would bar the inroad cares of *human life*; the neighbouring hostile power,—the home intrigue;—the treacherous bowl, or steel of dark conspiracy;—the demagogue, and turbulent uncertain thunder of the mob, or that, or this way rolling;—**ALL** *conspire* to overcloud his fairest day.—A thousand poisoning public and private cares, too long to tell, are yet untold; and, sure, *here's no equality* of happiness between the *lord of men* and *lord of beasts*.

The numerous kinds which graze the plain claim little of particular descent. Their state displays but small variety of good.—They feed and sleep, and wake to daily sameness with the past; and, in our eye, flat dullness seems to mark their mute con-

tent: But 'TIS CONTENT; and *while 'tis so no change is ever bliss.*—Besides, to those dull joys what joys do *men* prefer? What season of the day sheds thicker balm of rich delight on man, than evening hours serene; when full of cheer his soul o'erflowing teams with charity to all?—When doth the wary man petition man, but when he's full, and e'en the vilest soul is raised to generous mood? If aught of good inhabit his gross heart; that hour, by warmth of its own joy expanded large, it emanates.—Then let us not think small this bliss, so vast, itself a source of bliss.

If now we turn from brutes which roam on land, and view the various lives of wanton WATER TRIBES, how happy for the most part do they live.—'Tis true that fish are prey to fish: but is not man to man. 'Tis also true they oft-times hunger feel, in common with our kind. For all the rest, a happy life is theirs.—In downy fluid soft they

float; with ease they travel, glide, or wan-tou, as they will: For ever change, and find new bliss in sweet variety.—Daily warm'd to joy by Nature's fire, charm'd by its glo-rious light; made doubly happy by the two commix'd; they crowd the surface vast, al-ternate bask and play, in change continual.—Great length of life is theirs, both large and small: ever active, ever young; disease they know not, or but rarely know.—From harsh, or fatal contacts safe; no fractur'd limbs, no lacerated flesh, nor accident in aught, to agonise or stay them, ever seems their lot.—Climate and country, at their will, they change without impediment: their food is ready dress'd and ever in their way. In all things else (one only care apart) gay sport seems all their care.—Ye uncheck'd *human* kind who early drink of liberty's sweet fount; who cheer yourselves alike by Nature's fire; who hunt and bask and wan-ton as ye will, and of the *cankerling* morrow

never think, (how rude ye be, I care not) answer me; are not those simple sports of fishes life true bliss?

For all these goods, one ill alone is tax'd upon the watery race;—mere momentary dread of stronger foe *in view*; who, when he comes, but urges them to wholesome action of escape.—Perchance they're sometime caught: What then? The ill is momentary, and no malady they suffer a whole lingering lifetime long; in corporal and mental torture left to languish, melancholy, hopeless, bed-ridden, or poor, as *human beings*, millions, daily are: nor are the rich exempt.

Pain, when it comes, no gentle nerves respects; and in prospective view the rich feel most.—Observe the affluent, gay, voluptuous things which flutter in the sun-shine of a sensual round, arrested in their course by certain signs of shorten'd doom.—From that dread hour how chang'd imagination's tone; how spoilt their gust of every thing

that us'd to gender sweets.—Gay pleasures now curtail'd — denied — cut off:— Each cheerful thought to gloomy boding turn'd, or poisoning mix'd the two, by FORECAST of an ill not yet to come, perhaps, for many a day; though come it must.—Thus fortune's minions often linger on, a living death; and all to REASON owe the poison of their days.—Nor is this woe to *certainty* confin'd.—The world doth team with millions of our race, who live in daily fluctuating fears of ills which NEVER COME; *not less, for this, the torment of their lives.*

Besides the cares on which our foresight *justly* broods, of body, fortune, friends, and fame, how many *causeless fears* rise up in REASON'S EYE; phantoms in fact, but in tormenting real, sure enough.—In fairest peaceful cities, (every soul in triple safety lock'd) how many thousand female bosoms, through the tedious night, beat strong and oft' the larum of a tortur'd soul: Howmany

thousand hearts, scar'd from balmy rest,
partake the vigil of the trembling lamp;
and, forced to emulation, quake at every
whispering fissure's breath.—Such the
nightly bliss of *human kind*, secur'd by mo-
ral and by civil laws, by bolts and bars; by
all the pomp of guardian watch and ward!!

What *brute* would change its ignorance for
this,—to live on daily draughts of dire an-
ticipated woe?—To be as fish, compar'd,
seems paradise.

How easy 'tis to cleave the yielding brine:
to neither dig nor toil, nor prison'd be in
hungry, cold, and dreary climes; nor weary
travel on with chaf'd and wounded limbs,
and want of sustenance, as emigrating *man*
is fain to do when he would change.—
But, above all, how blest the watery race,
exempt from REASON'S CARES of every sort.

—Hath no man mark'd the sea-press'd
merchant, poring through the gloom of FU-
TURE with his carefraught beamless eye?—

pent up, in noisome frail and leaky vessel
prison'd close ; his fate bawl'd loud by ruth-
less elements, his melting hopes wash'd less
by every wave : his dismal deep funereal
knell beat heavy by the murmuring billows
on the body of his once stout bark, made
now the groaning coffin of a gallant crew.
None but Heaven can save him : nothing
in his sight but the capacious boundless
arms of Proteus Danger, now array'd in
foaming Ocean's form ; embracing close, and
to his horrid bosom pressing, the affrighted
ship.—Reduc'd to toil his few remaining
hours ; and Oh, far harder still, with tugging
heart-strings racking his stout manhood at
the thought of unprotected, unprovided
home : a lov'd and faithful mate, and darling
callow brood, all left to hold out mournful
piteous hands.—How oft at such an hour
hath this poor human sport of elements be-
held the playful PORPOISE rise, in myriad
legions, far as eye could reach ; making ju-

bilee o'er all the troubled sea. And when these wantons mark'd the way-worn staggering bark, more playfully they near'd, and shot, bright meteor-like, felicitous, full often to and fro, abrupt across the course of her mad flight, (at now its utmost speed) as though she grounded lay.—With these the burnish'd green refulgent gay DORADO's mix'd, in golden spangles set; the mottled silver TUNNIES, and variety of other surface tribes in seeming neutral sports:—all beautiful in forms;—in various colours vastly beautiful;—gestures exquisite:—in swiftness, each one marvellously wing'd.——Whole hours they wanton'd on; nor seem'd their bliss to cloy. In saucy daring to the surface, close, they slanted oft: here carelessly upturn'd their fine proportion'd silver sides, and golden water-wings, to show how gaudily they were attir'd. Then turning tail, in independence proud, (to others giving place) were off again; as if in sportive mock

at awkward man's distress, in his ingenious and advent'rous scheme to lord it o'er *their* element.—Rare happy thoughtless things, how oft the boding, pain'd, fatigu'd, and prison'd mariner, in envious comparison, hath thought ye blest.

But countless are the *kinds* of water tribes; and various are the *modes* in which they're happy made.—Full far from homeward seas, and near where antipodean wonders feast the sight, as on a day serene the surly ocean slumbering lay, and weary sea-beat galley floated fast asleep; the time hath been, the idle sea boy, in that calm and quiet hour made truant of his cares, hath by the searching ray of zenith sun down peer'd into the bosom of the treasur'd deep, where wondering he saw the secrets of a magic nether world, of exquisite contrivance for *appointed minds*.

Forth from the bottom high majestic rose phantastic forms, of coral palaces and spread-

ing groves, begirt with lawns and woody tufts, *all wond'rous submarine* ;—mysterious alleys,—grots,—and numerous nameless shapes of objects all around.—And through these scenes did wanton countless groups of various happy things, whose names (save they were *fish*) he knew not aught; but this much saw, that by their tasteful *zon'd* and *spotted coats*, of many a drug's and many a metal's hue, they seem'd high dress'd to revel in the decorated fairy haunts which then seduc'd his eye.

As thus he gaz'd, coy Nature (*mistress of the revels here*) for pastime chang'd the scene: For, by some varying light contriv'd, what first seem'd bright pavillions, gardens gay, and groves luxuriant; turn'd, in reverse, to dungeons drear, and caverns dark, and dismal scenes anomalous: while shapes of living forms confus'd, with hideous horrid heads, and waving outstretch'd giant arms, to fright imagination from her *human seat*,

made up the picture of a dreadful dream.—But this was only *playful Nature's mock*,—a drama made of various pastimes for the favor'd tenants of the place: For undisturb'd they rang'd, and soon new rays of sunshine bright made all as first; while ever, intricately gliding, sported on the happy tribes—blest natives of these realms.

Blunt are the seaman's powers to sketch out various Natures finer traits; his feelings rudely sear'd,—the inlets of his exquisite perception frozen up by chilling press of care and stormy toil: Else might we learn of many a fairy land, *no fairy land beneath the briny main*.

Thou ship-boy FALCONER, kind feeling brother of the nautic band, whose native simple tale of sailors' woe hath oft times wrung unwonted sighs from hearts of steel; whose soul was double temper'd,—form'd for enterprise of seaman hard, and rarely strung to feel and to express,—had not

rough Neptune snatch'd thee to himself, had thy ill fated ship liv'd round the point of HOPE, and far through many an intricacy of the Orient Isles thy muse's eye had revel'd in the varying charms of Nature's naked wiles, as our dull eyes have done; then might such scenes as now are told, in finer features trac'd, in other language sweetly cloth'd, have brought persuasion, (a rich cargo) to thy country home. But in its stead, rude speech of dry and humble narrative must, as it may, drag through.

Wherever live the watery race, from minnows to the whale, they live in sport.— All flesh must die, nor can these favor'd beings be exempt; But, small's the ill to them. Their trouble scarce begun, is o'er;—they neither sorrow long before, nor leave a wretch behind to sorrow after them.—What are the ills of such a life and death, to human woes;—to such as leave, and such as weep for, all their souls hold dear. To choking

agony of widow'd mothers, hanging over sons whose memory alone must longer live: To families from sweetest union torn; the sire and dam by death, or distance doom'd (oh worse than death) no more to meet; the tender offspring scatter'd o'er the world, to want, contempt, and woe.—What is an instant death, at close of happy life, to *foresight* that ourselves, or those we love, must onward miserable be,—to agonising *retrospect* of what we HAVE,—or what we MIGHT HAVE been?

Yon family, for virtue, grace, and union fam'd; whom not the venom fang of calumny had dar'd to bite; was by the cast of adverse ventures,—faithless friends,—reduc'd to omen of prospective indigence.—To save his fortune's wreck, and raise a drooping home, the father sought a distant clime, and sojourn'd in the sun beat realms of Ind.— His virtuous labours fortune fails to crown. But health and hope yet live; and brighter

schemes in native clime invite. He eager hastens home, where far more rich than golden treasures claim his care.—The ship has made the western bourne; the wind sits right for shore: the husband and the father glows with almost mad'ning hope's tumultuous fever heat.—Meantime (O long wish'd happy hour) the welcome missive flies, and greets the trembling hand of virtuous widow'd love.—Now sweetly soft convuls'd with struggling joy, yet not unmix'd with keen impatience for the bliss of meeting exquisite, the amiable mother waits encircl'd by her darling daughter group of budding sweets, and proudly burns to place them in a much lov'd husband's dear approving sight. Her soul sits watching in her ear,—her eye, —to catch the first alarm of actual bliss: Her lovely red and white, scarce seeming past meridian bloom, now faintly struggles useless, hostile banner'd under causeless hope and fear, so near at hand comes peace-

ful certainty.—But now the joyous day runs down his rapid course ; the night falls lowering rough : and hark (*O fate*) a Royal ship, for safety met, strikes full our lesser ship.—One horrid yell ; and down.—Alas what change in one sad moment wrought. A dearest husband, father, fortune, hope ; *ALL ALL for ever gone.*—O RETROSPECT, mark now thy cruel work.—What chemic drug, by wily searching reason conjur'd up, can give the tongue of joy to that death's counterfeit, and those rack'd statues of embodied woe, which e'en but now made up a smiling family of loves.

But soft.—A death-like grief is not yet death. The virtuous mourners have not thus escap'd a world of woe.—Life yet remains ; and Nature hath stern claims which may not be put off.—They must arouse and ply their talents 'gainst the stream of troubled life.—From shew of affluence hurl'd,— from equal friendships torn, and

humbled to the quick,—behold them sunk. The wonted flowing streams of courtesies now all dried up, or prudently through other channels turn'd by those who lately sought their converse: Rare a drop of heavenly sympathy, or sweet approving note, vouch-saf'd by their elect who ever claim'd the kindest name of friends.—By harsh demands now sorely press'd, their little wreck is scatter'd to the winds; and thus the lately gay and happy group is mingl'd with the dust.

—Now what a life to come? Can they unmake their thoughts, or *change* their feelings, as they may their now too costly clothes with some low drudge, to suit their present state?—*Can they forget* they once had wealth, polite amusements, emulating passions, flattering hopes; and took their little flights, the equals of those summer birds who now fly off from their cold indigence, as though some odious crime had

made them shunn'd?—Industry, truly, is their friend; 'twill doubly serve, to stay their needs and steep their recollection in oblivious toil: but labour late begun, with gentle unprov'd hands, and grieving disappointed hearts, must long prove heavy, harsh, and faulty armour 'gainst the sharp assaults of barb'd adversity.

The widow, ten fold wretched in the wretched lot of those her soul holds dear,—her cup with bitter poison'd to the brim,---now sorrows on: her days and nights make up one dismal sea continuous of woe, till death,—yet not a peaceful death,—present a dreary shore.—Disease and age assault before their time; the world grows pitiless beyond its first neglect;—the tortur'd mother's FORESIGHT casts long gloomy shadows o'er the onward course of her poor orphan lambs; and thus her Sun of Hope for ever sets: In secret wailings of despair she

sees, o'ercast with horrid forms of children's woe, her Star now dip into the dreadful rising wave of dark eternity.

O, what a fate is here if no bright land exist beyond this sea.—But no, the sufferer *must not hope*.—'Tis *human reason without hope*, is here the argument,— the *earthly state alone* of man, as well as beast.

Yet let us hasten to a close.—The forlorn orphan daughters, now to every chance expos'd, fall into devious paths.—Their early wooers chang'd ;—their gentle bosoms (how much torn by conflicts of just pride, 'gainst hard contending pangs of disappointed choice) are now to prove the shocks of libertine assault;

Happy thrice are they if virtue still their guide: Self approbation is their rich reward.—Penury,—neglect,—the want of progeny,—the sight of happy wives and mothers in their ill-disembl'd pride ;—the cold forlorn exist-

ence of the single life,—privation of great Nature's glad design,—are but mere trifling ills, compar'd ; not worth the naming here, to check the rising scale.

Vary now the action, or the actors, as we will ; all this is but a scene of common life,—a group of REASON's woes of every day complexion, and no rarity in all the world.

—'Tis not the bent, nor needs our argument, to search *rare* instances of human woe, or feeling harrow up with pictures of transcendent misery. All prison doors be therefore fast ; and let no dungeon groans escape to tell their dreadful tale : No ray of light pervade the dread abysses of tyrannic power, or inquisition cells, to raise a gorgon o'er the appall'd visage of the pitying eye. Let not a sigh sublim'd from thirty summers' deep concentrer'd rankling woe, distill'd from dungeons of a green and yellow dank, ascend to taint the air. —— **WHAT BRUTE DOTH THUS TO BRUTE?**—Compar'd

with such like *human courtesy*, is not *the tiger's gripe* a welcome friends embrace; *the deadly serpent's fang* a sweet, a soothing anodyne?—But yet, let all these ranker hot-bed **FRUITS OF REASON, ALL,** be hid: We have enough of ordinary growth to feed our argument.—By far the oft'ner wrong is that wherein the body's free; and yet the stricken heart is, by some villain's working, made itself the hopeless dungeon which conceals a woe that none on earth may loose. But be these also hid, there is no need to dip the pen in thickest gall of reason's misery; nor here depict such tissue work of agonising feelings all combin'd, of long endurance fetter'd in the soul, as might make *widow's woes* flit like shadowy superficial troubles of a summer's dream.

As little need we summon to this count the lesser rubs of life, the disappointments, cares, and chagrin, of the bustling crowd;—the honest service left unpaid,—the

cheater calling honesty the cheat;—vice riding impudent, and virtue in the dust.—These are but scum of ills, which float along the stream and transient pass astern, as frothy ebullitions by the side of speeding bark, which scarce impede her way, and leave no mark behind.——Nor bring we Nature's greater drama full upon the stage:—The horrid forms of *desolating* WAR, whose dire infernal page of actions long gone by, doth chace the life-blood from the christian cheek;—the deadly ills of pestilence and famine, fatal flood and fire;—of earthquakes, storms, volcanic bursts, and all the vast and fatal visitings which compass a whole land in one embrace.—The *very thought* of these, (beside the things themselves) doth canker deep into the anxious souls of all who *ever felt them—and EXPECT TO FEEL.*

What length of book could hold the tale of all these miseries—what time could serve to wade this sea of deep distress, and mea-

sure out the cares which all these bring to men, and *not to brutes?*—Could we depict the woes of **WAR ALONE**, 'twould ten times o'er surpass, perhaps, the total ills of ten times o'er the number of the brutish race.

BRUTES NEVER WAR, LIKE MAN:—In this and many other faults they are *belied*. 'Tis as *men* glut and get them drunk, and then their fellows say *they act like brutes*.—The lion wars not to maintain his offspring on a throne;—the tiger arms not for some province which his grandsire lost, or won.—No single shark claims homage of the narrow seas.—No crocodile claims *all* the Nile, as nat'ral limit of his proud domain.—Instinct's war is but a hunting ploy of killing one by one, and that for *present need*. In *brutes*, men harshly call it **WAR**; while in *themselves* (how marv'lous just) they softly name it *needful sustenance*.

Instinctive tribes scarce ever fight in legions, never in great hosts.—They hav'n't

sense for such sublime employment, worthy *man*.—How many brutes are innocent of blood in every way. And those which live, like man, on what hath life, but merely *go to market, as the best men daily do.*—The brute is least destructive even here: He stops when he is full; nor ever bleed whole hecatombs to feast his vanity.—Take size for size, full oft the veriest high school'd, bloodless, moral man in christian city found, *destroys as many lives* as might sustain the cravings of a *desart pard.*

Then WAR, O HORRID WAR, we plainly see, *is only one of REASON'S OFFSPRING DIRE:* and (woe the while) a few ambitious cruel men may ever let it loose, among the half wise millions of the human race, though nine tenths of the suffering hosts be peaceful honest christian citizens; not urg'd, but *dragg'd*, to murder of their kind.—To paint the features of this giant ill would claim a master hand.

To line its vast extent might here suffice.—
Be this much mark'd. In our illumin'd age,
when Science lights the world, and pure
Religion with her olive branch waves on for
peace and Heaven, *there's not a man alive*
who hath not liv'd while MILLIONS of his
kind have bit the bitter dust of ruthless WAR :
and all men surely know, the *outrag'd,*
houseless, foodless, groaning MILLIONS left
to curse the hour, bear dreadful deep propor-
tion to the dead.—There's not a land on
all the outstretch'd Earth hath in *our day*
escap'd this hellish scourge. In christian
Europe's wide embrace there's scarce a city
points its spires to Heaven, whose father's,
mother's, husband's, children's, *deep specific*
wrongs, (besides their general wants and
woes,) have not shriek'd out most horrible,
obtrusive up to Heaven's high throne itself
for load of madd'ning woe past bearing.—
Happy are the lingering victims left if DEATH
vouchsafe them speedy PEACE.—The rest live

miserable on, to drink, (who knows how many times?) the dreadful cup of NEW BREW'D HORRID WAR.

In savage, and in civil life the same ; the bloody work doth seldom cease : and ever is the CAUSE some good, or ill, IN REASON'S VIEW ; which, LACKING REASON, man would never covet.—INSTINCT *seldom slays beyond its hunger's call.*

At man's election is the SIN of war, though few may be in fault. But STILL, 'TIS REASON'S WAR ; and man, IF MADE INSTINCTIVE, might have liv'd as free, as do the brutes from this dire scourge.—THERE MUST BE CAUSE, THEREFORE, *why GOD hath made MAN thus* ; while brutes yet live at peace beneath their INSTINCT'S LAW.

Other giant ills 'twere vain to follow here, since one alone would fill a volume up ; and yet 'tis but a single one of many sweeping woes which deluge all mankind.—One wide, and deep, and deadly form of misery

indeed there is ; which we may barely name. It overwhelms us in a thousand shapes : we call it PRIVATE VICE :—'TIS REASON'S OFFSPRING, TOO ; and INSTINCT cannot give so dire a monster birth.—It genders quick in every land ; but quickest in the bed of luxury, now sought by high and low : and doth itself make up a world of woes enough to 'stablish our strong argument.

But, let us hastening mark.—'Tis foresight leads to WAR :—'Tis foresight leads to PRIVATE VICE :—and small's the sum of human ills,—(of feelings bitter,—passions dire,—and acts with evil fraught,)—but *have their source in FORESIGHT, or its FELLOW.*

Foresight fills the barn, 'tis true ; and builds the cottage snug : and *many a worldly good it does*, be gratefully confess'd. But what are these to INSTINCT's matchless works ?—The peasant's hut is easy of access to prowling tiger, or to prowling *man* ; and, if he 'scape them both, full oft he pe-

rishes by creeping serpent's gripe.—But, lo
the fenceless pensile nest on slender twig, in
magic strength of weakness safe, maintains
its chirping garrison in loud defiance of them
all.

In sum.—The mind of man is constant fed
(so wills **ALLWISE OMNIPOTENCE**)
from two vast chalices, each fill'd with good
and ill; but oh how great the ill of what
they make him do, and make him feel: nor
can he shun the draught.—Whichever way
he looks, or back, or forward, one presents
and may not be refus'd. It must be drank
though ne'er so bitter be it drugg'd;—a
dreadful discipline for moral purpose fit,
from which, *had man instinctive been* he had
been haply free.

Our theme is sober truth, and not poetic
flight. We may not in imagination figure
aught unfounded, with intent to lure, surprise,
or bias fancy to our cause.—If any think the

earthly vantage of *instinctive* life is less than here set forth ; we ask him *which are happiest of the HUMAN RACE*. The answer, too, lets take from Nature's self.—With whom the cares and woes of reason *least awake*, whose thoughts are most like thoughts of *apes*, or *elephants*, (if nature's greater wants be stay'd) content or pleasure oftenest dwells.

Observe the unfledg'd *infant man*. Be sure 'tis not the fractious child of vulgar luxury, by worse than foolish parents daily brib'd to *vice* and *woe*; but rude and coatless son of lab'ring peasant, or of savage wild.—Let him have food, we ask no more; then, turn him loose neglected out, to ramble in the genial ray of Nature's fire, stark naked on the sward; and let him mix in happy brotherhood with playful kid and lamb, scarce less of reason's sons than now himself. From morn till night, of each succeeding day, the **HUMAN ELF** will sport untir'd; nor

ever dream there's such a thing as woe in all the world.

But mark our trifler, now some older grown and yok'd in harness of the hated school :—made reason's slow recruit, and here amenable to drill of harsh and hard learn'd discipline, observe his clouded care-fraught visage and his heartless pace.—Where's now conceal'd the sparkling joyous front; the bound elastic, which well threaten'd to outdo the gambols of the mountain goat ; —the loud though inartic'late shouts of struggling extacy, which needed not of measur'd speech to make the ear-pierc'd echoing hills confess that he is blest ?

Now fast enlisted in King Reason's band, (but *not a volunteer*) the novice yields reluctant to the noble call ; and from this hour his cares and pains encrease in *number, shape, and magnitude*.—Pleasures, too, will sometimes intervene ; but far more oft, by fancy drawn, they coyly wait in some wish'd spot

behind the summit of the neighbouring hill. The hills augment in height as he gets on. His soul is frequent torn and goaded to the quick ; and oft hurl'd desp'rate down from pinnacles of hope ; while venom'd foes and envious competitors rejoice in vollies at his fall.

How many times the rugged, steep, and dangerous ascent, but brings him to the empty spot where gay deceiving pleasure, all inviting, *lately lay*.—By some enchantment of his changeful state, the wish'd possession proves a fruitless husk,—*the outward semblance, only, of a joy* : Or, worse perhaps, the bitter worm, corrupt, hath occupied the space within ; and made TH' EXPECTED BANQUET LOATHSOME EVERY WAY.

Suppose his journey with fair fortune crown'd ; he SICKENS at *his ease*,—flies back for cure and solace to his wanted cares ; and now finds out, *his toil's his greatest pleasure* after all.—His pleasures (when they come,)

are seldom so sublime, so sweet, or half so INNOCENT, as *instinct's infant gambols on the grass.*

A rare exalted few, sublimer pleasures feel.—They wed the sciences,—the arts ;—and soaring high in intellectual realms, scarce feel the common storms of vulgar life.

—But few are they, can breathe *so thin an air*: such flight celestial is *th' exception, not the rule* ——The MILLION's lungs must feed on thicker atmosphere: They're born to drudge below, on sordid Earth.—The mass of men must rest content with vulgar arts, nor feed on arts refin'd: Not all the power of luxury can alter this.——Our theme's THE MILLION,—*not the favor'd few*.—Already have we soar'd a mile above the level mass, and pictur'd roads to happiness which never yet were open to the crowd. Return we, then, to AVERAGE of human lot, for general truth lies there: But this in passing say, that as *mere earthly*

things, the prince, or minion; senator, or sage; may not compare in happiness with *playsome children, or with thoughtless brutes.*

In those fair happy Isles which stud the vast extent of half the drowned Earth, and other savage lands *where food abounds,* we find MAN happiest of his kind. And, BUT his HORRID WARS, and superstitious FEARS, and CRUEL RITES; (ALL FRUITS OF REASON'S GROWTH,) he e'en might vie in happiness with INSTINCT's happiest sons.

To feasted peasants and to *children* turn for *earthly bliss,—the village revel, or the school let loose;—the skipping lamb,—the ape,—the elephant;—nay, any of a thousand living things* with food supplied, except clear reasoning carefraught man devoid of future hope.

Now pause we here, and just conclusion draw from what is manifest.—Instinctive tribes are gaily light of *moral, physical, and intellectual ills.*—The first, they little know:

—The next, a tenth, perhaps, of what *men* feel:—The last *and greatest*—(Reason's flood of particolour'd bitterness) they never taste at all.—Now be it also mark'd, that UNDERSTANDING is not needed for *continuance* of life, since many kinds of brutes outlive the life of man.—It follows then,—**THERE MUST BE FULL SUFFICIENT CAUSE WHY THIS VAST SOURCE OF EARTHLY ILLS IS THUS APPENDED TO THE HUMAN MIND.**

The cause behold is manifest, and welcome makes the woe: For how could moral discipline devoid of knowledge be.—The mind destin'd to act a moral part, must surely taste of various ills,—must surely back, and forward look; and thus drink *daily o'er and o'er*, of all the bitter in the cup.—If LESS might *satisfy* APPOINTED right, yet ALL must needs be drank.—To taste the tree of knowledge and not evil taste with good, were sheer impossible; the thought which fathoms one, embraces, sure,

the other one commix'd. Hence, ever, as we view and wish for future good, we need must see and fear for future ill ; and thus drink pain, as well as pleasure, from the knowledge cup.—But this gives joyous hope of future land, beyond the bitter sea on whose turmoil our bark is toss'd ;—because, from view of dark instinctive tribes we see, we MIGHT HAVE BEEN made tenants of a long and happy life, without a fifth of actual human ills : though none can see that we could hope beyond the brute without some trial fit.

Instinctive tribes we still reserve for view in yet more happy scenes. And thus we then may bring our purpose to a close. *The argument which proves that GOD IS GOOD, proves here as well our hope of future life ; WHILE ONE DOTH HOLD THE OTHER CANNOT FAIL.* For in INSTINCTIVE BLESSINGS wide diffus'd to minds which *cannot thank*, we surely read

his mercy's pledge, HE would not load his *thankful creatures* with unnecessary woe.— In giving to *base* kinds such enviable GOOD WITH IGNORANCE, HE surely had *no need*, and *would not* LIGHT impart to MEN to make them find a dismal way to SIN AND MISERY.

SECTION SECOND.

CONTINUATION AND CONCLUSION OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE MORAL ARGUMENT.

THE gifts of Providence to Earth's instinctive tribes, are measur'd in degrees.—Some kinds are favor'd more, and others less; and all are frail and vulnerable in their earthly coil:—inevitable tax of their organic state. But *all live free UNTAX'D BY REASON'S ILLS*, and that's what *chiefly* makes them blest:—Yet 'tis not *all*.—Their *consti-tutions, ways, and elements*, admit variety

of joys which man's economy forbids. At best he may but poorly ape them; and, for most part, rarely dares attempt.

"Tis true, some brutish kinds appear exceptions to the general state: the snake, the toad, the mole, and various other tribes, enjoy (as seems to us) no enviable lot. But even these may have content we never can appreciate.—Do we not mark, when in luxurious softness *MAN hath slept*, and vacant floats his mind 'twixt sleep and vigilance;—the motley pictur'd swift ethereal current of his *memory* stopt, and light turn'd windmill *fancy*, now becalm'd, moves on no spoke;—*existence bare confess'd, with soothing sense of warmth and indolence*;—**WHAT TRUE CONTENT HE FEELS.**—Pleas'd with the soft enchantment of his powers;—the sweet oblivious slavery of tyrant sleep, stretch'd e'en to waking realms;—this **LESS THAN DREAMER DEPRECATES ALL CHANGE**, and sorely murmurs if necessity goad up to

action, or to *thought*.—Now whisper him that *banquets* wait his rise,—that *beauty* waits.—See if he stir, how well soe'er he *understand* the call. All's one; to down bed doth he cleave, *like LIMPET to the rock*.—Hail'd, hallow'd, be this region of the drowsy blest, beyond confines of moody REASON's rule.—Let no rude vulgar lazy things intrude, unless by stealth. Do we not see, 'tis regal lordly land: the high voluptuous alone are herein free to range, and lose themselves in bliss.—The graceless sons of indigence, much prone to sloth, do oftentimes long to lounge them in these realms; but well we know, such treats are for their betters made.—Now tell us, *Sceptic*, why the sleeping *snake*, the *limpet*, *clam*, and *cockle*, and *a thousand other tribes*, may not dispute the point of this choice happiness with *all the pamper'd of the human kind*?

But truly, some instinctive kinds may well be made less happy than our race;

nor can it matter here, since man must surely be compar'd with HIGHEST, not with lowest brutes.—Do lives of brutes refer to past, or future? Who knows this?—'Tis not our present search to know why goodness is gradual in brutes.

Of tribes already told, comparison doth ample promise yield: But let us now the theme pursue, that thoughtless things are happiest here. The truth once well survey'd, the inference is plain.

Turn we, then, to *feather'd tribes*, where Nature's choicest favors seem to fall.—What *man* hath never wish'd to be a *BIRD*,—to put on wings and soar sublime through boundless ether;—sporting with round Earth, as with a foot-ball.—Sport it surely were, to sail o'er states of princes,—palaces of kings;—and from aloft to see aspiring temples, pyramids, and fleets, (the pride of our earth-pacing master, lordly man) now here, now there, as they were kick'd by wanton birds

from side to side :—A higher game, to see
the tempest's sport,— the billows' wreck :
—the heaving intrails of volcanic Earth with
hideous bellowings burst forth, o'erwhelming
land and sea.—To view the Earthquake
frighting noisy Ocean from his bed, and then
again the coward Sea, in mad and dire re-
venge, regorging all its own and many a
mile of land beside, with all the hapless sons
of man that hour the tenants.—Doubtless
it were sight sublime to witness all this hor-
ror's jubilee of *human woes*; and we ourselves
on high, quite safe,—unruf'd even by the
slightest trembling tip of Fear's misgiving
wing.

Lo the royal eagle, soaring to the sun ;
looking down majestic on the realms of
kings : his breast not troubl'd by the cares
of state, not torn by thwarted love of unjust
power, not ruffl'd even by the virtuous cares
of well rul'd monarchs.—Grand he soars
without annoyance ; sporting all his happy
H H

hours in undisputed reign :—Wants he can have none, for he *commands* when fit.— His thoughts as tranquil as his floating wing, why would he change with CÆSAR, and become the voluntary peaceless victim of *precarious rule* ?

Ye travellers of ardent mind and curious eye, who wander through the Earth's four quarters ;—care and scant supply your sad companions,—toil your weary sport ;—danger and want your oft unwelcome haps for house and plenteous fare :—melancholy wand'rers far from friends and kindred, none to sympathise when ye are sad, or sentiment exchange when wonder urges speech ;—what would ye not give, in many a dismal hour, to share the safe companionable easy wing of emigrating birds, which sail in social fleets from land to land, and cheerful sympathising ever on the way exchange sweet notes of brotherly response ?

Observe the happy CRANES.—When fancy

moves their flight, they change a *clime*, almost in the same while that ye can change a vest, to suit your clam'rous feel from cold to warm. And on the vagrant voyage of their choice, when stronger call of hunger pleads, or daily march is done, they take a leisure telescopic view of a whole realm at once, and mark some favor'd spot: Then, cowering down upon the sweet romantic lake, well stor'd with choicest food and welcome resting place, in pleasure pass the night.—Their swampy citadel, secure without defence, (to foes of perilous access,) is ready fortified by Nature's hand; and in this hospitable fairy caravans'ra nought is wanting to secure their peace.

Those favor'd birds, while daily glutting their insatiate eyes with all the Earth's variety of scene, have not to fear, as men must justly do, the meeting with *their kind*: nor violence nor treachery is found in their fraternity.—Serene on wing, they let the lion

pass :—The deadly serpent, horrible to us, to them's a welcome treat.—They jeer, or pity, hapless *human* victims of inclement skies, to earthly fate fast chain'd: Their wings are magic bridges, never broke by mountain flood; but, at their wills outspread, join distant continents by waters sever'd far.—They make one step from foul to fair degree :—their winter's but as far from summer, as the night from morn,—*the journey of a day.*—In pelisses of down (like all the rest the special gift of Heaven) they warmly sail, and sleep; nor is this all: The SUN himself's their ample wardrobe; and in mere course of flight, they coyly choose how many plies of Solar Ray they will put on, to hold their happy talk, as they sail onward through ethereal realms of sweet and boundless liberty.

Bold, rational, and virtuous SAILOR COOK; and all ye meritorious travellers in virtue's

cause, by sea and land ; how hard, *compar'd*,
your human lot *if ye be not IMMORTAL ?*

Philanthropic HOWARD, matchless son of
Heav'nly Sympathy, did'st thou deserve so
hard a life, and birds so happy made, unless
thou art made happier NOW ?

Little think the favor'd few who plume
themselves on worldly joys, and deem all
made for them, how happy live the birds.
An instance, here, long memory supplies from
milder climes of all-enlivening Ind ; when
night stay'd on the margin of a lake, the tra-
veller from sleep arous'd, in secret saw
hard by his latent crib, the orgies of a group
of vagrant wild birds—(millions strong)—
which later came to revel out the night.—
The scene was witchery ; and fairy land the
place. The moon shone bright,—the wind
blew soft,—the ambush tiger, sated, slept or
silent lay ;—and nought in Nature seem'd to
wake, but happy birds and marvelling man,
and thought of GOD who made them thus.

The orgies had commenc'd,—the feast begun :—The weed, (ambrosial food for duckling epicure) seem'd plenteously supplied, as if by hidden spirits of the deep.—And now the happy clan, much burden'd with their bliss, could scarcely glut their grosser hungry sense, for idle wish, obtrusive, to speak out their extacy in stammering talk.—Incessant was the gabble of their joy ; and envious it would have made our many a hungry office-man, to mark the lengthen'd gust with which they fed.—Nor were the revels bounded here. The restless wanton welcome strife of love rag'd far,—the desultory courtship constant broke the order of the feast ; and happy riot seem'd to reign, amid new peals of gabbling exultation.— Meanwhile Nature, pleas'd, presided at this banquet ~~quiet~~, and lent her cheering aid : For lucid moon-beams, as if smit with soft contagion, smiling kiss'd the trembling bosom of the lake ; and dancing lightly, seem'd

to play enliv'ning measures brisk, in unison with all their joys.

This is no fairy tale, but philosophic truth: The life lives poorly in the sketch; and word, perhaps, could not describe the bliss then felt by MILLIONS of the MEANEST *brutish minds*.—It struck the traveller deep, though harden'd long in slaughter of their race; and such the sanction cast around their now unguarded heads by reason's view of happiness design'd by Heaven, that, shame struck of himself, he let his thunder sleep, repress'd its murd'rous tongue.—The gabblers joy'd, and slept, untouched by chasten'd man; and pass'd *that once scot free by law of sympathy*.

Shall we the *human orgies* here bring in: not fetes of every day, as with these happy birds; indeed but rarely known among our *million class*; among the rich what are they, when they come, but heartache meetings big with pain.—It were indeed a breathless task

to run the catalogue of poisons mix'd in *Human Revels'* pleasure-killing cup.—Had we not better spare the theme.—The few past lisping youth who present pleasure taste, too often find it prove a fever's dream with fatal issue fraught: And, even, when the din of joy is high, if we could count the canker'd hearts and malcontents, against the happy ones, the odds would tell a melancholy tale.—To childhood only it is sterling gold;—to youth 'tis silver, yet not unalloy'd;—to age mature, at best, scarce else than drossy lead, if Reason hold the helm.

Childhood finds some gold in every ore,—childhood blythe, where urchins live *the antipodes* of sad REASON's son's, and farthest off from forethought, as from woe.—'Tis in that happy realm we may dispute of bliss with playsome brutes. Its much lov'd picture never total fades, but lives in latest memory and holds a polar influence o'er the heart.—Behold the veteran at farthest verge

of life, full facing to his earthy goal, turns round, magnetic drawn, and trembling points his unavailing wish to long past infant scenes.

—The Soldier, or the Statesman, after tossing on the stormy sea of life, immers'd in all the little greatness of the world, at length discerns the vanity of human hopes, and casts regretting looks far back to childhood's days; where fond he recognises happiest hours.—

Now would he cling (if fate had not debar'd) his dying hopes to those sweet early scenes.

—The town and all its silly mock he quits, and seeks his *natal spot*,—the scenes first mark'd by pleasures *unalloy'd* and *uncontaminated*: Here conj'ring up in recollection's eye each memorable ploy, each day's adventure that befell him; fain would he cheat his cauk'ring care with shades of buried joys.

—So when the wat'ry-fated ship, long shatter'd on her way, now hapless urges east the trembling prow, into the gloom of her last coming night; while all around, above, the

sky o'ercast with stormy darkness, big with fate, forbids next morning's hope; the pensive seaman, mournful o'er the stern, casts back one soften'd glance at his last parting Sun.—He, sighing, recollects at outset of his voyage its glorious rise, in vast resplendent beauty undefin'd, and all the promises its golden aspect gave. And now, while he would clutch it in his eye, and fix it there; behold, 'tis gone——*and DARKNESS HATH ITS PLACE*:—Hope's earthly luminary, lo, from him is ever fled; and nought remains to contrast with the chaos of his doom, but small faint gilded gleams, lamented lovely, shooting farewell rays from far horizon's parting verge, through the thick curtain of eternal night, to all rays else impervious.—Sweet lamented glittering thornless hour of uncheck'd infancy; thus looks it in the eye of *o'ercast hopeless age*.

On bleak and dreary hills, blown bald by wint'ry North, a *callow STRANGER* first drank

deep, the wild romantic pleasures of a mountain life.—With tender limbs of few years pith, an urchin group stray'd joyous daily forth; and scrambled as they could, till storm-worn summits met them and confess'd their toil.—They mingl'd with the goat-herds, and their goats; sought berries and sweet mountain roots; approach'd the stately eagle's royal burgh, and, in shrill valleryes of their feeble boasts, menac'd the airy monarch on his throne.—In lands so little blest, what sweets do childish minds extract. The nest discover'd, stor'd with curious eggs, or chirping young: The wanton wilings of the spotted trout, from cunning cover view'd: The bold diversity of mountain,—valley,—precipice,—and dell;—each promising a treat to young untravell'd eyes, and paying, at the least, some undefin'd impression of great Nature's way.—Scenes kind for germ of young reflection, whispering to the infant soul the awful thought of CAUSE,

—EFFECT ;—of WISDOM, and of POWER.—
But, now the modest beauties of the scene ; (beauties, sure, in unfastidious childhood's curious eye,)—the starv'd nude hills confess'd, yet decently begirt with belts of verdant fir ; the dales with shrub, and corn, and pasture variously beset ; but, above all in childhood's eye, *the yellow fragrant charms of furze, and broom,* diffusing golden glories over all the waste.—Ye damask roses hide your lovely blush ; for who will give you preference UNSEEN ?—Who ever sigh'd for tints of sweet Circassian bower, WHO NEVER SAW *but hues of Scottish broom?*—Earthly blest is he who's clad in IGNORANCE, the happy magic curtain of the soul ; which, shutting out comparison with good we know not, *magnifies so passing vast the good we know* ; which hiding all the ills that may befall us, sinks our mountain cares to mole-hills, o'ertop'd by an infant's step.

Yet now the active urchins onward press,

and try a doubtful path, the niggard courtesy of rocky chasm; where sidling cautious, close, within its rugged jaw, with vent'rous footsteps (e'en by goatherd fear'd,) they upward gain.—And here they pass the brawling Cataract, demanding superstitious tribute of a stone; which each threw in as he went safely by, impress'd with awe, with wonder, and with din.—Some standing place secur'd, all turn and inward muse; as if by musing they, perchance, might find what language mystic speaks the murmuring stream, as down it plunges, urg'd by fate, into the foamy dark abyss.—Had it but sense,—had the dead fluid but the sense of poor short-witted *man*, our gazers might conceit, it (much mistaken) loud bewail'd *the thought, it ne'er should rise again.*—Here gloomy *Sceptic* thou may'st learn to hope. How couldst thou know, *with no more view* than when the torrent SINKS, that by ALMIGHTY FIAT *it must RISE* when down;

and, mixing with its kind, shall then in concourse blythe behold that glorious light in which it loves to dwell? How could thou dream that, rising hence, it shall meander sweetly through a maze of beanteous scenes; and all the while ITSELF be deep imbued with that glad light which all adore?

Pondering here our silent group,—querying each the narrow council of his thoughts,—Lo, sapient Contemplation, watching such fair pause, now steals into the mind: and here, perhaps, the noble seed of INTELLECTUAL THIRST is first embosom'd in the infant soul. So AUGUST NATURE *gently works.*

—The full grown WISDOM of the sage, (as is his gross corporeal frame,) is first engender'd by some little spec of rudiment, too small for careless sense:—Else is it like the MIGHTY OAK, first prison'd in the acorn spilt upon the plain: Then either forc'd by some kind turn into the deep, rich, vivifying bosom of a mother soil, whence sprouting

high, it towers it o'er the lesser woods, in grand imperial majesty ;—or, *left unnourish'd on the surface, rots.*

Happy you, ye towering Oaks of wisdom early nurs'd :—Planted,—water'd,—foster'd,—rear'd by kindly care to high majestic eminence. How enviably sweet your grateful part, to spread your fostering branches o'er your *Species* far, and pay them shelter in a thousand shapes.—We all have knowledge, full enough, to gather woe. But ye alone can shed down antidotes, and teach us how to gather them.

Here, sated with their gaze, with one accord the boys face round, break silence, and ply up the devious track which leads to alpine heights.—The summit gain'd, how GRAND. How CALM *the bliss* ;—SERENE INEFFABLY :— the visual grasp of objects making gods of men ; or men of children, sure. For in the single bound of one eye glance, seems EARTH and all its greatness

to a little toysome form compress'd.—The soul, expanding by the eye, fills all the concave of imagin'd Heaven:—carrying pigmy Earth, as 'twere in hand; or, trundling it a ball beneath a mortal's foot.—Behold the fertile sunny SOUTH;—the icy NORTH;—the hazy EAST begirt with sea, whence thund'ring Navies which command a world appear in specs scarce seen: though spreading out their huge expansive canvass to the breeze, they make like minute insects wings which hardly catch the eye.—So looks ALL earthly grandeur when the SOUL IS SELF-RAIS'D *high sublime, and measures Earth with HEAVEN.*—And lo the misty WEST; where hills with hills, tumultuous rising, clash: as if by hand OMNIPOTENT the mad rebellious Ocean, heaving high his giant legions 'gainst the cope of Heaven, were with his host fast frozen at a poise,—their snowy sparkling crests arrested in their vaunt; in shapes we've seen them take, as loud the swagger-

ing bullies rac'd each other round the stormy Empire of the Southern Pole.

O favor'd much ; to see all this, *and think of HIM who lets.*—How many sermons live envelop'd in such pithy texts.

Sometimes, as chance, or fancy led the ploy, our playsome wand'rers took the far retir'd lake ; from whose black bosom's depth, 'twas awful told, a Dæmon nightly wander'd forth to prowl, and (*horrid*) oft on Virgins by the moon-light fed.— But in the day, full well they knew, some better spirit rul'd ; which granted youthful merit high rewards.—If memory prove true, and magic mock not, have been seen (grant process fit) both CROWNS and SCEPTRES moving from the surface of the mystic deep, and gracing well the hands and temples of ingenious worth : not in mere phantacy of airy show, but all of real RUSH. And much we question here (*in sober mood*) if older kings have often sat more lightsome 'neath

their GOLDEN loads, than these beneath
their grass.

Various other ploys made up the round of
happiest infant life; which, (then how sweet
soever) here to older ears alike insipid, we
forego.

Ye Learned, patience grant our shatter'd
chronicle of infant sports. 'Tis fit ye know
that we who *praise the dish*, have *tasted it*.
—'Tis truth ye seek. The question here
is, *who is EARTHLY HAPPIEST, of all that
breathe*.—This BLISS, we lowly wean, lies
far beneath you, *smoking* with the savage in
his hut; or *gambolling* with goatherd's chil-
dren on the grass; or *slumbering* with some
drowsy Lord, or *LIMPET*,—*wedded to a
dream*:—Or yet, more like, it *sits embower'd*
in deepest umbrage of the verdant groves;
not silent, seeking LORE, but blythe from
FEATHER'D clarions making all the valleys
echoing ring.—Nay, *peradventure it may dwell
with you*, whose tranquil courts I never trod:

But, for the GENERAL MASS, the *least* with vain *luxurious man*; with *savage more*; yet more with *children*; but the most with *favor'd BRUTES*, lives *smooth-fac'd sweet Content*, lives *joy*, lives *extacy*.—Wherever INSTINCT holds her revels and her rest, far down from calculating REASON's moody realms; or *man*, or *child*, or *brute*, or *savage*, be the wight, his happiness is long and unalloy'd,—his pains but momentary.

Childhood past, suppose we take the broadest base of human joys,—the greatest sum of wholesome pleasure found;—in every clime, in every rank, to every individual, equal good: The greatest we shall find (*when urgent wants are stay'd*) consist in QUAFFING FRESH ELASTIC AIR, with CHANGE OF VARIOUS SCENES; by SWIFT AND EASY EXERCISE made nearly *bliss*.—

Extatic joys but fleeting moments fill; they stand exceptions to our general state: True happiness more properly belongs to appetites

which bear a lengthen'd gust.—Mark how the *horseman flies*,—the *skater glides*,—the *boatmen vie* in swiftness o'er the main:—And, lacking means like these, the *active mountaineer*, on springing sinews hors'd, bounds him delighted on from hill to hill; making sport of danger in his devious dance, his keen romantic sight drinks horrid joy from mists of cataracts, at distance far beneath.

For sweets like these, not only will the money-drudge forsake his golden toil; but fortunes favor'd minions sicken in their ease, and home-stay'd cannot be content.—So great the nat'r al pleasure is, that ag'd and halt, who cannot home forsake, will take some mock content to sit at door and see the distant sports; and thus strain hard to drink a second time, the dregs of pleasure's empty cup.—The storm-worn state is left to steer itself;—the palace empty stands;—e'en sweet domestic lovely woman's charms, and

social bliss, neglected lie,—*for exercise uncouth,—rude fields,—rough seas,—and drear inclement skies.*

The anxious mother's hope, soft petted in effeminate caress, by artful wiles escapes her vigilance ; and, mixing with the ragged swarm of half-fed labour's truant sons, skims gaily o'er the smooth fac'd ice, delighted to the full : nor stops his pleasure till the day be done.—And mark we, here, how *equal* is the gift of *animal delight* in Nature's general feast. The rich *forgets he's rich* :—The poor *ne'er thinks of poor* : but on they fly, and **HAPPIEST IS THE FIRST.**—Though cold and hunger knock at both their nerves, they long may knock in vain ; and, when the day is spent, the **HEIR** slinks home *as little willing, as the HIND.*

From this we gain faint notion of the pleasures felt **BY FINN'D, AND FEATHER'D TRIBES,** —by sportive dolphins,—tranquil sailing kites ; by swallows and by swans,—*as swift*

and easily they glide through yielding elements.—From pole to tropic range the happy fish; the happy birds from tropic back to pole,—as change of season tempts.—Their *roads* are ready made; their *equipage* complete: their *inns* are furnish'd well with food and bed; and PROVIDENCE, (THEIR LIB'RAL HOST,) ne'er calls but to *one final count*.—The rest with them, is *horsing, skating, boating, bounding*;—call it what we will:—In truth, 'tis far before them all; 'tis easy sailing, and embraces recreating *change* of all these various joys.

OUR element and frame forbid such length of joy: our motions are unfit.—Our greatest, *longest* joys are *of this kind*; but yet how tax'd, curtail'd, and partial, when compared.—*Times* must be studied; and the *seasons* too: nor must the *cares* and *duties* of our state neglected lie.—In civilis'd commune, few of the

million may such pleasures taste, without some duty broke, some detriment. Of MANKIND *none* but *children*, *savages*, and *lords*,—like happy birds and fish,—make *pleasure serve for toil*; or, follow up their vagrant sports from morn till night, excluding other cares.

Vain were it here to talk of INTELLECTUAL PLEASURES tasted BY THE MASS.—'Tis true, some men reflect as they fly on; and higher pleasures drink, with grosser, in the chace: but this is not, nor ever can be, true in mass.—The HERD of men in civil, as in savage life, regale them on *the grosser* and *the humbler joys*.—Mark when a City sends its sunday myriads forth: what are the pleasures that these beings feel?—Vague *animal delight*, like that which glads the new uncoupl'd hound:—To them *a nameless cheerfulness* diffus'd through every mind; which all confess, but few can well describe.—If INTELLECT they have, 'tis seldom ask'd to tell

its story here. More oft, 'tis sent to sleep, like brawling child, that joy may not be marr'd ; nor wakes till *Monday's* wants demand anew.—A troop of northern *herring*s new let loose, and wantoning in southern sun-beams warm, takes *pleasure such as this*: nor can we certain say, which side exults with odds ; unless in this, that with the *watery race* 'tis *Sunday* every day.

But, *wholesome heart-some action laid apart*,—what do the MASS OF MEN use most, that sottish Witch to raise which mankind PLEASURE call?—POTATION'S DEEP,—ILL DRUG, —and OPIATE WEED,—and all the vap'ring family of REASON-DROWNING charms, which REASON's self doth charm from chemic depths.

Scarce had Ocean gathered up his mantle, vast, which whole the Earth had earst o'er-spread ;—scarce had the Earth a breathing time, to suck in store of nectar from the

Sun ; when MAN, like some o'er-laden jade impatient of the load, *shook off his galling REASON* and sat up to BREW.—The Scripture tale is simply told, and bears internal witness of its truth : for so do men e'en now, and ever since.—Thus mariners, from shipwreck haply snatch'd, fly straitway to red BACCHUS' *coffers* with a fix'd resolve : nor joy they less to have from REASON scap'd, than now from *fate*.—Cheated of their cares by magic poison, mark their witless gladness in their eyes,—those portals lately guarded by stern thoughts, where moody leader REASON, watching, gravely sat. But REASON (*thanks to Reason*) shipwreck'd like their ship, lies drown'd ; and they are *doubly free*. E'en Hell himself may roar, and Horror look aghast ; they jeer the fun and crack rude jokes with Destiny : shaking bully Danger by the beard ; and teasing growling Fate, as 'twere a terrier's pup, full impotent as mad.—O monstrous freak : but true.

—SO PRESENT SWEET, and yet SO DIREFULL BAD A THING, IT IS *to drown fair REASON in our cups.*

But yet, will man a wholesome warning take?—Oh no.—From sportive scenes cut off,—denied of *brother pleasures* to the BRUTES,—or wearied in his sports;—in house, or ship, or prison, pent;—to *place confin'd*, no matter what the cause;—MAN's greatest care is aye to mar reflection, and in thought to get as near INSTINCTIVE DULLNESS as he can.—Few can resist exhilarating juice; or stop while Reason steers. The MILLION drink to raise a sottish charm, *oblivious* in its hue; *nor feel content till FROM THEMSELVES ESCAP'D.*—FOUR QUARTERS of the EARTH, I call you witness to this truth. Then say which men seek most, or REASON's, or INSTINCTIVE joys?

"Twere well did truth stop here,—did higher mental gifts to nobler pleasures cling,

or *knowledge* prove a bar to baser gusts.—Far other is the truth: for genius hath a deadly *thirst*; and learning is *dry work*, as many a scholar's practice plainly shows.—Nay, Priests ('tis said) are sometimes well content to dim their clearer views of Heaven in *Tuscan Clouds*: and Sages have been known to smile on Folly through a flask.

Great CATO drunk, and staggering in the way, takes all the blush from patriarchal slips.—'Tis HUMAN NATURE'S *slip*: nor PATERIARCH'S, nor CATO'S.

WHO RUNS MAY READ.—The MILLION *throw off Reason when they CAN*:
nor take it up again, but when they MUST.

—Philosophy has nought to bear with what men SAY:—'tis what they DO determines her decree.

What here the inference. Is REASON, then, *not good?*—Is godlike reason not a heavenly gift?—Are we below the brutes?

—Fair Reason hail. Sublimely good

art Thou. Thou teachest us of GOD, and dost point out his way.—In this one gift is all contain'd that highest thought can reach. O boundless, boundless good ; to have a soul (some preparation past) which may eternal feed on rays shot forth from Wisdom, Power, and Mercy infinite.—Who then will say, thou art not good ? 'Tis only manifest, *when side by side with INSTINCT plac'd*, thou art NOT PRESENT SWEET ; Else, of *inductive certainty*, men ne'er would waste their days in glutting on low trash of gross instinctive joys ; full often at dire cost : Nor would they cozen THEE (O act most strange) to treason 'gainst thyself, and cunning arts invent to steal themselves from thy true wholesome rule, to wallow hoggishly in all the brutish joys which, when repentant, *they condemn, forsooth.*

But, now return we to conclude of FEATHER'D TRIBES. What language can describe their happy state in Nature's happier

climes :—their countless *species, numbers, beauties, sports.*—Ye who have trod the tropic regions wide, well know how vain th' attempt to paint the way in which great Nature teams with *feather'd life*,—and *feather'd life with bliss.*

Among the countless kinds, one tribe may here suffice ; not happier aught than other kinds, but ready in our retrospective view ; —the *cooing amorous doves*, enlivening all the plain.—O'er many a sun-beat realm they spread : not congregated cold, and void of soft partic'lar bent ; but leagu'd in wedded pairs, some steps from other pairs detach'd, they occupy all field, and tree, and bush, and cottage top : like other lovers true, who care not for the place, so they in converse meet.—Some thousand pairs may be within the range of one observant eye ; and, covering thus the land, they make the air incessant echo back their three-liv'd cooing tenors, trembling sweet and softly

to a lingering cadence on the ear.—All Nature seems to live in *sound*, as well as *scene*: The numerous intermingling tones of well paid love ne'er cease the liv'long prime of day; but, cheering all around, diffuse contagious joy throughout the soul of *man*, and gently force him into placid thoughts.—

O day of youth, this scene, ineffable, calls up thy buried shade: For in your time the triple happy murmurs of the cooing race did daily add new zest to morning life. "Tis in that morning life that most like you, ye unreflecting birds, we are most gay; and make ourselves false promises of life to come.—

E'en now the phantom memory of your notes calls up (associate link'd) faint momentary ghosts of long departed joys, which when they liv'd were, for the most part, shadows lacking shape and void of permanence.

Though vast advantage lies with brutes, in all their *grosser joys*; a greater vantage yet seems theirs, if measur'd fair.—In man's

mistaken estimate all *brutish happiness* is written **GROSS**. What strange perverseness in our race, *to shut the eye on truth*.—
As MAN doth learn from *frogs* to swim ; from *spiders craft* to weave ; from *ants* and *bees* to build ; E'en so from *many a brute* may he learn *kindness, friendship, peace, and love*.—
—Joys and DUTIES, *noblest, sweetest*, he may learn ; and when, like brutes, he's knit in partnership of virtuous cares and constancy, 'tis then he forms the strongest bulwark 'gainst the woes of life.

Happy wast thou ADAM ; out of EDEN cast, yet blest beneath the curse, possessing EVE ; thy high hope's bane, 'tis true, but through life's future cares how sweet the antidote :—Not partner of thy body and its labours sheer ; but as it were the double of thyself, imparting more than twice an individual's strength to bear the load.—
From Paradise when first thy sight was sicken'd at the view of Earth accrû'd, alone

how hadst thou stood the shock? But casting back a look on Eve whose eye stood ready to drink death from thine, thy manly soul forgot its own distress. To soothe and cherish her engross'd thy thoughts; the noble purpose brac'd the man, and gave a Heroe's strength. *Thy* strength it was; and yet deriv'd from *want of it in her*: such magic force hath lovely woman's weakness, when in virtue rob'd.

Thereafter on the cession of his daily toil, when gloomy doubt hung o'er the work, and dreary prospects paralized her husband's sore-strain'd nerves, the faithful Eve's sweet converse, and sincere embrace, *new made him more than man.*—Well cheated of his cares the Sire of mankind nightly was intoxicate; yet not with juice of deleterious grape, as since his sons have been; but wholesome drunk with pearly intellectual nectar, shot in sun-beams warm from Eve's sweet april eye, as deep she drank th' affec-

tion of her lord. And now, (all woes well drown'd in rich domestic bliss,) the first of human boasters, vaunting, thus exclaim'd.

—“External ills I mind ye not:—Incle-
“ment skies, wild beasts, and sterile Earth,
“and hard earn'd sustenance by matchless
“labour won, I'm equal to ye all.—My
“soul's new brac'd in Eve's caress,—my ar-
“mour in my heart;—and when the morning
“dawns I'll forth and try your odds:—nor
“murmur at my lot, so I, each night, find her
“sweet solace.”—Morning come, I see
him hieing forth, with giant strength; yet
more of soul than NERVE.—And when the
day declines, return'd fatigu'd; *but not cast*
down,—upheld by absent Eve's sweet image
many a mile.

This was salvage of fair EDEN's wreck,—
A taste of joys almost celestial,—still with
human beings sometimes found; and, after
Virtues' self, the sweetest counterpoise of
human woes.—But, in the race of BIRDS 'tis

happiness *of course*;—and *not of rare occurrence*.

FEATHER'D TRIBES farewell.—Among your other joys, in this, the greatest, ye exceed;—the bliss of wedded life.

Turn we now, to TRIBES BY MAN RECLAIM'D;—spite of his rule how happily they live.—The fatt'ning ox fares better, —far more happily in his own way, than the fat man upon the carcase fed.—The brute eats on *content*; untax'd by man's *repletion-pains*,—or *fear of pains*,—or *care of any sort*.—The *human* glutton frequent lives a prey to multifarious ills, of *flesh's*, and of *reason's growth*.

Of other *conquer'd tribes* the vantage, sure, is great.—Observe the well kept SHEEP and KINE:—The various SOCIAL BROODS around the house; those happy families, all made content in sweet domestic life.—The PETTED PRIS'NER BIRDS, who scorn and pine

at liberty, *when got*.—The PAMPER'D DOG and CAT,—oft idols of the human race.—
ALL these do surely FARE *much better*,—CARE *much less*—than A WHOLE PEOPLE *in the HAPPIEST LAND*.—In very ridicule we lord it here: for men are but the servants of these tribes; who, happy, *never know the price we make them pay* for this insidious kindness.

Here our search might stop. But yet ANOTHER WORLD *of living nature's* claims our view, outspread on every land; whose sum of happiness, if here by numbers judg'd, *must vastly far surpass the whole yet nam'd*.—Already have we seen that all which float in yielding elements, and ply their nat'ral-gifted indefatigable oars through various scenes of easy change, are highly blest beyond earth-pacing tribes.—Besides the constant pleasure which appears the bus'ness of their lives, they're safe from galling chafes,

from fractures, falls, and painful contacts, worse than fatal to their frame ; and quite untax'd by various other ills besetting grosser kinds. In equal press of aerial fluid, softer ten times than the kiss of softest down, they float extatic in the genial beam ; and revel through the journey of their lives. — — — Now be it mark'd, that **MYRIAD LEGIONS INFINITE**, *are born to this inheritance* ; and fill all **AIR** and **WATER**, — every *sea* and *lake*, — the *rivers* and the *rills*. — The vast elastic aerial *envelop of EARTH ITSELF* seems but one living **SPHERE OF MINDS**, so thickly set, that millions, joyous, get a lazy ride from every winnowing of a sparrow's wing.

What mighty sums of happiness are here. — — — *In bliss, a mind is but a mind* : — **CONTENT, IS AYE CONTENT.** — Whether by great or little beings found, *delight is, sure, delight*. — — — *In midges, and in whales* ; — *in monkeys, and in men* ; when **GOD vouch-safes to bless them to THEIR FULL, they're**,

EQUAL HAPPY THINGS.—Thinks any man the sage, *sublime*, feels more delight when feasting on a *new found truth*; than broad-fac'd FOLLY, when his *belly's getting full*?—Then why should animalcule be *less pleas'd*, —*less PROUD*,—when plying all the wond'rous tactics of his matchless frame; than gaudy millions of OUR KIND, whose noblest flight aspires to show their tinsel to the gaze.

Here let us stop, and sum the count.—
ONE RULE extends o'er nearly all INSTINCTIVE TRIBES, in every region found.—Their fears are few, and very short:—Pains and diseases fewer still:—Their wants (with few exceptions) well supplied: *And, to sum up the marrow of the whole, their THOUGHTS OF ANY KIND do very rarely on the OWNER PREY.*—Now be it here observ'd that Sages well have said,—and none

deny, —— “WHO IS CONTENT IS
“HAPPY.”

By this certain maxim measur'd it doth fairly seem, that happiness and pain, in men and beasts, exist in inverse rates.—Momen^ts of JOY in man, and PAIN in brutes, are doubtless few: And, while the oft'nest tone of HUMAN LIFE is discontent;—content's the tenor in the life of BRUTES.

Tranquil live the BEASTS, without desert: Blest without one thought of the ALMIGHTY GIVER:—Strangers, entire, to all the tissu'd woes begot on *Human Memory*, by *Human Thought*.—But how lives MAN?— Except he hope in HEAVEN, he's frequent steep'd in all the poisons of his reason's growth: And though he strive to walk in Virtue's ways, and make a down-bed of his honest thoughts; how many a waking hour he heaves the sigh,—looks almost envious on his *vacant dog*,—and utters sad this truth,
—WHO IS CONTENT IS HAPPY.

Had we been, like humbler minds, with INSTINCT, *not with REASON*, gifted, would the Sun have shone less cheering on our eye; or cloth'd the verdant Earth with happier garb, than now it wears to *man*.— Would the elastic air have fainter rang the glad response of animal delight; or INSTINCT gambol'd less amid its joys, than now our REASON doth.— As *merely SENSUAL THINGS*, could not INSTINCTIVE MAN have roam'd, or congregated, like the lively APE, who mimics well this possible condition.— With these playful, social, sensual, happy mortals he, *the human ape*, had found all grosser pleasures of his present state: with liberty,—sweet liberty,—the idol of his rational desire, so rarely found in human states.—**IF MAN, THEN, DIE LIKE THESE**, how happy is their apish lot,— *how high above us must the MONKEY stand in Heaven's regard*;—so choicely favor'd in a

pleasant life, and in a death which never costs a hour's thought.

But hail we joyfully this contrast here. It breathes whole volumes of assurance, *in the preposterous reverse of all that's probable under control of A GOOD GOD.*—Can any one so impious, or stupid be, as to compare the minds of BEASTS with MEN;—their *lives*,—their *thoughts*,—their *possible attainments*;—and then believe that GOD plac'd man by far *the lower* on that scale of merciful design with which he, doubtless, made all living things,—to taste his gifts of bliss?

Then, be we here assur'd;—for great as REASON's office is, it hath *no necessary purpose* to inform an EARTHLY MIND.—In no case is it *needful* but in what bears reference to ABOVE. All other offices by INSTINCT had as well been fill'd.

Does now a doubt remain? Or, in the prime conclusions of the mind's tribunal, are

the *legs* more proper made to *walk*,—
the *hands* to *feel*,—the *eyes* to *see*,—THAN
HUMAN REASON FOR A FUTURE
COUNT?

THE RECREATION.

LO, NOT THOU, O MAN, *art miserable here*.—That dark imaginary, *fabl'd*; *brain-born thing*, mere EARTHLY MAN, 'tis HE alone (imprison'd in the SCEPTIC's world) may envy *brutes*.—THY real great DESIGNED happiness is HOPE, of wholesome Knowledge surely born: and HOPE's the GUIDE to HEAVEN.—The happy road before thee lies, full strait: and with thy GUIDE, this sweetest, truest FRIEND; and all the other various goods (or more, or less,) with which thou, haply, mays't more cheer the way; make up of bliss a sum so VAST, as makes all countervailing ills but higher relish GOOD.

—Then praise and reverence be thy glad return. Cast forth thy view to NATURE's NEVER CEASING ORGIES, and be fill'd with *bliss.*

IMMORTAL SON OF MAN arise, and happy, happy, deep imbu'd with gratitude for thy FAIR HOPE, now gladly join CREATION's HYMN to GOD OMNIPOTENT—CREATOR SELF-EXISTENT.

See our SUN ARISE: His beams awake the grateful EARTH: His far spread living rays inform the eye of man that his ALMIGHTY MAKER LIVES. — His blaze resplendent signals forth Great Nature's jubilee, and all created things are summon'd to the festival of praise.

And lo, our DAY, SERENE INEFFABLY in chastest azure rob'd, with majesty advances fair. High Almoner is he of GOD's transcendant gifts: Bearing, heavenly splendid, in his bosom calm embrac'd, our glorious SUN, he upward grows in sweet cerulean

radiance to meridian heights ; from whence he showers his GREAT CREATOR's mercies thick upon the craving World.—And mark, how at his balmy soft ethereal distant touch all Nature's children wake : *Animate* and *senseless* things all move harmonious at his genial call.—The souls of MEN and BEASTS ;—the mindless HERB and GRASS ;—DEAD EARTH ITSELF,—through him alive, prolific made ; all thrill and yield appropriate glad responses to the life-strings of his golden harp.

Of things with MIND endow'd, now first come forth ye little myriads who live unseen by human eye ; come *every kind*, from those which wanton float in single sun-beams as a free domain, to such as giant-like (compar'd) fill up the eye of wonder-searching microscope : *yourselvess how small, how great your destiny* ; for ye were made to swell the endless choir, ascending from the *animalcule* to the *Seraph* and the *Solar bands*. None are excluded : *praise your happy task ; and joy*

the only tribute here appointed you to pay,
to HIM WHO MADE US ALL.

Next ye various tribes more tangible to
human sense,—ye GROSSER THINGS, by *Instinct led*, which teach observant MAN high
lessons which *yourselves know not*; arise and
put forth all your notes of bliss, in harmony
with *less* and *greater* Powers.—From *Mam-*
moth to the *Ant*, ye all have joys and ways
of utterance; nor is your praise confin'd to
gift of tongues.—Language belongs to *every*
thing that FEELS. By *word*: by *deed*: by
silent mere content, ye may praise GOD.

Now MAN, strange subject of contending
Nature's; Half, by Reason bright illumin'd,
soaring high; and half, the slave of thy
mysterious bare-condition'd frame; stand
forth: here lay aside thy grosser self, and
nobly join a higher strain than ever vibrates
to an *earthly* Theme.—GOD is our song,—
GOD SELF-EXISTENT. Let thy soul
expand to vast conceptions of sublime ideas:

strive to praise to farthest range of human thought ; and, in this strife alone presumptuous, emulate the starry giant Beings of celestial mould,—those who in corporeal purity inhabit SUNS.

But now we rise,—our thoughts ascend ;—we mount from *pigmy Earth* to REALMS DIVINE, to *Powers* more fit and *Tongues* more eloquent ;—collective blaz'ning chorus of *revolving Worlds*.—The HEAVENS proclaim the HOLY SONG ; and all the choristers of starry space tune their melodious ORBS, to praise in one grand unison THEIR ONLY GOD.

What tongue of earth may here describe the mighty blazon of this choir ?—whose HOLY MUSIC NEVER SLEEPS.—Forget not, low adoring man, that to *thy* sense alone it *seems* to pause. While thou, in balmy restorative trance, art at due seasons lost ; and may in *many a* DEATH lose this high cognizance of bliss ; the HEAVENLY CHORUS NEVER

DIES.—Short-sighted as thou art, its least of glories now its *greatest seems*. When ONE fair SUN beams forth the Hymn t'ward thee, no tongue need tell thee that its music reigns: But when its dazzling blaze is curtain'd by the EARTH, thy feeble eye, reliev'd, may deep enraptur'd find the glorious FANES of fiery CHERUBS, INFINITE; whose tongues of praise pervade as well ALL SPACE, as WHOLE ETERNITY.

As countless atoms go to form some mighty whole; so our round huge and ponderous EARTH (with endless millions stor'd of living things) forms but one *willing* point,—one element of *grateful* pulse,—one *praising* atom sole minute,—to vibrate in the boundless burst of MIGHTY, MIGHTY HALLELUJAS.

In the far concave of unbounded space each SOLAR ORB (*itself surpassing vast*) is but a GOLDEN HARP of HEAVEN; breathing doubly, *living music* and *eternal praise*.—

Each SUN wafts forth, to favor'd creature's sense, the triple sounding blest harmonious notes of *life*, of *light*, of *happiness*, through the vast range of its own spheric choir ; and all things quicken'd by its tones are priviledg'd to join their echoing notes, in gratitude : differing, indeed, in *absolute degrees* ; but all made equal worth, by *distance infinite* from **HIS ALL-PERFECT ATTRIBUTES** whose praise they sing.

Lo, all Creation pois'd.—The mighty Hymn begins.—Nature's grand chorus now resounds.—All beings now join praise.— Millions of myriads of Planet-ruling Suns now strike at once, a universal chord to their **ALMIGHTY GOD**.—The peal ineffable, reiterated far, **TEN THOUSAND THOUSAND** fold, speeds on through *Space* and *Time*, and all things made therein. On mighty wings of **CHERUB THOUGHT** (swift Sire of *less swift LIGHT*) the endless Halleluja flies in bursting acclamations; through successive spheres

of peopl'd Worlds, to beings (doubtless) who *beyond all ken of HUMAN thought* join the extatic theme, with added DEEP HOSANNAS TO ALMIGHTY GOD.

But pause ;—adoring, silent, listen here,— presumptuous Wing of feeble human flight : For what avails thy vain attempt to trace the boundless range, or show the fashion, of this offering to the GREAT FIRST CAUSE.— No earth-born thought can ever soar so high : No worldly thing affords fit simile to help our weak conception to so vast a flight.— If we would figure aught sublime of sublunary grandeur for this end, 'twould sink, ineffably, to puerile meanness in our sight : itself however grand.——The dauntless mariner, who from the giddy ship beholds the southern mountain-billows grow, as onward they unfurl their rolling heights, a seeming mile between ;—Or he whose ventures footstep measures the full altitude of that vast nether Heaven, the prodigious

ANDES, and in livening fancy sees the mighty elevation roll, *a moving REALM*;—such man, of life and thought presumptuous, who else hath oft, with calm and curious eye, mark'd the quick shooting of ELECTRIC FATE, as visibly it flew through Heaven, *destroying man and beast*, and towering *tree*, and high rear'd *earthly pile*, such favor'd souls may well indeed think grand those partial views of power infinite. But let them not, in infant sport, compare those *earthly* baby-toys to the celestial waft of HEAVENLY PRAISE;—those living waves, alone fit measures of CREATION'S THANKS, which onward fly from WORLDS to WORLDS, *and never find a terminating shore*.—All likening here is futile, vain;—and unless chasten'd must be impious.—Earthly Creature know thyself; and in mute extacy adore that view thou art not fit to scan.—For thee (much favor'd to discern e'en what thou know'st) if yet ambition spur, fall prostrate low before thy

GOD : Beseech him to empower that thou break through thy prison-house of earth, and burst forth far beyond the present range of human thought ; to contemplate that boundless field of glorious things, which to thy feeble sight already hath vouchsaf'd so high a foretaste.—Humbly supplicate (if humbly may such Heavenly boon be sought) for that estate wherein sweet SOUND shall be thy *grossest SENSE*,—GOD's DAILY PRAISE thy SOUL's *insatiating food*,—and the FAR WORLD of never tiring VISION shall be given to play continual on thy glance, *in all the endless changes of SUBLIME and BEAUTIFUL*.—But now, until thy prayer be heard, bow low for what thou *dost* behold, and for that PRECIOUS HOPE vouchsaf'd thee, thus, by ALL THIS MIGHTY BLAZON OF DIVINE ARRANGEMENTS. Ever feel thou hast *no tongue*,—*no thought*,—*no possible conception*, wherewithal to offer up *fit* praise for HOPE thus given.—The vast be-

nevolence of HIM *who gives it*, stands to thee for *merit*: In his MERCY only thy HOPE lives.—NOUGHT BUT A HUMBLE GRATITUDE *is thine*,—*in value NOTHING* save in MERCY'S EYE; but in this heavenly coin (O ever welcome thought) *the beggar may be rich*.—MAUGRE FORTUNE,—MAUGRE FRAILTY,—*this pure tribute THOU CANST PAY*; and, if GOD look approving on the deed, how enviably rich thy portion with the blest !!!

END OF THE SECOND PART.

of the same "kind" as the one he has just mentioned. This is the point at which the reader may well wonder whether the author is not about to introduce a new concept. But no, he is not. He is simply referring to the fact that the two concepts of "kind" and "type" are not synonymous. In other words, the author is distinguishing between what he calls "kind" and "type". The former refers to the general class or category of things, while the latter refers to the specific characteristics of a particular member of that class or category. In this context, the author is referring to the fact that the two concepts of "kind" and "type" are not synonymous.

The author's distinction between "kind" and "type" is based on the following consideration:

"Kind" is a general term, while "type" is a more specific term. In other words, "kind" refers to a general class or category of things, while "type" refers to a specific member of that class or category.

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PART THIRD.

SECTION FIRST.

OF A DUE ESTIMATE OF THE HAPPINESS, OR
MISERY, OF CIVILISED MAN.

THE serious reader, who deeply feels the important stake he has in the present subject; and therefore desires to investigate it farther, for his own satisfaction; will consider, that the sketch contain'd in the *Second Part* of this *Essay*, does not follow *human evil* into all, nor yet into *all the broadest*, of its departments.—Neither, on the other hand, does it exhibit more of *brute happiness* than a

very few instances, which must here serve to represent all the vast amount of animal enjoyment which enlivens the Earth.—I therefore certainly do not intend the view in question as the MEASURE of either general fact; but only as a body of evidence which (though very deficient) may fully serve to form that broad and philosophical ground of moral hope, which has hitherto been a desideratum against SCEPTICISM, and ATHEISM, and all their attendant evils.

In the earlier part of the Essay I have endeavoured at some length, to point out the erroneous influence of the IMAGINATION upon our views of *animal life*. But, in order to form a just estimate of our subject, it is no less necessary that we guard against this SAME deceiver, the *imagination*, in our views of *human life itself*.—Except it be by rare accident, no man will attempt such a subject as the present, but whose early and long established habits, and associated ideas, are

those of a highly civilised community. But the *most familiar images of life* in the mind of such a man, are far above the AVERAGE of mere *human* happiness : and, though he may easily observe quite enough to make him confess (as so many of the best and most learned men have done) that human life is full of misery, yet, the *conveniencies*, the *comforts*, and the *decorums* of life with which he is surrounded ;—the *moral disposition* of his own mind, and of the minds of his associates ;—the vastly encouraging *hope in Revelation* ;—and perhaps various other considerations, are continually *intruding upon, occupying, and vitiating* his IMAGINATION, so far as regards a true estimate of human happiness, or misery, as it exists generally *throughout the Earth* ; Or, as it would exist IN CIVILISED LIFE itself, had RELIGION never existed.

To form a true estimate of this subject, it is of the utmost importance that we *do not overlook*, that the men whose happiness we

are to weigh, must be men *without hope in futurity*.—If, for instance, we choose to take an *English Peasant* as the representative of the *Species*, we must first divest him of all religious belief: so that whenever, from *labour, vexation, poverty, disease, age, or* aught else, he may be urged to complain; he must have *no refuge*, no solace in the hope that GOD will *HEREAFTER* consider him as a suffering virtuous man.—We are here strictly (*if possible*) to measure the happiness of *man consider'd* as a being who *perishes utterly at death*; and he must have nothing to do with *hope* until *after* the question of his *earthly happiness* is decided.

But when we would seek out *a whole people* to answer this last description, there is no Nation in Europe which can serve our purpose: On the contrary, in every Christian state the condition of the *million* is greatly ameliorated by a very powerful twofold cause. First, by *moral ties*, arising from religious hopes and fears; which (though too

often ineffectual) do certainly operate very widely to *prevent* the commission of *crimes* and to *farther* the operations of *sympathy*. And, Secondly, by *Religious Faith*, which always proves so sweet a balm to men, under troubles when they *do* come.—

When we for a moment reflect on these two causes, it will become manifest, that all Nations influenced by them are *actually vastly happier* than they *ought to be*, to serve as a *fair representation* of OUR SPECIES, in a *general comparison* of the two ORDERS of minds.— Farther, although this must be *so manifest* to our *reason*; yet, as we always *view* the bulk of society in a greater or less degree defended by *moral ties*, and supported, when down, by the consolations of *Religion*, the *IMAGINATION* cannot readily *picture* the *EVILS*, and *DESPONDENCY*, which would prevail among such a people as the *comparison strictly demands*.

If these considerations be attended to,

without looking farther, I believe it will be granted, that any man (whatever be his talents and learning) who shall sit down to the subject in the midst of a people ameliorated and defended by religious persuasion, will find it a matter of *great effort* to hold himself divested of the intrusive pictures of his **IMAGINATION**: And I humbly conceive, it is neither in the moral and tranquil retreats of learning; nor in the bustle of a prosperous *commercial country*; nor even among the much favored *peasantry* of such a country as ENGLAND, that a man can, without much effort, receive a *true natural impression* of the **MEAN of human happiness**.—The poverty of SCOTLAND, and the miseries of the other SISTER COUNTRY, I apprehend, afford pictures much nearer the *average*.

But suppose we *do* take an *English Peasant*, if not as the true, yet as the momentary representative of the *species*; we must neither take the *Peasant of a Pastoral*, nor of a

rural ballad: but must follow the *real character*, through all the *misery*,—the *sordid drudgery*,—the *pinching cold*,—the *searching heat*,—the *toil* and *weariness*;—the *vexation* with his *cattle* and his *master*,—and, in short, all his *plagues* and *cares*.—To be liberal here, we will not include *sickness*, or *hurts*; *poverty*, or *age*; but only tax upon him the *FORETHOUGHT* that thus he must drudge on, *as long as he lives, without any sober hope of bettering his lot.*

Let us now, on the other hand, view the fair side of his condition.—It has been said that the husbandman has a more enlarged mind, than the sedentary mechanic, or manufacturer. But it may not follow that this enlargement (*as such*) adds to his happiness. Nay it may awaken reflections which, *chained as he is to his destiny*, may tend to make him *more miserable*.—He has, however, the great blessing of rude **ANIMAL HEALTH**, and its concomitant, *cheerfulness*; and

upon a morning view of Nature, with the glorious rise of a summer's Sun, he may perhaps be supposed to join his rude carrol upon an *equal footing of happiness* with the LARK above his head; though this *may be* allowing vastly more than the truth.—Perhaps also, during his morning solace, he may dream of some other joys within the *probable compass* of his lot: and this, I think, may be the summit or extent, of what we may call his *enjoyment*.

There are yet two other kinds of pleasure which the Peasant is said to enjoy, in a degree which kings themselves might envy. These are *eating* and *sleeping*.—Now, as to the first, I am ready to confess, that a good appetite with plenty of wholesome *coarse fare*, is a very solid enjoyment, provided the food have a good natural relish. But I would ask here, if the *Peasant* tastes more pleasure while *bolting* his bacon, than his *horse* does while *chewing* his beans. Their respective

feasts are, I believe, nearly equally *short*; and I dare say, equally *sweet*; even taking in all the *thoughts of each party* during the repast.

Let us, then, proceed to consider the luxury of *sleep*.—The sleep of a labouring man may be accounted *sweet*; since, *like the dead*, “he rests from his labour.”—But what is the *fact* in this case? In plain language it seems to be this, that he is so *continually a drudge*, that *oblivion* serves him instead of *positive enjoyment*.—No man will attempt to say that the *stone-like* sleep of a ploughman contains any conscious enjoyment. He neither dreams, nor dozes, but is as senseless as death in one minute after lying down.—The only change produced in him by sleep is, that **NATURE** is *insensibly restored*.—I pretty well know what a gratification it is to be permitted to sink from toil and watching *into oblivion*; and can well appreciate this luxury of the Peasant, which indeed

may be called a Heaven compared with the restlessness, or sickly dreams, of many thousands in higher life. But viewing the *fact* strictly, as we must here do, it is simply evident, that all the *enjoyment* which *any man* has in sound sleep, is the *anticipation* of the moment when it shall BEGIN.—All beyond that *moment* is but *temporary death*.

Having offered these mere hints toward a true estimate of the happiness of the *English Peasant*, I leave the reader to follow them up, and draw his own conclusion upon the whole: Only observing, that *however uninviting* this Peasant's condition may appear; I deem him, under his happy laws, his pure religion, and comparatively happy moral bonds, to be *actually happier* than the *million* over all the rest of EUROPE; and *certainly* happier than mere human Nature would *ever permit* the *million* to be, in any CIVILISED COUNTRY WITHOUT RELIGION.

Monsieur Helvetius says, that if *men* la-

bour but six, or seven hours in the day; and have food, and the society of their wives ; they are nearly as happy as they can be. This remark, when applied only to men in *reclaimed societies*, may be nearly just; and it amounts to this, that in *civilised life* the difference of *ranks*, does not necessarily produce much difference in happiness.— But this maxim will not hold true if we apply it to man at large, including *natural man*; —for a very important consideration, in this larger view, is, as to the NATURE of the employment.—I do not consider the *Ploughman* miserable on account of the *degree*, nor even of the *sordidness*, of his business ; but only on account of its KIND, inasmuch as it is totally void *not only* of what is usually called *pleasure*, but *also* of ENTERPRISE which can, of itself, convert pain into pleasure.— Instead of being *chained to his team* ; and thus tantalised by beholding the various beauties of Nature, among which, however,

he *may not range*; instead of this, if the Ploughman were a *Hunter* in the most desert wilds, and often little better than half fed by his success; his labour would seem but *sport*, and his life would be far happier, —far nobler,—than that of a drudge at a plough, or a cart tail.

As these remarks are intended but as mere hints to caution the inquirer against forming a hasty estimate; let me but add, that I do not imagine any more equality of *happiness* between the *English Ploughman*, (who is here supposed to represent the MASS of *civilised man*,) and the *SAVAGE of the Isles in the PACIFIC OCEAN*; than there is *equality of cheerfulness* between *noon-day* and *twi-light*. And I have already argued, that owing to the operation of *REASON*, in producing *wars, violence, and other evils*; the *happiest SAVAGES* are not absolutely *so happy* as a *commonwealth of APES, or ELEPHANTS*.

Facts are confessedly stubborn things,

and it is a fact which it would be vain to deny, that IMPERFECTION OF MIND very commonly produces *earthly* happiness; while knowledge, or wit, as commonly brings misery; both in the *brute*, and in the *human Order*. Not only is the Hog much less liable to alarm or care, than the sagacious ELEPHANT: but, in the *human species* we know, that persons of the LEAST MIND, usually pass through life with far more cheerfulness, or content, than those of acute minds.

—Nay, it is highly worthy remark, that the NEGRO (who, as a great variety of the *human species*, approaches the BRUTE, both in body and mind, more nearly than any other of the five varieties) is constitutionally and habitually the *cheerfullest of men*.—Those who have seen him, after labouring twelve or fifteen hours in the day solace himself, by dancing several hours longer, to the sound of an empty cask, and that with an exertion of muscle admirably Herculean,—spite of sl-

very,—*s spite of fate*;—those who have marked his lively laughing countenance, and his habitual good humour, *void of forecast*;—will never compare him with the *calculating moody enlightened EUROPEAN*; and then say, that the **PERFECTION** of our **Nature**, as **EARTHLY beings**, leads to happiness.—

If after the evidences which have already appeared of the happiness of *Savages*, in very different Nations, any thing could add strength to our conviction; it is to observe, that a great people, who occupy near a quarter of the Globe, and whose characteristic formation of **CRANIUM** denies that *form* of **BRAIN** which is *required* as the *instrument* of **PROFOUND intellect**; this people, above every great people, *displays the greatest share of constitutional happiness*.

The fact which I am here illustrating, is so broad a one, in **BOTH ORDERS** of **MINDS**, that perhaps the whole aspect of things cannot furnish a more certain conclu-

sion, than that man *without religion*, was *not destined* to find EARTHLY happiness by means of the *perfection of his nature*.

Although it has been repeatedly asserted in the course of the inquiry, yet, as our eye is continually occupied with the picture of *society around us*, I deem it not unnecessary to remind the reader once more, that we are not to overlook, in the comparison of the **TWO ORDERS OF MINDS**, that the truly religious part of mankind are *not included*.— It is all along supposed that *the MAN who trusts in GOD, and HOPES in FUTURITY*, is assuredly *the happiest of all earthly beings*: and I here declare my conviction that he must be so, even though his worldly lot were in other respects truly hard. And, taking the *ordinary run* of life, *the CHRISTIAN*, adding his future hopes to all the other goods of an enlightened community, is, doubtless, *a very enviable being, even upon earth*.

The **CHRISTIAN WORLD**, then, as it stands,

is, in point of fact, admitted to be *far happier* than the **BRUTE WORLD**; and surely, since this is so, we need feel neither jealousy, nor mortification, to have it put highly in evidence, drawn from so many quarters, that the **INSTINCTIVE ORDER** is happier, than those **MEN** who have no sense of a **GOD** as their present and their future hope.—Nay, on the contrary, we must be encouraged, and raised ineffably, to observe here, that *Man* surely becomes happier than *brutes*, by the contemplation of **Heaven**,—AND ONLY BY THE CONTEMPLATION OF **HEAVEN**, including all the amelioration of his *pursuits*, his *manners*, and his *thoughts*, owing to that contemplation.

This high point being securely admitted, the following positions may be claimed with the utmost confidence, as being proved to a far greater extent than we have any need to embrace.

First.—That the *happiness of MAN* (if we

totally exclude the operation of religion) is found by experience NOT TO FLOW *naturally*, (or unless by some mere accident) in the direction of his *intellectual perfection*; since *Savages*, in almost all countries, are actually found to be happier, than those parts of *civilised society* who are but little influenced by religious hope and fear; and since, also, even in *civilised life*, it is an undeniable every day truth, that those who are called *dull easy minds*, (who know little, and *think less*,) usually pass through life *far more happily*, than persons of an improved, or an active intellect.—Such persons, (it is vain to deny) *live longer*,—*laugh oftener*,—*enjoy better health*,—and *oftener profess themselves happy*, than men of the most *noble* and *refined minds*.—No fact, then, is more certain, and few are more broad, than that the *scale of happiness* (*except by aid of religion*) does *not run* with the *scale of PERFECTION*: and this fact, as I have already ob-

served, holds even in the BRUTE, as well as in the *human* ORDER.

Secondly.—That in point of fact, CIVILISED MAN (if we totally exclude the operation of religion) is not, by *a vast distance*, actually in a state of happiness PROPORTIONATE to his *intellectual endowments*, — *when COMPARED* with the *happiness and endowments* of the BRUTE ORDER.

The reader will observe, that this last is a very *retired* position : because the thing that has been had in evidence all along is, that Man (wanting religion) does not possess an *absolute equality* of happiness with many tribes of BRUTES. But an *absolute equality* of happiness, (even if he could claim it) is yet *far short* of a PROPORTIONATE equality, considering the *vast superiority* of MAN's *intellectual endowments*.

Whoever investigates the bearings and magnitudes of all the foregoing considerations, will perceive, that we have, indeed,

after the most sober calculation, abundant ground to spare, over and above what is required for a truly philosophical ground of MORAL ARGUMENT, arising from a comparison of the TWO ORDERS.



SECTION SECOND.

OF THE PROXIMATE DESIGN OF CREATING
MAN, AS AN ORDER CONTRADISTINGUISHED
FROM BRUTES.

AS a separate collateral indication of a future state, cannot in any case be unacceptable, I will here present a speculation, limited to the HUMAN SPECIES *itself*; which I trust may come in with the more effect, after all that has been advanced in the way of evidence. It is an argument somewhat different in its nature from the principal one, to prove that the *grand characteristic*

of MAN, as contradistinguished from the *brute order*, is very certainly *designed to force* him above the *ignoble happiness* of brutes ; which ignoble happiness, it has clearly appeared, he does enjoy to a very considerable extent, *so long as he remains in the lowest state of his INTELLECT.* And that this, his characteristic endowment, does *by its proper essential operation* lead him to discover, and to endeavour to deserve, a *higher happiness in a future state.*

Or, I may state the position thus.—It appears *designed* that Man, by advancing from the *lower* to the *higher* state of his *intellect*, should *not increase*, but rather *diminish*, his happiness ; EXCEPT in that advance he discover *indications of AN HEREAFTER*, and counteract the *certain increased desires, vices, and cares of CIVILISATION*, by the various goods arising from that happy discovery :— BUT, at the same time, it also appears, both from History and the present state of

the World, that the *usual result* of the advancement of any Nation to greatness, is at least *some indication of an HEREAFTER* ;—the exceptions to which result are but *particular instances*.—**THEREFORE**, *it was designed* (and is carried into effect BY THE COURSE OF NATURE ITSELF) that MAN should find a PROPORTIONATE happiness on earth, *by the contemplation of a FUTURE STATE*; and ONLY by the contemplation of a future state.

To establish this position, the reader might perhaps gather full sufficient matter from the evidence already had: But, if not, I shall begin by assuming, that the *proximate DESIGN* of ANY *thing in Nature*, is to be gathered from its known *chief properties*, or *effects*.—BEASTS, in general, were made to walk;—BIRDS to fly;—and FISH to swim.—For whatever ENDS these different classes of animals were created; walking, flying, and swimming, are respectively the *proximate de-*

signs of their being made *what they are*: and whatever results of *happiness*, or of *misery*, accrue from these several *modes of existence*, are surely **DESIGNED** results of those distinctions.

In like manner (though, if possible, with *greater certainty*) we are convinced that the *proximate design* of creating **MAN** was, that he should *exist by the EXERCISE of REASON*.

—*Knowledge, actually gained and exercised*, forms the essential distinction of **Man** from the brute Order: for, as to man's **ACTIONS**, these are nothing but the mere *mechanical effects* of his **KNOWLEDGE**.—It is equally certain that knowledge is *more necessary to man*, than flying to birds, or swimming to fish: because man (having no guiding instinct) would certainly and speedily perish, if totally spoiled of his **REASON**.—But the extent of this truth is *not necessary* to our position, since it is otherwise so very obvi-

ous, that it is by the *exercise of reason* that Man is *to fulfil his earthly destiny*.

But farther, it holds, generally, in the different species of living Nature, both in the *animal* and *vegetable* kingdoms, that they are all subject to greater or less *advancement* toward perfection, according as *accidental* circumstances operate; and we always deem those, of each **SPECIES**, the most perfect to the **DESIGN of creation**, where we find their **CHARACTERISTIC properties completely developed**, or *exercised*.—Agreeably therefore to all the other analogies of Nature, we are to consider **MAN** as most perfect to the *proximate design* of creating him, where he has (*in mass*) attained the greatest advance in *general KNOWLEDGE*, which may for our present purpose be called synonymous with **CIVILISATION**.

Now, as the World is known to have been peopled for at least six, or seven thousand

years ; and as it is more than half that time since the Earth was RECAST, for the express purpose of reforming INTELLECTUAL *Man* ; it would be neither philosophical, nor religious, to suppose that he has never yet answered *the proximate design of his CREAT-OR.* I must therefore suppose that he has, in several instances, attained as much of CIVILISATION and attendant *happiness*, as he *can do without the aid of RELIGION.* And wherever this extent of knowledge has been attained, if we can ascertain the HAPPINESS *it produced* ;—cleared of the influence of *accidental causes*, and totally void of the benefits of a belief in GOD, or a *future state* ; we shall, I think, assuredly find that degree of happiness, which could have been DESIGNED for MAN, if, for the argument's sake, we treat him, here, as designed for *this life only.*

Such a condition, *of any GREAT PEOPLE*, as that required, I have already observed, does

not precisely exist in Europe, or indeed in the World : and perhaps any such never did exist. But, making due allowances, History certainly furnishes us with some guides which will, at least, leaye us in no error of *conclusion.*

Both the GREEKS, and ROMANS, in their proudest days of civilisation and luxury, were, comparatively speaking, but little influenced in their *private characters* and *happiness*, by the hopes of a future state : But doubtless they were influenced in *some degree*; and were thus happier than any Nation *ought* to be, *to serve for our investigation.*—I am, however, content they stand for it; and shall securely leave it to the reader, whether the HAPPINESS of either of these People, *flowed on, and kept pace with, THEIR CIVILISATION.*

It is not my intention to investigate this matter at much length, here, since two or three prominent instances may probably suf-

fice. And fortunately, besides the Nations already named, there is yet another, which perhaps affords us a fairer subject than any upon record.—The JEWS, especially under their celebrated King, SOLOMON, were a flourishing Nation,—in a happy region of the Earth,—and with about as much knowledge and affluence, as seem in our own day to yield the most of happiness *in civilised life*.—Moreover, it is peculiar, *they thought themselves DESIGNED by GOD for earthly happiness, and for no state beyond earthly happiness*.—As a single Nation, and a small one too, they were very liable to *partial causes*: and, as a fear of GOD had much influence over their *moral conduct*, and *earthly hopes*, they were, *by so much, happier* than they ought to have been for our present purpose.—But still they furnish a valuable *guide*, which will lead us *near the truth*: and, luckily, we have a very beautiful, and doubtless a very *true CHART of the*

Jewish happiness of that day, drawn by the hand of this very King SOLOMON, or by the wisest of those about him.—Let us therefore examine this *chart*, and observe how much of *smooth sea*; and how much of rocks, shoals, whirlpools, and quicksands, it contains.

The Book of ECCLESIASTES is assuredly one of the wisest of Books.—It is a chart of HUMAN VANITY; to measure which, every wise man will find a scale and compasses in his own bosom; and he will farther find the Jewish delineation most sadly true; that is to say, if he put FUTURITY totally out of the question, as the Jew who wrote that book certainly did.

Let us here but mark, what is the estimate of life made by the most fortunate of men;—a man who enjoyed all the advantages of a PATRIARCHAL *king*, without the countervailing trammels, and cares, of modern kingship;—who certainly may be

judged happier than the *bulk* of his people ; —and who, by his own confession, so admirably put in practice the INDUCTIVE METHOD, by experimenting all the possible varieties of *Human happiness*.—What then was the result, according to him ?—Why this,

That the first and greatest of all wisdom is *to seek GOD*.—But, after that, the greatest of earthly wisdom is to EAT, DRINK, and be MERRY ;—for which this plain reason is assigned, that whether, or not, “ ALL IS VANITY AND VEXATION OF SPIRIT.” —With the exception of FEASTING and MERRIMENT, he was decided, that *death is better than life*; and all other human employments but a foolish abuse of time.

These prime precepts to EAT and DRINK and be MERRY, have certainly come down to us embalmed in masses of the soundest wisdom ; and, therefore, we may be assured that in the eye of any mere earthly man, they are *themselves the height of wisdom*.

This SUBSTANTIAL HAPPINESS, so cried up, and so repeatedly enjoined, in the book of ECCLESIASTES, (I desire the reader to mark,) is *so truly of the SAME KIND with the INSTINCTIVE ENJOYMENTS of BRUTES,* that the WISDOM of SOLOMON (or of the Jews of his day) is, in its whole tenor and extent, a most high authority for the *comparative happiness of brutes;* which fact I have all along maintained. And certainly, no one need attempt to deny this fact, unless he shall first demolish, or turn to folly, the Jewish wisdom; as well as that of those learned and dignified Christians which have pronounced on the same side.

But my more direct object here is only to show, that mere *earthly knowledge* does not advance man's happiness, after the expansion of his intellect *has once forced him above the unreflecting animal happiness of a SAVAGE.* —And First,—that the JEW, in all his wisdom and glory, was (by his own confes-

sion) not so happy as the *poor ignorant KAMTSCHADALE* is, by *his* own confession: —the reason of which appears to be, that the KAMTSCHADALE (*in the true wisdom of SOLOMON*) *thinks* as *little*;—and *eats*, and *drinks*, and is *glad*, as *much*;—as he can.— AND next,—that neither the ancient GREEKS, nor ROMANS, during their most exalted and luxurious days, were so happy as the present SAVAGES of the Islands in the PACIFIC OCEAN.

A short and decisive illustration of this last truth, may be given in a very few words.—*Modern Englishmen* are filled with disgust and horror at a picture of the manners of those ancient Nations; their *tyranny, bloodshed, proscriptions, multifarious wrongs and barbarities*, and even the *hard-heartedness* of their *social manners*:— And yet, these very same modern Englishmen (fresh from the most *humane* country upon earth) were charmed with the *amiable*

manners,—the *affection, freedom, and HAPPINESS*, which they actually found, *locked up with ignorance*, in the *Oriental Islands*.

To offer any illustration after this, would indeed be a waste of words; and he who cannot now see the fact would hardly be enlightened by any other evidence. I therefore esteem it as amounting to a **LAW OF NATURE** (that is to a general fact, proved by various trials made upon Nations in the course of time) that **MAN** by means of the perfection of his Nature arrives at greater happiness than any other earthly being; BECAUSE, it is the *natural or usual result* of that perfection, to be attended by *the discovery and contemplation of a FUTURE STATE*.— But that, if by *any accident* (such as the rise of a **FALSE PHILOSOPHY**) any great People have their hope in a future state **PREVENTED**, —or **DESTROYED**, — that People will be found *uncharitable* in their nature,—*dissolute* in their morals,—and *desperate* in their distresses.

Let us here state the matter in the briefest terms.

As Man advances from ignorance to knowledge, if he take in the contemplation of an hereafter, he becomes the *better* and *happier* being.

As Man advances from ignorance to knowledge, if he *do not* take in the contemplation of an hereafter, he grows less happy than he was in his savage state.

We sufficiently know the history of a full set of each experiment.—The ancient Jews, Greeks, and Romans, furnish (though *not purely*) the result of CIVILISATION *without hope in futurity*. And Christian Europe now displays the happy result of *civilisation with hope.*

Now if the reader but consider the moral turpitude of those three ancient Nations by the time that Christianity began to operate; And, against this, place the *comparatively* moral conduct, and charitable general dis-

position, which now adorn Christian Europe, crowned by the existing conventions of discordant Sects and Nations to abolish slavery ;—the lustre of this comparison alone must flash upon him a vast conviction.

What, then, are these two sets of experiments upon the progressive happiness of Nations, but a complete demonstration, that *a trust in IMMORTALITY* is the balm, *and the ONLY BALM*, afforded by NATURE, to render man happy *proportionately* with the natural growth and perfection of his intellect?—And how efficient must this cause be IN ITS OWN NATURE, when it already produces such good effects; notwithstanding it is certainly counteracted by *an AUGMENTING RESISTANCE of luxury and vanity*,—by *the leaven of SCEPTICISM*—and of *ATHEISM*,—and by all the evils of false philosophy.

The Atheist has here, in one general Fact, both a distinct proof of a GOD, and an im-

dication of *his own future existence*.—It is vain that he may attempt to say, that the Notion of a GOD, which Notion produces all this happiness, may be *invented by man*, and kept alive, by tradition, through all Nations. The Atheist, in his pretensions *as a philosopher*, must look for *man's designed state* where his *powers* are fully *developed*: and when he finds that it is a LAW OF NATURE, that the development of his powers, by *naturally ENCREASING THE NUMBER of his desires and cares*, makes him *more vicious*, and *MORE miserable*, UNLESS he qualify these with *the supposition of a FUTURE STATE*;—what will he say to such a general result thus *naturally produced*?— Suppose the Notion of futurity but *an Hypothesis*, and never before thought of:—must not the Atheist (*as a philosopher*) admit any supposition that is SYSTEMATICALLY indicated by NATURE HERSELF;—which makes men happy, and WITHOUT WHICH

they grow miserable, as naturally as the trees grow upward.

Here be it observed, I neither overlook, nor wish to undervalue, the various evils which have, in time past, flowed from the abuses and errors of RELIGION.—These however, at the worst, are rather to be laid at the door of REASON, than of *religion*:— And what is more, the *latter* is a good of so *peculiar* a Nature, that under its public evils it always affords an *equivalent in HOPE*. This is demonstrable; for otherwise, the persecuted man would become a *convert*, and so suffer no longer: Nay he would often mend his worldly affairs by the change.— As to the adoption of false religions, and then, upon PRINCIPLE, persecuting those who differ in opinion; what does this amount to, but to show, that so long as men embrace *any religion* that does not accord with THE LAW OF NATURE (that is, which does not inculcate a *pure* UNIVERSAL MORALITY) they

produce *more evil*, and *less good*, than *would arise* from a rational faith?

But what is far more important here, is, that those sad clouds of superstitious tyranny are very generally blown over; and RELIGION is certainly now rapidly spreading happiness over the world.—The humane temper of the times, and more particularly evinced by that feature which I have already mentioned, of the exertions and conventions of different Sects to annihilate the very name of slavery shows that Religion is operating with a true heavenly spirit, and vast extending arms, to render man happier than he ever was: though it is still true, (such in the eye of short-sighted man, is the force of a PRESENT interest, opposed only by a FUTURE one,) that some public wrong exists in the best communities; and even the cloak, and cant, of Religion is often assumed as the guise of abominable private iniquity.

My position does not assert that no er-

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rors, or evils, can come *with* religion : but only that, during progressive civilisation, *no steady augmentation of good* can come *without it*. And, I trust it is put beyond all question that, notwithstanding any partial evils, or errors, in religion, yet the contemplation of a future state is the **ONLY medium** by which man can here attain *proportionate happiness*.

I beg leave to remind the reader that this is a **PHYSICAL argument**, and quite a different thing from the **MORAL one**.—It has no dependence upon whether man is happier than brutes ; Or, whether one man is happier than another ; Nor, upon any supposition of the design of **GOD** for man, as a higher, or lower being, than any other in Creation.—Differently from all these, it is here stated as a **NATURAL LAW**, that **MAN** becomes happy as an earthly being, **ONLY** by supposing an *hereafter*; just as it is a Natural law, that trees grow *only* by aid of *moisture* ;—or, that men

can become strong *only* by taking *fit sustenance*.

I am not aware that any one has run the same comparison, in order to point out this indication of a future state from the *natural progress of the Human Mind*; and there is good reason why it may have escaped notice.—It is very universally agreed, that CIVILISATION encreases the happiness of man: and in the eyes of every one, the fact is so in Christian Europe. But perhaps few men have thought of ANALYSING this happiness, and putting on one side all the good that belongs to the direct, and indirect, operation and influence of religion.— When this shall be done, we shall find what extent of happiness would exist without it; but as the various operations, and influences, of religion form A VERY COMPOUND SUBJECT, I must be content here to leave the result to a guess: quite assured, however, that the inquirer cannot guess on the wrong side.

Here if any man would choose to name OTHER NATIONS, which have existed, or do exist, without any steady contemplation of a future state; I have no doubt of being able to maintain, that the *happiest classes* in such Nations, are made happy by the NARROWNESS, and NOT *by the enlargement*, of their intellect.

After the above digression, in order to exhibit a systematic indication of man's immortality in the LAW OF NATURE *herself*, I now return to conclude the MORAL ARGUMENT drawn from a comparison of the TWO ORDERS.—From this last it has abundantly appeared, that *an ignoble or earthly happiness* never was designed for *Man* in the perfection of his Nature; otherwise there are different ways in which it might, without any breach of general laws, have been bestowed upon him.

Not only is it ascertained, by the re-

searches of Geologists, that the ANIMAL CREATION is ALTERABLE,—NOT UNALTERABLE:—but it is obvious to every one, that without placing *Man* under the INSTINCTIVE CODE,—without taking him out of the RATIONAL SYSTEM,—there are many thousands of his Species so happily constituted that *without any merit, or exertion, on their part*, they float on, cheerfully, or content, through life; and neither *suffer*, nor *inflict*, any great misery.—Therefore, surely, ALL MEN *might have been* thus evenly constituted, had it been *fit*.

But, as a MORAL *being*, TRIAL is *fit* for Man; PREPARATORY for a higher state: And therefore, whenever he would seek his happiness by the natural improvement of his intellect, IF HE DO NOT take in the notion of an HEREAFTER, and make that his grand object, he must find himself *humbled*, and *mortified*, in his DISAPPOINTMENT; and when he looks philosophically back, upon

the condition he started from, he finds out his ERROR in supposing, that the *noble gift of Reason* was given him for *no higher purpose* than an *earthly* happiness.

On the other hand, when a view of HERE-AFTER arises ; it may so increase in steadiness, and magnitude, as can swallow up all ordinary, and extraordinary earthly ills ; and make us rejoice that we were created MAN.—Nay it may do more, much more ; for were the indications of a future state once established, so as to satisfy the PHILOSOPHICAL *World*, the opinions of all lower classes would gradually be *included*, and *fixed* ; because either directly, or circuitously, the opinions of scientific men assuredly find their way into, and biass, the thoughts of *all ranks in life*.—It is a melancholy fact (such is the *contagious nature* of opinion) that a single sneer from a man who is *thought to be profound*, may not only put belief to the blush ; but for ever unhinge the

principles, and destroy the happiness, of a whole company of inexperienced auditors. But, were **SCEPTICAL** poison once neutralised by the general consent of the learned, every man, high and low, would for his own sake apply himself to deserve happiness, in a state which he would then **BE CERTAIN** awaits him ; and, in this way would arise the greatest possible *diminution* of moral and *intellectual evil* ; and *encrease of sublunary good*.

In taking leave of the subject, I trust it may now be claimed with the fullest confidence,

FIRST,—That the proved amount of **ANIMAL** *happiness* diffused over the Earth, is a vast manifestation of **GOODNESS** ; which attribute, we find, is often disputed upon a view of the *Human Species only*, and without *proving which*, no moral argument can exist.

SECONDLY,—That the result of the

comparison of the TWO ORDERS, is a moral indication *far beyond* the objections drawn from GENERAL LAWS; and therefore, of vastly greater extent, or philosophical value, than can be furnished by *any view of the Human Species.*

Now, to show this, was the object of the undertaking.

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